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Preface
The last decades have been marked by an increase in inequality across many dimen-
sions. On the one hand, interpersonal inequality has increased significantly in the de-
veloped world (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011). On the other hand, there has been a
growing divide between prosperous and lagging regions (Ehrlich and Overman, 2020).
This development is not only worrisome from an economic perspective, but has also led
to political political backlash (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018). This thesis will investigate both
potential causes of and remedies for the increase in inequality. It consists of four chap-
ters, each of which can be read independently. The first chapter investigates both the ef-
ficiency and equity effects of a place-based policy, a common tool used by governments
to reduce regional inequality. The second chapter analyzes the influence of political
partisanship on tax competition and labor mobility, two important factors contributing
to the rise in income inequality. The third chapter evaluates the effect of fiscal rules on
distributional policies such as progressive income taxation. The fourth chapter studies
the effect of disclosure laws on politicians’ outside incomes, which have been discussed
controversially in debates on earnings inequality. In the following, I will summarize
and discuss each of the four chapters in more detail.
Chapter 1, which is joint work with Tobias Etzel and Sebastian Siegloch, evaluates a
potential tool to combat the increase in regional disparities. We analyze the efficiency
and equity effects of a prominent German place-based policy. After re-unification, the
policy, which was mainly targeted at manufacturing firms in East Germany, subsidized
up to 50% of the costs of investment projects. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation
in regional subsidy rates and administrative employer-employee data, we estimate the
causal direct policy effects, finding that a one-percentage-point decrease in the subsidy
rate leads to a 1% decrease in manufacturing employment in the long run. Second, we
test for various important spillover effects. While we do not find significant regional
spillovers within commuting zones, we demonstrate significant local demand effects,
as the untreated construction and retail sectors are also negatively affected by subsidy
cuts. Furthermore, far-away regions that are connected with the treated regions via
trade also experience a negative effect on manufacturing employment. We also show
that local policy makers react to subsidy cuts by increasing the local business and prop-
erty tax. Last, we derive the efficiency and equity implications of the policy. We find
that the place-based policy is slightly more efficient than place-blind policies such as
unemployment insurance or cash transfers by calculating the marginal value of public
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funds. In addition, it is significantly more effective in reducing regional inequality. We
show that the efficiency and equity effects of the policy are less beneficial when ignoring
spillover effects.
One potential policy tool to reduce interpersonal inequality has traditionally been
progressive income taxation. Due to the rise of globalization, the mobility of high-
income individuals across borders has increased substantially (Kleven et al., 2020). This
puts pressure on governments to lower the progressivity of their income tax schedules.
A central tenet of classical optimal taxation models is that mobile individuals react to
tax differentials through migration, and in turn immobile individuals vote for lower
taxes (Simula and Trannoy, 2010). In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Dirk En-
gelmann, Eckhard Janeba and Lydia Mechtenberg, we investigate to which extent this
argument is complete. In particular, political ideology may influence voting on taxes.
We vary mobility and foreign taxes in a survey experiment within the German Internet
Panel. We find that while the treatment effects qualitatively confirm model predictions
how voters take mobility of high-income earners into account when choosing domes-
tic taxes, ideology matters: left-leaning high-income individuals choose higher taxes
and emigrate less frequently than right-leaning ones. These findings are in line with
the comparative-static predictions of a simple model of inequality aversion when the
aversion parameters vary with ideology.
Besides tax competition, austerity policies have increasingly been pointed out as a
reason for lower levels of income tax progressivity. Especially in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, the potential harms of austerity for the poor have been hotly debated.
While the efficiency aspects of austerity have been widely investigated in the literature,
there is very little casual evidence on its distributional impact (Alesina, Favero, and
Giavazzi, 2018). In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Matteo Alpino, Zareh Asatryan
and Sebastian Blesse, we use the autonomy of Italian municipalities in setting non-linear
income tax rates and the exogenous introduction of a fiscal rule to analyze the effect
of austerity on distributional policies. We show that the mandated austerity actually
increases local income tax progressivity. Consistent with this municipal evidence, we
find in a panel of countries that austerity correlates with higher marginal tax rates on
top earners, but not on average earners. We neither find evidence for reductions in
total spending nor in redistributive spending. The increase in progressivity in Italian
municipalities is driven by mayors having a college-degree or working in high-skill
occupations, while less-educated or lower-skill mayors raise taxes uniformly. In the first
post-reform election, mayors that increased progressivity have higher reelection odds.
This suggests that politicians trying to ease the potential distributional implications of
austerity are rewarded at the ballot box.
When economic disparities increase, the public can become increasingly sensitive to
potential conflicts of interest of politicians. If voters perceive a politician to act in their
own interest and not in the interest of the public, they have the option to vote the politi-
cian out of office. This democratic mechanism is similar to the political incentives dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, but a necessary precondition for its functioning is the availability
of high-quality information to voters. Only an informed public can provide incentives
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for politicians to act in their best interest. Chapter 4 of this thesis, which is joint work
with Carina Neisser, explores the consequences of providing more information about
the outside activities and incomes of politicians to voters and the reaction of politicians
to these changed incentives. In Germany, the outside earnings of members of parlia-
ment were not observable to voters up to 2007. Starting in July 2007, German federal
members of parliament were forced by law to publish their earnings in a bracket system
top-coded at 7,000e. In 2013, more brackets were introduced, such that only earnings
above 250,000e were censored, which greatly increased the information available to
voters. We exploit both reforms to identify the causal effects of public disclosure rules
on politicians’ outside earnings using administrative tax return data. This allows us
to observe politician’s pre-reform income as well as enables us to use unaffected mem-
bers of state parliaments as a control group in a difference-in-difference setup. Our
results indicate that the top-censored nature of the reporting scheme of the first reform
had the consequence of raising outside earnings, while the second reform provides ev-
idence that a higher degree of public disclosure leads to a decrease in outside earnings.
To identify potential mechanisms behind our findings, we collected the published in-
formation on earnings and activities along with political and electoral variables. We
provide evidence that electoral accountability mediates the effect of public disclosure.
In summary, this thesis underlines that one has to be careful when trying to un-
derstand the causes and remedies of inequality. Place-based policies have long been
dismissed as being second-best when compared to people-based policies (Glaeser and
Gottlieb, 2008; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Chapter 1 shows that, when accounting for
spillover effects, place-based policies can be at least as efficient as people-based policies.
This makes them a viable policy option if one is concerned with the rise in regional in-
equality. The mobility of high-income individuals has been understood to put pressure
on the progressivity of income taxation (Mirrlees, 1971; Simula and Trannoy, 2010). In
Chapter 2, we show that this argument is not complete when one ignores the political
preferences of voters. If a sufficient number of voters has inequality-averse preferences,
we observe less migration of the rich and a higher level of taxation than predicted by
the textbook argument. Austerity has largely been seen as hurting the poor dispropor-
tionately, especially in the public debate (Blyth, 2013; Mendoza, 2014; Varoufakis, 2016).
In Chapter 3, we demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case using the example of a
fiscal rule for Italian municipalities. The combination of a multitude of policy options,
including progressive income taxation, and strong reelection motives for local politi-
cians lead to more redistributive policies. Last, the introduction of public disclosure
rules for politicians was intended to provide voters with the necessary information to
potentially pressure politicians to change their behavior. Chapter 4 shows that the ef-
fects of income disclosure laws crucially depend on their exact implementation. If the
disclosed information lacks precision, such that voters cannot identify top earners, pub-
lic income disclosure can increase outside earnings and thereby might increase the risk
of conflicts of interest. Only when the disclosed information is sufficiently precise, we
observe a decline in outside earnings.
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Each chapter of this thesis shows that the question asked is more complicated than
one expects at first glance. It is of first-order importance to consider unintended con-
sequences, spillover effects and political economy considerations and neglecting these
issues can lead to mistaken policy conclusions.
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Chapter 1
Direct, Spillover and Welfare Effects of
Regional Firm Subsidies
Joint with Tobias Etzel and Sebastian Siegloch.
1.1 Introduction
In many countries and federations, place-based policies are a means to support regions
that are economically lagging behind (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008). The European Union
spent more than e350 billion – about a third of its budget – on regional policies during
the funding period from 2014 to 2020 (Ehrlich and Overman, 2020). The U.S. currently
devotes about $60 billion to place-based policies (Bartik, 2020; Slattery and Zidar, 2020)
– mostly through business tax incentives. A recent wave of papers has demonstrated
that place-based policies unfold positive economic effects on targeted regions (see Du-
ranton and Venables, 2018; Kline and Moretti, 2014b; Neumark and Simpson, 2015, for
further summaries of the literature). However, it is well-known that the overall welfare
effects of place-based policies also depend on the indirect policy effects that go beyond
direct effects on treated workers and firms in subsidized regions (Austin, Glaeser, and
Summers, 2018). We refer to these indirect effects as spillovers throughout the chapter.
Spillovers may take various forms and signs. Positive agglomeration effects in sub-
sidized places might induce relocation effects and negative agglomeration in unsub-
sidized places (Kline and Moretti, 2014a). There might also be relocation of factors
between treated and untreated sectors in subsidized places, shaping local multiplier
effects (Moretti, 2010). An increasing concentration of educated workers may unfold
positive human capital spillovers (Diamond, 2016; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008). Lo-
cal subsidies might be capitalized into housing prices leaving real wages unchanged
(Austin, Glaeser, and Summers, 2018; Busso, Gregory, and Kline, 2013). Local subsi-
dies might also have intra-regional spillovers via trade flows (Blouri and Ehrlich, 2020).
Local policymakers might respond to the (foregone) subsidies by adjusting local pol-
icy instruments (Ehrlich and Seidel, 2018). Finally, a successful local subsidy should
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have fiscal externalities on federal-level tax bases and social insurance systems (Austin,
Glaeser, and Summers, 2018). Most of the literature has discussed the welfare effects of
place-based policies using structural spatial equilibrium models and putting a special
emphasis on agglomeration spillovers (Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020; Gaubert, 2018;
Gaubert, Kline, and Yagan, 2021; Kline, 2010; Kline and Moretti, 2014a).
In this chapter, we take a different perspective on spillover effects of place-based policies
and their welfare implications. We provide cleanly identified reduced-form estimates
of the direct and indirect effects of a prominent German place-based policy subsidizing
investments of firms in distressed East German regions post reunification. In partic-
ular, we investigate a host of potential spillovers on other neighboring and far-away
regions, untreated sectors, local housing markets and local policy instruments. We then
use the reduced-form evidence and calculate the efficiency costs of the policy using the
recently proposed measure of the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) (Finkelstein
and Hendren, 2020; Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020), which provides an intuitive,
yet comprehensive way to translate reduced-form behavioral effects into a welfare met-
ric that accounts for additional fiscal spillovers on other sources of government budget
such as the personal income tax or unemployment insurance. The MVPF framework
benchmarks the welfare effects of a policy by comparing to other policies, which can
be taken from the literature, such as place-blind cash transfers, or the same place-based
policy ignoring spillovers. In a last step, we simulate the effects of the place-based pol-
icy on regional inequality for given efficiency cost and compare the distributional effects
to related place-blind policies.
We study the case of the most prominent German place-based policy called GRW.1 The
GRW constitutes Germany’s main regional policy scheme for underdeveloped regions
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1997). While not exclusively targeted at East Germany, the over-
whelming share of the subsidies went to the formerly socialist part of the country after
reunification and it was the main regional subsidy to revitalize the East German econ-
omy after reunification. The GRW’s main instrument are investment subsidies for man-
ufacturing firms in eligible regions. These subsidies can be used for purchasing new
machines or building new production sites. The explicit goal of the policy – and a crite-
rion to qualify – is to boost investment, and thereby creating new jobs and stimulating
regional growth.
We combine official data on the universe of subsidy cases with administrative social
security data on firms and workers to estimate the reduce-form effects of the policy,
differentiating between the direct policy effects and various spillover effects across re-
gions, sectors and to other local policies. Our identifying variation comes from multi-
ple reforms of the maximum subsidy rate of investment cost between 1997 and 2014.
These reforms changed subsidy rates differentially across East German counties based
on pre-determined economic performance. For each new policy regime, the measure of
economic development is based on past performance measures, which are determined
1 The German name of the policy is Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur –
throughout the chapter, we will refer to it using the official German acronym GRW.
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at a higher regional level. Hence, the measure is difficult to manipulate for counties and
we provide evidence that selection into treatment does not seem to be a concern. Ex-
plicitly, we compare counties that are below the threshold yielding a higher subsidy rate
to counties that are above. In other words, we zoom in on counties that are relatively
similar in terms of income, employment dynamics and infrastructure amenities prior
to treatment. Eligibility thresholds change across budgeting periods and these changes
are partly triggered by EU legislation, which is exogenous to economic developments
in East Germany.
We make use of the Establishment History Panel, an administrative plant-level data set,
provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Em-
ployment Agency. For the years 1996-2017, we have access to a fifty percent random
sample of plants in East Germany. The data cover the annual number of employees at
the plant level as well as the county in which it is located. In addition, we rely on admin-
istrative data on individual wages included in the Sample of Integrated Labour Market
Biographies (SIAB) – a representative two percent sample of German employees subject
to social security contributions from 1996 to 2014. Official subsidy data from 1996 to
2016 is provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. We have obtained the
universe of GRW subsidy cases, including the county, investment volume and amount
in subsidies paid. In addition, we gathered regional data to replicate the indicators de-
termining treatment status across all budgeting periods. The main outcome of interest
in our study is the effect of GRW subsidies on regional employment. Econometrically,
we make use of event study designs to pin down the policy effects. However, we do
not restrict our analysis to the overall effect of the policy on the treated regions, but
also study the underlying mechanisms and spillovers. Explicitly, we analyze (i) intra-
county sectoral spillovers by looking at non-treated industries in treated regions, (ii)
cross-county regional spillovers by studying the effect on untreated counties within the
same local labor market, (iii) trade spillover by looking at counties with significant trade
exposure to the treatment counties, and (iv) policy spillovers by looking at the policy
effect on local tax rates. We then use our reduced form estimates to infer the welfare ef-
fects of the policy. More specifically, we make use of the novel framework proposed by
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) and Finkelstein and Hendren (2020) to calculate the
marginal value of public fund (MVPF) – that is the “bang for the buck” – of the policy.
The MVPF explicitly takes into account fiscal spillovers on other tax bases and social in-
surance programs (Austin, Glaeser, and Summers, 2018). Last, we simulate the policy’s
capacity to affect regional inequality and compare it to other place-blind transfers for
given MVPF.
We derive the following three direct results for a one-percentage-point decrease of the
subsidy rate in the treated manufacturing sector. First, subsidized investment decreases
by 14.6% and total (i.e. subsidized plus unsubsidized) investment decreases by 6.7%.
Second, in the long-run manufacturing employment decreases by 1%. We do not find
asymmetric effects of subsidy cuts and increases. Third, wages are largely unaffected.
In terms of spillover effects, we derive the following results. First, a one percentage-
point-decrease of the subsidy rate for the manufacturing sector leads to a 0.26% and
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0.47% employment reduction in the untreated retail and construction sector, respec-
tively. Second, there is no evidence for positive or negative spillovers of a county-level
shock within the local labor market. Third, we find evidence for negative manufac-
turing employment responses of counties that have a higher trade exposure to treated
counties. Fourth, we demonstrate important negative policy spillovers: a decrease in
the subsidy leads to a long-run increase in local business and property tax rates, which
can be rationalized with a fixed expenditure requirements of municipalities and a de-
creasing tax base.
Last, in terms of welfare implications, we derive the following three results. First, we
calculate a marginal value of public funds of 0.96, which is higher than the estimates
of the MVPF of unemployment insurance and cash transfers, which target a similar
set of beneficiaries (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020). Second, a simple back-of-the-
envelope calculation shows that the cost per job were about 24,000e. Importantly, we
show that both the cost per job and the marginal value of public funds are substantially
downward-biased if one does not account for spillovers. Third, given the similarity
in terms of the MVPF, we show in a simulation exercise that place-based policies are
more effective in reducing regional inequality for given efficiency costs compared to
cash transfers since place-based policies as more regionally targeted.
We contribute to the existing and recently growing literature on place-based policies in
several ways. First, we provide novel evidence on the direct, reduced-form effects of an
important place-based policy. Our findings reinforce recent findings that place-based
policies work – in the sense that they have a positive and long-lasting effect on the lo-
cal economy. Kline and Moretti (2014a) show that the Tennessee Valley Authority, the
most prominent regional subsidy program in U.S. history had a positive effect on manu-
facturing employment that lasted even beyond the program end due to agglomeration
forces. Looking at Chinese cities, Alder, Shao, and Zilibotti (2016) show that special
employment zones have a strong positive effect on GDP mainly driven by an increase
in capital accumulation. A series of papers investigating the effects of the EU Struc-
tural Funds (ESF), a regional subsidy paid by the European Union, show that the ESF
increase GDP in the subsidized regions, but had no clear effect on employment (Becker,
Egger, and Ehrlich, 2010, 2012, 2013). Criscuolo et al. (2019) analyze an industrial pol-
icy in the UK, which is similar to the GRW, and find employment effects that are quite
comparable to our effects qualitatively and quantitatively. For Germany, Ehrlich and
Seidel (2018) investigate a different place-based subsidy paid to West German regions
close the Iron Curtain from the 1970s to until reunification and find positive treatment
effects. In terms of the GRW, Brachert, Dettmann, and Titze (2019) find no significant
treatment effects, looking at West (instead of East) German regions, using different data
and a different identification strategy. Our findings of a positive (negative) employment
effect of a subsidy increase (decrease) is in line with descriptive, more policy-oriented
papers in Germany (Bade, 2012; Bade and Alm, 2010). Analyzing the direct effect of lo-
cal subsidies is naturally related to work looking at the effect of state and local taxes on
workers and firms (see, e.g. Fajgenbaum et al., 2019; Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch, 2018;
Slattery and Zidar, 2020; Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016).
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Second, we systematically investigate indirect spillover effects of place-based policies
by providing cleanly identified reduced-form estimates. While various empirical stud-
ies have looked at single spill-overs, this is – to the best of our knowledge – the first
comprehensive analysis looking at various relevant spillovers discussed in the theoret-
ical literature. In line with Criscuolo et al. (2019), we find no evidence of positive or
negative regional spillovers on neighboring counties. However, we demonstrate im-
portant local demand effects as the untreated retail sector and construction sector are
negatively affected by decreases in regional subsidies to manufacturing firms. We also
point to trade spillover which have not been investigated in the literature before. In con-
trast to Moretti (2010), our local multiplier effects are somewhat smaller, which might
be explained by the fact that subsidies are not targeted at high-tech, high-skill firms, but
rather classic manufacturing firms. Last, we find important policy spillovers that have
not received much attention so far. We show that local tax rates increase as a result of
decreasing subsidies, which adds an additional burden on local firms. This finding is
in line with a result by Ehrlich and Seidel (2018) who look at a different German place-
based policy and show that the regional subsidy leads to higher local public investment
levels. Our results suggest that a decrease in the GRW erodes firm profits and thus the
local tax base, yielding higher local tax rates to finance the largely pre-committed local
expenditures.
Third, we add to the current debate on the welfare effects of (place-based) policies. We
make use of the novel framework recently put forward by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser
(2020) and Finkelstein and Hendren (2020) that enables us to transform our reduced-
from quasi-experimental estimates into a welfare statement. We evaluate one of the
first policies targeted at firms within this framework. Our approach is an alternative
to important structural approaches that have seen a recent surge in the literature (Fa-
jgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020; Gaubert, 2018; Gaubert, Kline, and Yagan, 2021; Rossi-
Hansberg, Sarte, and Schwartzman, 2019). Clearly and as established in other contexts,
both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. While the structural ap-
proach allows to estimate policy counterfactuals and is capable to capture general equi-
librium effects of non-marginal policy changes, the MVPF framework – similar to the
sufficient statistics approach – allows for a more immediate mapping between clean
quasi-experimental evidence and welfare implications (see Chetty, 2009; Kleven, 2021).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We explain the institutional set-
ting in Section 1.2, followed by Section 1.3 on the research design. Section 1.4 presents
the data. Our empirical results are presented in Section 1.5. In Section 1.6, we discuss
the welfare and inequality implications of the policy. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The GRW Policy
In this chapter, we study the main German regional economic policy, called “Gemein-
schaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur” (GRW). The GRW is
jointly coordinated and financed by the federal government and the individual states.
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The explicit goal of the policy is to equalize standards of living across German regions
by stimulating local business activity. Equivalent living standards across space is an
important principle and policy goal in Germany, which is explicitly mentioned in the
constitution. The GRW is the main federal program to achieve this goal.
The policy was implemented in 1969 and subsidized West German underdeveloped
regions throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In this study, we focus on the post-reunification
effect of the GRW until 2017. After reunification, the majority of GRW funds were di-
rected to East German regions, which were considerably less industrialized than their
West German counterparts. As such, the GRW was seen as one of the main instruments
aiming at re-industrializing East Germany and bringing it to Western levels.2
While the GRW consists of a bundle of different instruments, we focus on invest-
ment subsidies paid out to plants – the central instrument accounting for 74% of the
total GRW budget in our sample period.3 These subsidies covered up to 50% of the
costs of a specific investment project filed by a plant. The subsidy rate varied across
counties depending on the regional economic development, making the GRW a place-
based policies (see Section 1.2.2 for more details). From 1991 to 2016, on average e1.8
billion of subsidies (in 2010 e) were paid out annually to East German firms.4
1.2.1 Eligibility
In order to receive the subsidy, plants need to file an application for approval with their
respective state government. In the application, they need to clearly define the invest-
ments project to be subsidized. Typical projects comprise the acquisition of machinery,
the construction or modernization of buildings, but also licenses and patents. Labor
costs can only be subsidized if employees can be directly linked to the corresponding
investment project.
Eligibility of a project is determined by three criteria. First, the project has to be rel-
atively large. Either annual investment costs have to exceed the average amount of the
plant’s capital consumption (economic depreciation) in the preceding three years by at
least 50% (criterion 1a), or the project has to increase the number of regular employees
2 Other policy measures targeted at plants in Eastern Germany included a capital investment bonus pro-
gram (Investitionszulage), a non-discretionary capital subsidy targeted at entire Eastern Germany, and
loans provided by KfW and the European Recovery Program. Our empirical strategy outlined below
makes sure that we isolate the effect of the GRW. Another class of programs directed funds to municipal-
ities rather than to plants. We check that the reforms exploited for identification did not affect funds paid
to municipalities.
3 The other important instrument are infrastructure subsidies to municipalities, which were granted in-
dependently of the investment subsidies. Importantly, the maximum infrastructure subsidy rates do not
exhibit variation across space.
4 These numbers include co-payments by the European Union via the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF). Whether subsidies were paid for by the ERDF or GRW is irrelevant for the purpose of our
analysis since in Germany, ERDF funds simply increase states’ subsidy budgets. Restrictions on subsidy
usage, such as sectoral restrictions and maximum assistance rates are thus identical for ERDF and GRW
funds.
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by at least 15% (criterion 1b). New plant opening qualify under criterion 1b. Second,
the project has to be limited in time. The maximum duration of the project is three years
(criterion 2). Third, the subsidies are intended for exporting firms. At least half of the
plants’ revenues have to be made outside of the county (criterion 3). The rationale be-
hind criterion 3 as revealed by the policy discussion in the 1960s is that export-oriented
firms are supposed to generate additional income within a county, which, in turn, is
supposed to stimulate local demand. Due to criterion 3, 74% of the GRW funds go to
manufacturing firms. In Appendix Table 1.B.6, we shows an official list of sectors that
automatically qualified for the subsidy according to Criterion 3 without the need to pro-
vide further evidence. Notice that certain industries were excluded from the subsidies.
These include the construction and retail sector which we will investigate for potential
spillover effects.
States have an annual budget for projects to be subsidized under the GRW program.
In more than 90% of cases, states did not exhaust their annual budgets, which sug-
gests that there was usually no rationing of the funds and no rivalry between projects.
Nevertheless, not all projects were granted. While official data on rejected projects is
unfortunately not available, survey data for the state of Thueringa from 2011 to 2016
suggests that roughly 39% of applications were denied (IWH, 2018). However, these re-
jections were almost entirely due to formal reasons. The two main reasons for rejection,
accounting for 96% of rejections, were (i) missing documents and (ii) not meeting the
eligibility criteria. Hence, there is no reason to believe that the selection of projects was
based on their assessed quality.
1.2.2 Subsidy Rates
Upon successful application, plants receive subsidies to cover a certain share of the
investment cost stated in the application.5 There is a binding maximum subsidy rate
imposed by federal law, which varies by plant type, year and – importantly – plant
location, the latter source of variation making the GRW a place-based policy.
Below, we exploit the variation in maximum subsidy rates to estimate the causal ef-
fects of the policy. In the following, we describe this variation in detail. As a general
principle, the policy accounted for differences in the economic performance within East
Germany and assigned higher subsidy rates to relatively less productive counties. Im-
portantly, differentiation was conducted on the national level by the Federal government
based on past economic performance – both the national decision and the past economic
behavior being important features for our identification strategy. More precisely, local
productivity was measured by a performance indicator at the level of the commuting
zone (Arbeitsmarktregion) with counties being nested in commuting zones. There were
76 counties in East Germany and 53 commuting zones in the boundaries of 2014.6
5 It takes on average about 8 months for an application to be approved (IWH, 2018).
6 Over the years, some counties in East German merged. In a robustness check, we make sure that mergers
do not affect our results by excluding all counties that were partially treated. We exclude the county of
Berlin from all of our analyses because of its status as a federal state.
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In the following, we give an example of the performance indicator and how it af-
fected subsidy rates for the year 1997. The performance indicator for commuting zone r





0.1 × (wage1995r )0.4 × (unemp1995r )0.5,
where infr measures the quality of a county’s infrastructure in 1995, wage represents
per-capita earnings in 1995 and unemp measures the unemployment rate in 1995.7 All
counties were ranked according to this indicator as depicted in Appendix Figure 1.A.1.
Counties with an index-value below 100 were classified as high funding priority, coun-
ties with a value above the threshold as low funding priority. Counties with a high
funding priority receive a higher subsidy rate.8
Importantly, indicators, cut-off values and subsidy rates are valid for specific regimes
that last between 3 and 7 years. At the end of a regime, indicator function, priority
statuses and subsidy rates change, which leads to substantial variation in maximum
subsidy rates from the perspective of the individual county. In the last part of the sub-
section, we document the evolution of regimes and the resulting policy variation.
Table 1.1 gives an overview of the policy variation. In the early 1990s, all East
German counties were treated equally, with the maximum subsidy rate for small and
medium-sized plants being 50% and 35% for large plants. As of 1997, policy makers
started to differentiate funding priorities spatially. Based on the performance indicator
described above, 27 out of 76 counties were assigned to low funding priority and conse-
quently experienced a cut in the maximum subsidy rates by 7 percentage points across
all three plant size groups (see Table 1.1, regimes 1 vs. 2). In 2000, a new ranking of
the counties was generated based on updated measures of past economic performances
and slight changes in the indicator function (see Appendix 1.B.2). As a consequence,
additional counties switched from high to low priority status.
In 2007, the ranking of counties was renewed. This time, all German counties (East
and West) were jointly assessed and ranked – in contrast to previous years, where East
7 The infrastructure sub-indicator is based on measures of accessibility of airports and larger cities by
car or train, of the travelling time for trucks to the next trans-shipment center, the share of employees
in applied research institutes, the share of apprenticeship training position, the share of employees in
technical occupations, the share of high school graduates, capacity of inter-company training centers and
population density.
8 The rule is almost perfectly deterministic such that all counties above the threshold receive lower funding
probability. However, there is some noise in the assignment as revealed by Appendix Table 1.B.3. We see
that few counties below the cut-off were assigned low priority. This is mainly due to county mergers that
occurred after the reform, i.e. a county above the threshold was merged with a county that was below the
threshold. As mentioned above, we exclude partially treated counties in a robustness check. In addition,
the Federal government (jointly with state governments) reserves the right to deviate from the ranking
in rare exceptions (two counties in 1997). This is mostly due one county biasing the commuting zone
average upwards. For example, the relatively poorer county of Gifhorn is located in the same commuting
zone as the county of Wolfsburg, which contains the head quarters of Volkswagen. Therefore, policy
makers decided to assign Gifhorn to a higher priority even though the commuting zone index was too
high.
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Table 1.1: Subsidy regimes for East German counties since 1990
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime 5 Regime 6 Regime 7
1990-1996 1997-1999 2000-2006 2007-2010 2011-2013 2014-2017 2018-
priority high low high low high low high low high low high medium low high low
small plants 50% n/a 50% 43% 50% 43% 50% n/a 50% 40% 40% 35% 30% 40% 30%
medium plants 50% n/a 50% 43% 50% 43% 40% n/a 40% 30% 30% 25% 20% 30% 20%
large plants 35% n/a 35% 28% 35% 28% 30% n/a 30% 20% 20% 15% 10% 20% 10%
# counties 76 n/a 49 27 41 35 76 n/a 58 18 9 64 3 9 67
Sources: Deutscher Bundestag (1996), Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007), Deutscher Bundestag (2016) Notes: Plant size is defined
by the number of employees. Small plants have less than 51 employees, medium-sized plants 51 to 250, and large ones above 250.
Germany regions were assessed separately. As West German regions were still richer
than their East German counterparts, all East German counties received high priority
status. As a consequence, 35 counties saw an increase in their (employment-weighted)
subsidy rate.9 This particular reform is interesting for various reasons. First, the re-
ranking was completely exogenous to the economic performance of East German coun-
ties. Second, the reform enables us to test whether effects are symmetric.
The next reassessment occurred in 2011, when 18 counties were downgraded in their
priority status. The reason for this change was the EU’s enlargement from 15 to 25
member states resulting in a decline of the average regional GDP per capita in the EU.
According to EU regulations, regions above the 75th percentile of GDP per capita lose
eligibility for the highest maximum rates. In 2014, Germany was required by the EU to
again lower their maximum subsidy rates in two steps. Until 2017, subsidy rates were
lowered a maximum of 35% for small plants (25% and 15% for medium and large plants)
and in 2018, there was another cut of 5 percentage points.10 An exception was made for
counties that were located directly at the border with Poland since the difference in the
subsidy rate between them and the Polish regions would be higher than EU regulations
allow. Therefore, these 9 counties were allowed higher subsidy rates throughout the
whole period. Note that, even though we do not exploit the 2018 reform directly since
our data ends in 2017, we still account for these future reforms in our event study setup.
Overall, the various reforms generate substantial variation in maximum subsidy
rates across East German counties, which we exploit in our empirical research design
presented in Section 1.3. Figure 1.1a illustrates that all counties experience at least two
changes in the subsidy rate, while more than 50% experience three or four changes. The
change in the (employment-weighted) maximum subsidy rate varies from a reduction
of 13.4 to 24.9 percentage points (see Figure 1.1b). The right panel also shows some inter-
esting regional clustering, e.g. the counties bordering Poland experienced the smallest
cuts in rates, while the area around Leipzig, saw the largest. Note that our identification
9 The subsidy rate for small and large plants, which account for two thirds of manufacturing employment
on average, rose by 7 and 2 percentage points, respectively, while the rate for medium plants decreased
by 3 percentage points.
10 Three well-performing counties were directly downgraded to the 2018 level.
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Figure 1.1: Map of reforms from 1996 to 2014








Sources: Deutscher Bundestag (1996), Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007),
Deutscher Bundestag (2016) Notes: Berlin is excluded from the analysis.
strategy only exploits changes within federal states – indicated by the thicker line – for
identification.
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1.3 Research Design
We estimate the causal effect of the subsidy implementing different variants of event
study designs. Given that the policy variation described in Section 1.2 is quite complex,
we develop our preferred empirical model step-by-step.
1.3.1 Empirical Model
As described in Section 1.2, the vast majority of subsidy rate changes were decreases. In
the simplest form the event study model regresses an outcome y (such as employment
or investment) of plant i in county c and year t, yi,t on dummy variables indicating a




βkDkc,t + ξXc,t + δi + γc + ψs,t + εi,t. (1.1)
where Dkc,t is the mentioned set of event indicators indicating whether a change in the
maximum subsidy rate occurred for the county k ∈ [−4, ..., 10] periods ago. We refer to
Dkc,t as binned event indicators as the indicators at the endpoints of the effect windows,
k = −4 and k = 10, take into account all observable past (future) events going beyond
the effect window (McCrary, 2007; Schmidheiny and Siegloch, 2019). Let dc,t−k = 1 if
county c experienced a subsidy cut in year t−k, dc,t−k = −1 in case of a subsidy increase




s=−∞ dc,t−s if k = −4
dc,t−j if − 4 < k < 10∑∞
s=10 dc,t−s if k = 10.
(1.2)
The event study design enables us to test for flat pre-trends (k ≤ −1) and informs
about the adjustment paths of the post-treatment effect (k ≥ 0). All other estimates
are to be interpreted relative to the pre-treatment period k = −1, whose coefficient
is normalized to zero. In some specifications, we additionally include time-varying
control variables at the county-level Xc,t. Our specifications always include plant and
county fixed effects γc and δi as well as state-by-year fixed effects ψs,t to absorb state-
specific shocks. This is important because state governments play a role in granting the
subsidy and we see regional clustering of the intensity of subsidy rate cuts (see Section
1.2). Standard errors are clustered at both the county and plant level throughout.
Table 1.1 showed that there is variation in the subsidy rate cuts over time and across
counties and plant types as the reforms differentially affected maximum subsidy rates
for different plant sizes. To exploit this variation, we define treatment intensity Ikc,t of
















The intensity measure is a weighted average of the (absolute) change in maximum sub-




c,t−k−1| across plant types, p ∈ [small,med, large]. Respec-
tive weights are denoted by ωpc and defined as the manufacturing employment share of








∀f ∈ [small,med, large].
Efc,t denotes the number of workers in manufacturing plants of size f in county c at time
t. Weights ωpc are time-invariant and calculated in the data year 1995, hence prior to the
first reform.11
Based on these definitions, the generalized event study design that accounts for the








+ ξXc,t + δi + γc + ψst + εi,t (1.4)
Compared to the basic model given in equation (1.1), this variant of the event study
replaces the dummy treatment indicator with an indicator that is specific to the event.
As shown in Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2019), event studies – just as the numerically
equivalent distributed lag models – can be easily generalized to account for multiple
changes of different intensities if treatment effects are homogeneous over time.
1.3.2 Identification and Sensitivity
The classical identification check in event study designs is to assess whether pre-treatment
effects are statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, even flat pre-trends might not
be sufficient to interpret the estimates causally. The key remaining threat to identi-
fication is omitted variable biases concurrent with treatment timing. While plant and
county fixed effects control for time invariant confounders at the respective levels, state-
by-year fixed effects flexibly account for any confounding shock occurring at the state-
level. However, if the concurrent and confounding shock is at the county-level, esti-
mates would still be biased.
The prime suspect in our context is local economic performance as subsidy rates
are a function of past regional economic performance (see Section 1.2.2). The better the
county performed economically in the past, the higher the probability of a subsidy rate
cut. Note that such differences in past economic development should, however, show
up in the pre-treatment effects and we would expect pre-treatment effects increasing
from below zero. If we expect that a cut in the subsidy rate hurts the local economy, this
relationship would bias our estimates towards zero.
11 We drop year 1995 from the data after calculating the shares.
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Improving comparability. Given our institutional setup, we can further improve the
comparability of treatment and control group. Using the cut-off between high- and
low-priority counties and the resulting discontinuity in subsidy rates, we can restrict
the sample to counties close to the cut-off. Denote TM,R (CM,R) the set of the M counties
closest to the performance cut-off from below (above) following the indicator for regime
R. Let SM,R = TM,R ∪ CM,R be the set of 2M counties around the cut-off during regime
R. As we look at multiple regimes and counties might move toward and away from
the regime-specific thresholds, we define the set SM that includes all counties that are at
least once within the set of counties close to the threshold: SM =
⋂
R SM,R. We can then
refine our empirical model in equation (1.4) by restricting the underlying estimation
sample to counties in SM :







+ ξXc,t + δi + γc + ψs,t + εi,t. (1.5)
In our preferred baseline model, we chooseM = 30. We also varyM by reducing it or in-
creasing to capture the full sample and find that results (pre and post-treatment effects)
do not change in a meaningful way lending credibility to our identification strategy.
Heterogeneous treatment effects. With homogeneous treatment effects, applying an
event study with multiple treatments of different intensities produces unbiased esti-
mates of the treatment effect (Schmidheiny and Siegloch, 2019). However, there has
been a recent important literature emphasizing that (static and dynamic) difference-in-
difference designs with differential treatment timing estimated with a two-way fixed
effect model can be severely biased in the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects
(Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess, 2021; Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2020; Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfoeuille, 2020a,b; Sun and Abraham, 2020). Several new estimators have been
proposed to get unbiased estimates when treatment effects are not homogeneous. How-
ever, all these estimators are not valid for environments with multiple events for the
same unit. In order to test for potential biases due to heterogeneous treatment effects,
we cut our sample in 2006 and focus on the first three regimes since the reform in 2007
treats all counties (see Table 1.1). This yields a sample where every unit is treated at-
most once and we retain a group of never-treated units. We apply the estimators de-
veloped in Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020a) and Sun and Abraham (2020) to
our basic dummy variable specification described in equation (1.1).12 Notice that the
two estimators use different control groups since Sun and Abraham (2020) only allow
comparisons to never-treated units, whereas Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020a)
are also using not-yet treated units as controls. We find that our estimates are unlikely
to be driven by heterogeneous treatment effects.
12 Note that in our setup without covariates and with never-treated units, the estimators from Sun and
Abraham (2020) and Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) coincide.
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Controlling for observables. As another test, we include county-level controls that
control for local business cycle effects. We control for log GDP per capita and the un-
employment rate lagged by one year. This specification tries to account for remaining
differences in past economic performance and thereby purifies our βk estimates from
potential bias. Estimates are hardly affected and as expected, if anything, slightly more
negative. In another check, we include the contemporaneous values of the business cy-
cle covariates – ignoring even more the obvious bad control problem. Effects are again
very similar. Last, we also use the business cycle variables as outcomes and test whether
we find significant pre-treatment effects pointing to an identification concern. We find
flat pre-trends.
Other subsidies. As discussed in Section 1.2, we test whether changes in the GRW
subsidy rate have triggered changes in other regional subsidy programs, which could
in turn bias our estimates. We test for this possibility by looking at the effect of GRW
subsidy cuts on the sum of other subsidies received and find no spillovers.
Symmetry. We estimate a model that explicitly differentiates between subsidy cuts
and increases to test for symmetry. Note that we are mostly observing subsidy cuts, but
the peculiar reform of 2007 enables us to separately study subsidy increases.
Sensitivity. Apart from these identification tests, we run several sensitivity checks to
make sure that modelling choices are not driving our results. First, we implement the
basic dummy variable event study specification of equation (1.1) which ignores the size
of the subsidy changes. Second, we drop the few counties that – for various reasons
discussed in Section 1.2 – were only partially treated. Fourth, we vary the event window
between nine, ten and elven lags. Last, we estimate our model in first differences instead
of with fixed effects. In none of these checks, results change in a meaningful way.
1.3.3 Extensions to Test for Spillovers
One contribution of this chapter is to systematically look at spillovers. Depending on
the context, we have to adjust our baseline model, given in equation (1.5) to assess the
role of the spillover.
Testing for regional spillovers. A cut in subsidies might have spillover effects that go
beyond county borders and affect neighboring counties. Theoretically, these spillovers
can be positive in case local demand or agglomeration effects radiate beyond county
lines. They may also be negative if economic activities are relocated from control to
treatment counties. We test for those kinds of spillovers by moving the analysis to a
higher level of aggregation. Explicitly, we follow Criscuolo et al. (2019) and aggregate
equation (1.5) to the level of the local labor market. The difference between the estimate
at the county level and the estimate at the local labor market level gives an indication
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of regional spillovers. Note that there is some variation in subsidy rates across counties
within local labor markets. First, counties have different plant size distributions. Sec-
ond, there were county-level mergers beyond commuting local labor market borders.
Third, there were some exceptions in the assignment rules discussed in Section 1.2, for
instance, the special treatment of counties bordering Poland in the late 2010s or due to
extreme outlier counties in terms of economic performance within local labor markets.
Testing for trade spillovers. Given that manufacturing firms in East German counties
are part of a larger value chain, we also test for trade spillover. In particular, we test
whether manufacturing plants in other counties that have significant trade exposure
to the treatment counties also respond to the subsidy cuts. First, we take the imports
(measured in tons per year) of county c coming from treatment county g with c 6= g
and divide them by the total imports of county c. Equivalently, we calculate the share
of exports that are exported from county c to treatment county g. Then, let the trade















Dlg,t · I lg,t
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(1.6)
where Dlg,t and I lg,t are defined as above. To test for trade spillovers, we include the













c,t + δi + γc + ψs,t + εi,t (1.7)
where βltrade represents the effect on plants with trade exposure to a one-percentage-
point subsidy cut l years ago.
1.4 Data
In this section, we present the data that we use in our analysis. Detailed information
on variable definitions and sources can be found in Appendix Table 1.B.1 and summary
statistics are presented in Appendix Table 1.B.2.
1.4.1 Subsidy Data
We make use of administrative subsidy data provided by the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs. For the years 1996-2016, we obtained the universe of GRW subsidy
cases in East Germany including investment volume, subsidy amount and the receiving
plant’s county. Matching these data to plants is prohibited due to data protection laws,
hence we are unable to identify which plants did in fact receive subsidies and which did
28
1.4. DATA
not. We follow standard practice and estimate the intent-to-treat effect, investigating the
employment response of plants in a treated area (Criscuolo et al., 2019). As mentioned
above, 74% of all subsidies were paid to manufacturing firms. Appendix Table 1.B.2
shows that the average yearly subsidy payments received by a county amount to e18
million, supporting investment projects worth e82 million.
1.4.2 Employment and Wage Data
We measure employment using the Establishment History Panel (BHP), which is based
on social security records and provided by the Institute of Employment Research in
Nuremberg (Schmucker et al., 2016). We have access to a fifty percent random sample of
plants in Germany for the period of 1996-2017. The dataset includes the annual number
of employees by skill at a plant as well as the county in which it is located and its
industry classification.
To measure wages, we additionally make use of the IAB’s Sample of Integrated
Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) from 1996 to 2014. The dataset is a 2% sample
of individual earnings biographies and includes individual characteristics as well as
employer information from the BHP.13 We drop all apprentices, social service workers,
working students and interns and convert wages to 2010 e. Then, we calculate the me-
dian wage at the county level for manufacturing workers, non-manufacturing workers
and all workers. As one can see in Appendix Table 1.B.2, workers in the manufactur-
ing sector have a higher median wage than workers in other sectors. We also calcu-
late wages by education level within the manufacturing sector. As expected, high-skill
workers earn substantially higher wages than their low-skilled peers.
1.4.3 Investment Data
Moreover, we obtain investment data at the plant level from the AFiD Establishment-
Panel provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. The data cover the uni-
verse of German manufacturing and mining plants with 20 or more employees for the
period from 1996 to 2016. Importantly, we can observe total investment on the plant
level which we deflate to 2010 e. Additionally, the AFiD data provide industry codes
and information on the plant location at the municipal level. We use that information
to restrict our sample to manufacturing plants and locate plants within in the current
county borders.
1.4.4 Trade Flow Data
We use trade flow data from the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure
to calculate the trade exposure of German counties as described in Section 1.3.3. The
13 Earnings histories are in general recorded for persons who have appeared at least once in the social
security system, either as an employee or as being unemployed, since 1975.
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data include a complete matrix of trade flows between all German counties as well as
foreign countries for the year 2010. Trade flows are measured in tons per year and we
can observe the direction of trade, i.e. we can differentiate between imports and exports
between two counties.
1.4.5 Other Regional Variables
Last, we make use of further regional variables either as outcomes or as control vari-
ables. We obtain administrative data on the local business cycle (GDP per capita and
local unemployment) as well as labor force and population numbers, provided by the
statistical offices of the German states. In order to assess policy spillovers, we addition-
ally obtain data on the municipal local business and property tax rate. While the tax
base of these taxes is set at the national level, municipalities can freely set their own
tax rates (see Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch, 2018; Löffler and Siegloch, 2021, for a detailed
description). Furthermore, we obtain tax revenues from business and property taxation
and use it to calculate the respective tax base.
In addition, we gather data on municipality-level grants and subsidies in order to
make sure that other transfers are not confounding our GRW effect. To keep the level
of analysis consistent, we aggregate the municipal-level data to the county level using
pre-form population shares as weights if necessary. Moreover, we collect data on the
net commuting flows normalized by the number of employees from the Federal Office
for Building and Regional Planning.
Last, we add on housing prices, to assess whether the GRW subsidies are capitalized
into housing prices. In order to populate our long panel starting in the 1990s, we use
house price data from the German real estate association IVD. These data cover the
largest city within a county.14
1.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the reduced form effects of the place-based policy. Subsec-
tion 1.5.1 focuses on direct policy effect of a subsidy cut for manufacturing plants in
treated counties. In subsection 1.5.2, we address various identification challenges and
demonstrate that our main effects are robust. Subsection 1.5.3 sheds light on the various
spillover effects of the GRW.
1.5.1 Direct Policy Effects
Investment effects. In a first step, we assess whether cuts of the maximum subsidy
rates affect the subsidies paid out, that is, we test our first stage. Figure 1.2 shows the
14 For some county-year pairs, no data is available. We interpolate occasionally missing data points linearly.
More comprehensive micro data, e.g. from the online platform ImmobilienScout24 (the German Zillow),
only start much later in the mid-2000s.
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log GRW subsidies log subsidized investment
log investment
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, AFiD Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a
regression of changes in log subsidies paid to counties, log subsidized investment and log investment on leads and lags of a
change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (1.5). The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30).
Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
effect of a one-percentage-point decrease in the maximum subsidy rate on GRW subsi-
dies at the county level. We find that a subsidy rate cut in treated counties decreases
subsidy amounts by 13.8% after ten years which corresponds to a decrease of e2.5 mil-
lion for the average county. In line with this finding, we also see that log subsidized
investment decreases in a very similar manner. The total investment volume subsidized
by the GRW decreases by 14.6% ten years after the reform. Reassuringly, treatment and
control groups exhibit a very similar development before a reform for both variables as
revealed by the pre-treatment trends.
Last and importantly, we are interested in the effects of subsidy rate cuts on total
investments by plants. Using the AFiD data, we show that overall investment de-
creases by roughly 6.7% after ten years. The investment response is almost exclusively
driven by investment in equipment, which makes up about 85% of all investment (see
Appendix Figure 1.C.1). Note that it is difficult to make a statement about possible
crowding-out of private investment because of two reasons. First, the AFiD data only
contain plants with 20 or more employees.15 Second, there might be positive or negative
spillovers on untreated manufacturing firms, which are reflected in the AFiD estimates,
but not in the effect on subsidized investments. Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle
these effects without strong assumptions.
15 The AFiD is the largest and only administrative microdata set on plant-level investment in Germany.
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (1.5). The sample includes the 55
counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
Employment effects. We now move to our main outcome, the employment effect of
the GRW policy. Consistent with the finding of a decrease in investments, Figure 1.3
shows that cuts in the subsidy rate significantly reduce plant-level manufacturing em-
ployment. While pre-trends are flat, our estimates imply that a one-percentage-point
decrease in the maximum subsidy rate leads to a decrease in manufacturing employ-
ment of 1% after ten years for our baseline sample.16 These estimates are quantita-
tively similar to the main finding of Criscuolo et al. (2019). We find that the decrease
in employment is mostly driven by medium-skilled workers, which make up 80% of
all manufacturing workers, whereas employment of low- and high-skill workers de-
creases to a lesser extent (see Appendix Figure 1.A.2). Thus, these results do not speak
in favor of human capital spillover playing a major role in the context of the GRW sub-
sidy, which targets mainly German manufacturing firms (Diamond, 2016; Glaeser and
Gottlieb, 2008).
Since the negative effect on manufacturing employment at the plant-level only re-
flects adjustments at the intensive margin, we also look at the number of manufacturing
establishments on the county level. Appendix Figure 1.A.3 shows that there is little ev-
idence for any effects on the extensive margin. Accordingly, the negative effect on total
16 For each regime, we pick the 30 counties which are closest to the cut-off from below and the 30 counties
that are closest from above. Aggregating over regimes, we end up with 55 counties that are at least once
close to the cut-off. In some years, less than 30 counties are above the threshold, which is why the number
of counties is below 60.
32
1.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS




















-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log median
manufacturing wages on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the
55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
manufacturing employment at the county level in Figure 1.A.3 is quantitatively very
similar to the plant-level effect in Figure 1.3.
As discussed in Section 1.2, the rationale of the GRW policy was to stimulate the
export-oriented manufacturing sector and thereby push the entire local economy. Fig-
ure 1.3 shows that the manufacturing sector, which accounts for 18% of total employ-
ment, is responding as intended. In terms of total employment, however, we find little
evidence that the aggregate effects on non-manufacturing plants are particularly strong.
As a result, total employment goes down by only 0.2% (Appendix Figure 1.A.4). Nev-
ertheless, the aggregate effect on non-manufacturing employment masks interesting
spillovers on certain industries, which we discuss in Section 1.5.3 below.
In line with the effect on employment, we detect that the number of unemployed
increases by about 0.5%, however estimates are imprecise (see Appendix Figure 1.A.5).
This suggests that the laid-off workers mostly transitioned to unemployment. Consis-
tent with that, there is no effect on the size of the labor force (see Appendix Figure
1.A.5). GDP per capita at the county-level also drops, but the effect is not significant
(see Appendix Figure 1.A.6).
Wage effects. Last, the decrease in labor demand could lead to decreasing wages in the
manufacturing sector. Using the SIAB data, we calculate the median wage of workers
in the manufacturing sector at the county level. We use the median as around 13% of
wages are top-coded in the SIAB data.
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As Figure 1.4 shows, wages are virtually unaffected by subsidy cuts. Also, when
differentiating by skill, wages for all skill groups are largely unaffected (see Appendix
Figure 1.C.2). Wages in non-treated sectors and overall wages do not respond signifi-
cantly to the subsidy cut either (see Appendix Figure 1.C.3a). Results are similar when
using average wages instead of median wages (see Appendix Figure 1.C.3b).
1.5.2 Identification and Sensitivity Checks
In the following, we present various tests demonstrating the robustness of our main
results. The rationale behind the different checks is discussed in Section 1.3.2.
Improving comparability. First, our baseline specification improves the comparabil-
ity of treatment and control group counties by focusing on the jurisdictions that are
close to the eligibility cut-off that determines treatment status. Our preferred specifica-
tion uses 55 counties around the cut-off per regime. This is clearly an arbitrary choice
trading off comparability and statistical power. Appendix Figure 1.C.4a presents results
for different cut-off samples including the full sample. The magnitude of the employ-
ment effect is hardly affected as we vary the number of counties around the cutoff.
Controlling for observables. Next, we add control variables that pick up local busi-
ness cycle fluctuations (and consequently affected treatment status via the eligibility
indicator). Reassuringly, the inclusion has little effects on the results, as demonstrated
in Appendix Figure 1.C.4b. Importantly, we do not find significant pre-trends when us-
ing log GDP per capita or unemployment as an outcome (see Appendix Figures 1.A.5
and 1.A.6).
Other subsidies. We also test the effect of the GRW reforms on other subsidies re-
ceived by municipalities. Figure 1.C.5 shows that the reforms did not have a significant
effect on other subsidies received by municipalities.
Symmetry. The majority of subsidy rate changes are decreases. However, the reform
in 2007 in which all East German counties were assigned high priority status (see Section
1.2.2), led to an increase in subsidy rates for roughly half of the East German counties.
Therefore, we can estimate a model that allows for different effects of subsidy increases
and decreases. Appendix Figure 1.A.7 shows a symmetric pattern. We can neither reject
the null hypothesis that any individual post-treatment effect is asymmetric nor the joint
test of asymmetry (p-value = 0.213).
Heterogeneous treatment effects. To test whether heterogeneous treatment effects
are biasing our results, we apply the estimators by Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille
(2020a) and Sun and Abraham (2020) to our baseline dummy variable model described
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in equation (1.1). We stop our sample in the year 2006 to have a setup with a maxi-
mum of one treatment per county and retain a group of never-treated units. To ensure a
comparability across specifications, we also estimate equation (1.1) as a standard event
study on the same sample. We plot the resulting estimates and their standard errors
in Appendix Figure 1.A.8. The effects are very close both in size and pattern to our
baseline event study estimates. We conclude that heterogeneous treatment effects are
unlikely to drive our results.
Sensitivity with regard to modelling choices. Last, we provide a set of checks that
assess the sensitivity of our findings with regard to modelling choices we make when
setting up our baseline. First, we test whether implementing a standard event study
design using a discrete treatment indicator following equation (1.1) yields similar re-
sults. As Appendix Figure 1.C.6a shows, results are very similar when comparing our
baseline model and the dummy-variable specification scaled by the average cut.
Second, recall that due to changes in county border definitions, in some counties
only a subset of municipalities receives a decrease in the maximum rate, effectively re-
ducing treatment intensity. Dropping these few partially treated counties yields larger
effects, suggesting that our baseline estimate is conservative (see Appendix Figure 1.C.6b).
Third, we vary the number of lags of our event window between nine and eleven
years. As Appendix Figure 1.C.7a shows, the effects tend to level off after ten years.
Last, Appendix Figure 1.C.7b shows our baseline results estimated both in a fixed effect
and first difference model. Size and pattern are again very similar.
1.5.3 Spillover Effects
While we have established a clean and robust direct policy effect, we investigate various
potential spillover effects in the following subsection.
Intra-county spillovers. First, we check whether the place-based policy had an ef-
fect on untreated industries in treated counties. Above, we have shown that non-
manufacturing employment only responds marginally to the cut in subsidy rates, re-
sulting in a small and imprecise aggregate employment effect. However, when we de-
compose non-manufacturing employment into finer industries, we do find some evi-
dence of intra-county sectoral spillovers. More specifically, we look at the retail and
construction sector which were de jure excluded from receiving GRW subsidies allow-
ing us to pinpoint spillover effects (see Appendix Table 1.B.6). Figure 1.5a shows (posi-
tive) spillover effects for the untreated retail and construction sector.17 A cut in subsidy
rates leads to an immediate decreases in employment in the construction sector, which
seems intuitive as we have seen that subsidy cuts trigger an immediate decrease in in-
vestment projects like building new or extending production facilities. Likewise, we
17 We define a positive spillover as going into the same direction as the direct policy effect.
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1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy rate cut
Notes: Panel (a) plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log industry employment at the plant level
on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (1.5). The sample includes the 55 counties closest to
cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. Panel (b) plots coefficients along with 95%
confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log manufacturing employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum
assistance rate at the county and local labor market level. When aggregating to the local labor market level, treatment intensities of
counties are weighted by the number of manufacturing employees. The sample includes the counties or local labor markets that
contain the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M = 30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county or local labor market level. Panel
(c) plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in the log local business and property tax rates
on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to
cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level. Panel (d) plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals
of a regression as in equation (1.7) using log manufacturing employment at the plant level as the outcome. The sample includes all
German counties. Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
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detect a (smaller) negative effect on retail employment, which could be explained by
a decrease in local demand. In total, one job lost in the manufacturing sector leads to
0.64 [0.16,1.87] additional jobs lost in retail and construction sectors. This is a somewhat
lower estimate of local spillover than Moretti (2010) finds for US cities. A likely reason
for this divergence is that the GRW subsidy is paid to traditional manufacturing firms
rather than firms that rely heavily on highly-skilled workers.
We also test whether subsidy rate changes are capitalized in house prices. If an
increase in the subsidy rate would lead to increased house prices, the distributional
impact of the policy would change with (pre-existing) home owners being main benefi-
ciaries. As Appendix Figure 1.A.9 shows, we do not find any effect on house prices.
Regional spillovers. Next, we test whether negative manufacturing employment ef-
fects in treated counties spread across county borders within the local labor market.
We aggregate county-level manufacturing employment to the local labor market level
and use the weighted average of counties’ treatment intensities to re-estimate equation
(1.4) on the baseline sample. Figure 1.5b shows that the treatment effect on manufac-
turing employment at the labor market level is very similar to our baseline at the plant
and county level implying that there was little reallocation of workers across counties
within local labor markets. This is consistent with the null effects on the net commuting
flow per employee and population we find (see Appendix Figure 1.A.10).
Policy spillovers. We also test for the possibility of policy spillovers. Since a subsidy
cut negatively impacts local employment, municipalities finances are also affected. The
effect is theoretically ambiguous. If local politicians want (or are forced) to balance
their budget, they might need to increase local tax rates to counteract the loss of tax
revenue. On the other hand, local politicians being aware of tax competition might try
to compensate firms for the decrease in subsidies by lowering tax rates. Figure 1.5c
shows that both local business and property tax rates are raised in response to a cut
in the maximum subsidy rate. This finding is not surprising in the context of German
municipalities, which are not very flexible in adjusting their expenditures (Löffler and
Siegloch, 2021).
Overall, the results on policy spillovers imply that businesses in treatment counties
do not only receive a subsidy cut, but also face higher business and property tax rates.
Local tax revenues from property taxation increase slightly, whereas business tax rev-
enues decrease (see Appendix Figure 1.C.8a). The latter effect implies a shrinking busi-
ness tax base. As we do not see any effects on the number of plants, the most plausible
answer is that firm profits decrease (see Appendix Figure 1.C.8b).
Trade spillovers. Last, we assess whether cuts in the GRW affected untreated counties
that were connected to treated counties via trade flows using the empirical model speci-
fied in equation (1.7). We differentiate between import and export exposure to treatment
counties. Figure 1.5d shows that a 1% trade exposure to a 1 percentage-point-decrease
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in the subsidy rate reduces manufacturing employment by 0.005%. This is consistent
with the effect of the subsidies propagating through the value chain and thereby also
affecting untreated counties with higher levels of trade exposure to treated counties.
1.6 Discussion: Efficiency and Inequality Effects
In this section, we provide a welfare analysis of the GRW policy by assessing its effi-
ciency and redistributive implications.
1.6.1 Efficiency Assessment
To asses the efficiency of the GRW, we calculate the marginal value of public funds (Hen-
dren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020). The measure relates marginal benefits of the policy to
its marginal costs by taking the ratio of the willingness to pay (WTP) of all beneficiaries





The willingness to pay aggregates the real economic effects of the policy, including the
WTP of direct beneficiaries (workers in directly treated plant) as well as additional ben-
eficiaries due to spillovers. Net government costs comprise both the direct program
spending and the fiscal externalities caused by the policy, for instance changes in in-
come tax revenues triggered by changes in wages and/or employment.
Since this approach does not rely on assumptions about welfare weights, knowing
the MVPF alone is in most cases not informative about the question of whether or not
the policy should be implemented.18 Instead, the MVPF unfolds its potential when com-
paring across policies that target similar groups of recipients. In this case, the MVPF
is informative of which policy can achieve the same goal at a lower cost (Finkelstein
and Hendren, 2020). Hence, we compare the MVPF of the GRW with MVPFs for other
policies that target a similar group of recipients such as welfare cash transfer or unem-
ployment benefits. Moreover, we can make an internal comparison comparing the the
GRW MVPFs with and without accounting for spillover effects.
We consider the policy experiment of increasing the subsidy rate by one percentage
point and use our reduced form estimates to calculate the resulting effects. We consider
this experiment for two reasons. First, we have a direct mapping between our reduced-
form estimates and the MVPF formula. Second, calculating the willingness to pay for
marginal policy changes is more straightforward than for large reforms (Finkelstein and
Hendren, 2020; Kleven, 2021).
18 If net government costs are negative, the policy pays for itself and the policy should always be imple-
mented as long as it the WTP is greater than zero.
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For the willingness to pay, we consider the following effects: (i) the increase in net
earnings due to newly created manufacturing jobs, (ii) the increase in net earnings due
to positive spillover effects to the retail and construction sector, (iii) the increase in net
earnings due to newly created manufacturing jobs via trade spillover, and (iv) the de-
crease in unemployment benefits payments for newly hired workers.19
Since we do not find evidence for regional spillover, we use our plant-level estimates
to calculate the number of jobs created. We multiply the baseline estimates of a 1% in-
crease with the average number of manufacturing jobs in East Germany in our sample
period to get the number of manufacturing jobs created. We then multiply that number
with the average manufacturing wage in East Germany obtained from the SIAB in our
sample period to get the increase in gross earnings. We iterate this procedure for all
estimates from year 0 after the reform to year 10 after the reform assuming a discount
rate of 3%.20 We subtract additional income taxes by applying the average income tax
rate to obtain net labor earnings. We conduct this procedure for manufacturing, retail
and construction jobs. Next, for the trade spillover, we adjust the coefficients for im-
port exposure by the average import exposure in our sample and compute the number
of additional jobs by multiplying the adjusted coefficient with the average number of
manufacturing jobs in Germany as a whole. The number of jobs is then multiplied with
average manufacturing wage in Germany and income taxes are subtracted. Last, we
calculate the number of unemployed using our unemployment estimate and multiply
it by the average unemployment benefits in our sample period. This yields an estimate
of the unemployment benefits that individuals forgo by being employed.
For net government costs, we consider the following items: (i) direct program spend-
ing, i.e. the costs of the GRW subsidies, (ii) an increase in income taxes paid due to the
increase in net earnings, (iii) a decrease in unemployment benefits paid due to the de-
crease in unemployment, which also reduces the net costs, and (iv) the changes in local
business and property tax revenues.
For direct program costs, we make use of our estimate on the subsidies paid out in
response to a one-percentage-point change in the subsidy rate multiplied by the average
subsidies paid out. We then subtract the increase in income taxes of manufacturing, con-
struction and retail workers as well as the reduced spending on unemployment benefits.
We calculate 95% confidence intervals using the bootstrapping algorithm suggested by
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020).
We start by focusing on the direct policy effect, i.e. the policy-induced changes in
manufacturing jobs. The estimated behavioral responses yield an aggregate willingness
to pay ofe0.784 billion and net government costs ofe1.594 billion. As Figure 1.6 shows,
the resulting marginal value of public funds is 0.50 [0.17,1.14]. Next, we add spillover
effects on other sectors, which increases the willingness to pay to e1.214 billion and
reduces the net government costs to e1.520 billion. Hence, sectoral spillovers increase
19 The effect on manufacturing wages is very small and noisy. It does not affect the MVPF estimate but
inflates standard errors (see Appendix Figure 1.C.9a). Therefore, we do not include it in our baseline.
20 Our estimates are virtually unchanged when we vary the discount rate (see Appendix Figure 1.C.9b).
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Source: own calculations, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) Notes: Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws.
the marginal value of public funds to a value of 0.80 [0.37,1.83]. Next, we add the effect
of trade spillovers, which increases the willingness to pay to e1.141 billion and reduces
the net costs to e1.484 billion. This increases the marginal value of public funds to a
value of 0.96 [0.47,2.22]. This shows in turn that disregarding spillover effects of place-
based policies can lead to substantially biased welfare conclusions. Last, we add the
effect on unemployment benefits and local tax revenues. These additions hardly change
the marginal value of public funds (see Figure 1.6). However, it decreases precision
since the unemployment and local tax revenue effects are rather noisy.21
After having demonstrated the importance of accounting for spillovers, we compare
the MVPF of the place-based policy to the MVPF of other policies targeting a similar
group of recipients. The average East German worker in the manufacturing sector is 40
years old. We select unemployment insurance and cash transfers as they target individ-
uals of similar ages (30-40 years old) (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020). Place-based
policies aim at saving and creating jobs and thereby stabilizing incomes. Unemploy-
ment insurance and cash transfers (welfare benefits) come in when jobs have been lost.
We take the estimates for unemployment insurance and cash transfers from the origi-
nal contribution by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020). Unemployment insurance and
cash transfers have an average marginal value of public funds of 0.61 and 0.79, respec-
tively, which are similar, but smaller than the GRW – in particular when accounting for
the GRW’s positive spillover effects.
21As discussed in Section 1.2, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) covers some of the direct
policy costs. Adopting a purely national perspective and ignoring these direct costs would increase the
total MVPF, including spillovers, to 1.16.
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Cost per Job. As an alternative to the MVPF, we compute the cost per job created,
another standard measure of the cost effectiveness of a policy. This metric has the
drawback that it neglects other effects, such as workers forgoing unemployment bene-
fits. Nevertheless, the measure is easy to interpret and allows a comparison with esti-
mates from the previous literature. To calculate the cost per job, we take the estimate
of the number of jobs created in manufacturing and other sectors as well as the di-
rect government costs from our marginal value of public funds exercise and take the
quotient. Appendix Figure 1.A.11 shows the results for three scenarios. The cost per
job is relatively high at e44,412 [e17,446,e114,028] if one neglects all spillover effects.
Including sectoral spillover effects substantially reduces the costs per job to e27,113
[e10,250,e50,490] since both the number of jobs increase as well as the net government
costs decrease. Accounting for trade spillover causes the estimate to decrease even fur-
ther to e24,194 [e9,680,e50,981].
1.6.2 Implications for Regional Inequality
In a last step, we investigate the effectiveness of the GRW to achieve its politically stated
goal, i.e. to reduce regional inequality. In a first step, we calculate the coefficient of
variation of the county-level labor income a measure of regional inequality as suggested
in Ehrlich and Overman (2020). We calculate the labor income per capita in county c and
year t from the BHP and SIAB data as follows.





jobscst · wagecst (1.9)
where Nct denotes population in county c and year t and s stands for sector from set
S = {manufacturing, retail, construction, other}. Moreover, jobscst and wagecst are the
number of jobs and the average wage in county c, sector s and year t, respectively.
Figure 1.7 shows that regional inequality has increased from the mid-1990s until recent
years. At the same time, the generosity of the GRW as measured by annual spending
has been decreasing over time (see Figure 1.7).
We are going to investigate how much of the increase in regional inequality could po-
tentially be reversed by increasing the subsidy rate for low-income counties. Clearly, we
cannot causally link the decrease in the generosity of the GRW to changes in inequality,
but we can approximate its potential to mitigate the increase by extrapolating from our
causal reduced-form evidence derived in Section 1.5 and using regional distributions of
jobs and wages per sector in 2014. We simulate the GRW effect on regional inequality
under various counterfactuals. In our baseline counterfactual, we increase the subsidy
rate of the bottom 20% counties (15 in total) in the East German labor income distri-
bution to their 1996 level.22 This corresponds to a 21 percentage point increase of the
22 We also repeat the same exercise for the bottom 15% and 25% of the labor income distribution (see
Appendix Figures 1.C.10a and 1.C.10b). The resulting patterns are very similar to our baseline scenario.
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Source: SIAB, BHP, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs Notes: The coefficient of variation is computed with respect to the labor
income per capita as calculated in equation (1.9).
subsidy rate for these 15 counties on average. We apply the same methodology as in
the previous sections to calculate the additional manufacturing, retail and construction
jobs from year 0 to year 10. We also calculate the number of jobs created through trade
linkages in all East German counties by multiplying their import exposure to the treat-
ment counties with our trade spillover estimate. In order to calculate the counterfactual
regional dispersion under this regime, we modify equation (1.9) to account for these ad-
ditional jobs in the treated counties. Comparing this counterfactual regional dispersion
to the actually observed regional inequality in 2014 indicates by how much an increase
in the GRW could curb regional inequality. We calculate 95% confidence intervals by
bootstrapping the procedure. As Figure 1.8 shows, expanding the GRW in this way
reduces the coefficient of variation in 2014 by 0.0430 [0.0270,0.0508], or about 7%.
Next, we simulate the counterfactual of a revenue-neutral, place-blind policy and
calculate its impact on regional inequality. To that end, we uniformly increase welfare
payments to every welfare recipient, independent of location. First, we calculate the net
cost of the GRW policy by dividing the willingness to pay for the policy by the marginal
value of public funds that we calculated in Section 1.6.1, yielding total costs of e0.681
billion. Taking into account that increased payments to the unemployed could have
indirect costs on the government budget, for example by reducing labor supply, we
need to adjust the amount spend. In our baseline, we are conservative and assume that
the efficiency cost of the transfers are equal to the place-based policy even though the
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Figure 1.8: Counterfactual regional inequality
H0(GRW  cash transfers):
p-value = 0.0003








































Source: BHP, SIAB Notes: The first bar displays the effect of an increase in the GRW subsidy back to 1996 levels for counties in the
bottom 20% of the labor income distribution on regional inequality within East Germany. The second bar displays the effect a
revenue-neutral policy that pays cash transfers to all unemployed within East Germany. The third and forth bar show the effects of
the two policies if they were applied to Germany as a whole. East Germany excludes Berlin. Confidence intervals are based on
9,999 bootstrap draws. The p-values refer to one-sided tests whether the effect of the GRW policy is larger than the effect of cash
transfers.
MVPF of cash transfers provided by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) is somewhat
lower.23 This yields efficiency-adjusted costs of e0.668 billion.
Next, we divide the adjusted costs by the number of unemployed in East Germany
and assign each unemployed person this amount as a cash transfer. In this policy coun-
terfactual, cash transfers have a presented discounted value of e1,076. We simulate
that in this counterfactual the coefficient of variation decreases by 0.0194 [0.0110,0.0272],
which is substantially lower than the effect of the GRW policy (see Figure 1.8). This is
due to the place-blind nature of the cash transfer policy which captures spatial inequal-
ity only in so far that the number of unemployed is higher in poorer areas. Since the
counterfactual policy also increases the income of recipients in relatively rich regions,
the effect on regional inequality is much smaller compared to the place-specific policy.
So far both counterfactual have been targeted at East Germany. In a last step, we also
simulate how the two simulated policies would affect Germany as whole. As before, we
increase the GRW subsidy by the same amount for the bottom 20% of the overall Ger-
man labor income distribution in 2014. This corresponds to a 21 percentage points in-
crease for 80 counties. The total cost of such a policy would be e4.579 billion, which we
again adjust by the marginal value of public funds of our GRW policy to e4.487 billion.
Dividing by the total number of unemployed in Germany in 2014 yields a presented
discounted cash transfer of e1,548 per unemployed. As Figure 1.8 shows, the pattern is
23 In Appendix Figure 1.C.11a, we apply the MVPF of 0.79 that Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) find,
which further strengthens our results.
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very similar when we extend the two policy counterfactuals to all German counties. The
GRW policy would reduce spatial the coefficient of variation by 0.0442 [0.0219,0.0626]
which equals roughly two thirds of the increase in regional inequality we observe from
1996 to 2014. We find a very similar pattern when we use the Gini coefficient as an alter-
native measure of inequality (see Appendix Figure 1.C.11b). We also investigate the role
of spillover on the effect of the policy on regional inequality. Appendix Figure 1.A.12
shows that without accounting for any spillover effects the effect on regional inequality
is substantially lower. Adding sectoral spillover further reduces regional inequality as
it accounts for additional jobs created in poor regions. The effect of trade spillover is
ex ante ambiguous. On the one hand, if poorer regions generally have a higher trade
exposure to other poorer regions, it would further reduce regional inequality. On the
other hand, if poorer regions are disproportionally connected to richer regions, trade
spillovers dampen the reduction in regional inequality. We find that for East Germany
the first case applies, while for all of Germany the latter applies. In general, the overall
impact of trade spillover is rather modest in size. Last, we also compare the effect of
both policies on the gap in labor earnings between East and West Germany as it was
a stated goal of the GRW policy to equalize living conditions between the two. Ac-
cording to the BHP and SIAB data in 2014, East Germans have a 33.29% lower labor
income per capita than West Germans. The GRW policy would reduce the gap by 4.97
[2.73,7.15] percentage points, whereas the reform policy would reduce the gap only by
2.99 [1.50,4.43] percentage points.
1.7 Conclusions
We investigate the direct, spillover and welfare effects of regional firm subsidies. Inves-
tigating the case of investment subsidies predominantly paid to manufacturing firms
in East Germany after reunification, we exploit substantial variation in maximum sub-
sidy rates for identification. First, we find that the place-based policy has a strong local
effect: a cut in the subsidy rate has a sizable and robust negative effect on local manu-
facturing employment. A one-percentage-point decrease in the maximum subsidy rate
leads to a decrease in manufacturing employment of 1% ten years after the reform.
While wages remain unaffected, local unemployment increases. We provide evidence
that policy effects are symmetric, such that subsidy rate increases lead to higher levels
of manufacturing employment.
In a second step, we go beyond the effect on treated firms in treated counties and
investigate various spillover effects. We find evidence for local multiplier effects in the
untreated construction and retail sectors, in which employment also drops as a conse-
quence of the reduction in the subsidy. Our estimates suggest that one lost manufac-
turing job implies 0.64 jobs lost in the retail and construction sectors. Counties with
a high trade exposure to the treated counties also experience a slight decline in man-
ufacturing employment. In terms of regional spillovers, we do not find any evidence
for reallocation of labor within the local labor market. Last, we find that local policy
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makers increase the business and property tax in response to subsidy cuts. We use
the framework by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) to show that the efficiency of the
place-based policy is similar to unemployment insurance of welfare cash transfers when
ignoring these spillover effects. Accounting for spillovers makes the regional subsidy
slightly more cost-effective. Moreover, we show that the place-based policy is favorable
in reducing regional inequality compared to place-blind cash transfers.
In the light of the increase in regional inequality observed in many developed coun-
tries, place-based firm subsidies could play a role to mitigate regions further drifting
apart. In this respect, this chapter adds to a recent set of papers demonstrating the
positive welfare effects of place-based policies. For instance, Austin, Glaeser, and Sum-
mers (2018) argues that place-based policies are more targeted. Fajgelbaum and Gaubert
(2020) demonstrate that place-based policies can increase spatial efficiency because sort-
ing off high-skilled workers is inefficient. Finally, Gaubert, Kline, and Yagan (2021)
show that place-based redistribution is favorable compared to place-blind policies like
income taxes when society favors spatial equity. This chapter provides further evidence
for this case. For Germany, a country where the goal of spatial equity is referred to in
the constitution, we show that targeted place-based policies have important spillovers
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Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. Notes: This figure plots indicator values and the ranks of counties in the year 1997.
The cutoff was formally at indicator value 100.
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low-skilled medium-skilled high-skilled
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment by skill on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (1.5). The sample includes the 55
counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
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log manufacturing employment log # manufacturing firms
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in the log number
of manufacturing establishments and log manufacturing employment at the county level on leads and lags of a change in the
maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard
errors is at the county level.
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manufacturing non-manufacturing all sectors
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log industry employment
on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (1.5). The sample includes the 55 counties closest to
cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
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log unemployed log labor force
Source: Statistical Offices of German States Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression
of changes in the log unemployed and log labor force on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county
level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression
of changes in log GDP per capita on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample
includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.



























-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 pp decrease in subsidy rate
1 pp increase in subsidy rate
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate. Treatment is discrete as in equation (1.1) and we
include separate dummies for increases and decreases in the subsidy rate. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs
(M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
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baseline Abraham & Sun (2020)
de Chaisemartin & D'Haultfoeuille (2020a)
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of the methods developed in Chaisemartin
and D’Haultfoeuille (2020a) and Sun and Abraham (2020) used on equation (1.1) with manufacturing employment as the outcome.
We cut the sample in 2006 for all three estimators to only have one treatment per unit and retain never-treated units. We
implement the estimator from Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020a) using the Stata command did multipleGT and obtain
standard errors through 999 bootstrap iterations. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
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Source: IVD Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in the log housing
price on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest
to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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net commuting flow per employee log population
Source: Statistical Offices of German States, Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning Notes: This figure plots coefficients
along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log population and the inverse hyperbolic sine of the net
commuting flow per employee on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample
includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.





















baseline + sectoral spillover + trade spillover
Source: own calculations Notes: Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws.
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Source: BHP, SIAB Notes: The first bar displays the effect of an increase in the GRW subsidy back to 1996 levels for counties in the
bottom 20% of the labor income distribution on regional inequality within East Germany without accounting for any spillover.
The second and third bar add trade and sectoral spillover, respectively. The forth, fifth and sixth bar show the effects of these
scenarios if they were applied to Germany as a whole. East Germany excludes Berlin. Confidence intervals are based on 9,999
bootstrap draws.
1.B Data and Institutions
1.B.1 Data
Table 1.B.1: Definition of variables and data sources
year description source
plant level
total investment 1996 - 2016 Total investment normalized to 2010 e on the plant-level for
manufacturing plants with 20 or more employees.
AFiD
equipment investment 1996 - 2016 Equipment investment normalized to 2010 e on the plant-level
for manufacturing plants with 20 or more employees.
AFiD
employees: manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of manufacturing employees at the plant level. BHP
employees: low-skill manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Number of manufacturing employees with a lower secondary,
intermediate secondary or upper secondary school leaving cer-
tificate, but no vocational qualifications at the plant level.
BHP
employees: medium-skill manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Number of manufacturing employees with a lower secondary,
intermediate secondary or upper secondary school leaving cer-
tificate and a vocational qualification at the plant level.
BHP
employees: high-skill manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Number of manufacturing employees with a degree from a uni-
versity of applied sciences or a university at the plant level.
BHP
employees: retail 1996 - 2017 Total number of retail employees at the plant level. BHP
employees: construction 1996 - 2017 Total number of construction employees in at the plant level. BHP
employees: non-manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of non-manufacturing employees at the plant level. BHP
employees: all 1996 - 2017 Total number of employees at the plant level. BHP
county level
employees: manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of manufacturing employees at the county level BHP
plants: manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of manufacturing plants at the county level. BHP
GRW subsidies 1996 - 2016 Total subsidies paid out normalized to 2010e at the county level. Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
subsidised investment 1996 - 2016 Total amount of investment that is subsidised by GRW funds nor-
malized to 2010 e at the county level.
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
median manufacturing wage 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers at the county
level. We weight all observations with the duration of the em-
ployment spell within the year and drop all apprentices, social
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Table 1.B.1 continued
year description source
mean manufacturing wage 1996 - 2014 Mean wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers at the county
level. We weight all observations with the duration of the em-
ployment spell within the year and drop all apprentices, social
service workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
median manufacturing wage: low-skill 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers with a lower
secondary, intermediate secondary or upper secondary school
leaving certificate, but no vocational qualifications at the county
level. We weight all observations with the duration of the em-
ployment spell within the year and drop all apprentices, social
service workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
median manufacturing wage: medium-skill 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers with a lower
secondary, intermediate secondary or upper secondary school
leaving certificate and a vocational qualification. We weight all
observations with the duration of the employment spell within
the year and drop all apprentices, social service workers, work-
ing students and interns.
SIAB
median manufacturing wage: high-skill 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers with a de-
gree from a university of applied sciences or a university. We
weight all observations with the duration of the employment
spell within the year and drop all apprentices, social service
workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
median non-manufacturing wage 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of non-manufacturing workers at the
county level. We weight all observations with the duration of
the employment spell within the year and drop all apprentices,
social service workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
median wage 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of workers at the county level. We
weight all observations with the duration of the employment
spell within the year and drop all apprentices, social service
workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
unemployed 1997 - 2014 Number of unemployed at the county level. Statistical Offices of the German States
population 1997 - 2017 Total population at the county level. Statistical Offices of the German States
labor force 1997 - 2017 Sum of unemployed and employed at the county level. Statistical Offices of the German States
GDP per capita 1997 - 2017 GDP per capita normalized to 2010 e at the county level. Statistical Offices of the German States
other investment subsidies 1997 - 2017 Sum of all other investment subsidies received by municipalities
aggregated to the county level.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local business tax: multiplier 1997 - 2017 Average local business tax multiplier weighted with the 1995
population at the county level.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local property tax: multiplier 1997 - 2017 Average local property tax multiplier weighted with the 1995
population at the county level.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local business tax: revenues 1997 - 2017 Local business tax revenues aggregated to the county level and
normalized to 2010 e.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local property tax: revenues 1997 - 2017 Local property tax revenues aggregated to the county level and
normalized to 2010 e.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local business tax: base 1997 - 2017 Local business tax base normalized to 2010e and obtained by di-
viding the local business tax revenues by the product of the local
business tax multiplier and the federal business tax rate (Steuer-
messzahl).
Statistical Offices of the German States
local property tax: base 1997 - 2017 Local property tax base normalized to 2010e and obtained by di-
viding the local property tax revenues by the product of the local
property tax multiplier and the federal property tax rate (Steuer-
messzahl).
Statistical Offices of the German States
net commuting flow per employee 1997 - 2017 Net number of commuters normalized with the number of em-
ployees at the county level.
Federal Office for Building and Regional
Planning
house price 1996 - 2012 House price index of the largest city within a county. We linearly
impute occasionally missing data points. For some county-year
pairs no data is available.
Immobilienverband Deutschland
trade flows 2010 Import and export flows between all German counties as well as
foreign countries measured in tons per year.
Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital
Infrastructure
local labor market level
employees: manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of manufacturing employees at the local labor
market-level.
BHP
Notes: This table provides details on the definition and sources for all variables used.
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Table 1.B.2: Descriptive statistics
variable mean sd N years
plant level
total investment (in thousand e) 931.16 7176.99 124754 1996 - 2016
equipment investment (in thousand e) 795.32 6618.93 124754 1996 - 2016
employees: manufacturing 21.82 87.53 407694 1996 - 2017
employees: low-skill manufacturing 1.52 8.59 407694 1996 - 2017
employees: medium-skill manufacturing 17.42 68.81 407694 1996 - 2017
employees: high-skill manufacturing 2.67 17.65 407694 1996 - 2017
employees: retail 7.82 21.87 897327 1996 - 2017
employees: construction 8.78 23.20 560518 1996 - 2017
employees: non-manufacturing 10.68 56.39 4055878 1996 - 2017
employees: all 11.70 60.00 4463572 1996 - 2017
county level
employees: manufacturing 5319.71 3850.82 1672 1996 - 2017
plants: manufacturing 243.84 159.58 1672 1996 - 2017
GRW subsidies (in million e) 18.39 27.54 1596 1996 - 2016
subsidised investment (in million e) 83.90 140.60 1596 1996 - 2016
median manufacturing wage 1894.95 299.55 1444 1996 - 2014
median manufacturing wage: low-skill 1480.08 573.24 1424 1996 - 2014
median manufacturing wage: medium-skill 1925.31 272.36 1444 1996 - 2014
median manufacturing wage: high-skill 3420.31 635.79 1444 1996 - 2014
median non-manufacturing wage 1647.77 163.58 1444 1996 - 2014
median wage 1700.38 145.27 1444 1996 - 2014
population 173891.30 96067.54 1672 1996 - 2017
local business tax: multiplier 357.06 45.30 1672 1996 - 2017
local property tax: multiplier 375.26 61.06 1672 1996 - 2017
local business tax: revenues (in million e) 10.80 9.03 1672 1996 - 2017
local property tax: revenues (in million e) 4.29 2.52 1672 1996 - 2017
local business tax: base (in million e) 72.90 63.50 1672 1996 - 2017
local property tax: base (in million e) 32.65 17.31 1672 1996 - 2017
net commuting flow per employee -0.13 0.21 1596 1997 - 2017
unemployed 13833.10 8588.68 1444 1996 - 2014
labor force 87131.02 52498.05 1672 1996 - 2017
GDP per capita 16901.04 2259.06 1672 1996 - 2017
other investment subsidies (in million e) 63.43 38.68 988 1996 - 2009
house price (in 1,000 e) 146.87 42.20 797 1996 - 2012
local labor market level
employees: manufacturing 7628.27 5457.74 1166 1996 - 2017
Notes: There are 76 counties in East Germany (excluding Berlin) according to 2014 county definitions. All monetary variables are expressed
in 2010 e. For sources and definitions
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1.B.2 Institutions
Indicator formulas The following formulas describe the indicator used to evaluate the












0.05 × (wage2003r )0.4 × (unemp2002−2005r )0.5 × (empforecastr)0.05
where infrtr measures the quality of a region r’s infrastructure assessed at time t, wage
represents per-capita earnings, unemp the average unemployment rate, and empforecast
is an employment rate projection.
Construction of cutoff samples Tables 1.B.3, 1.B.4 and 1.B.5 illustrate the indicator
rankings and cutoffs for the years 1997, 2000 and 2011. We do not use the rankings of
the 2007 reform since all East German counties were treated. When counties merge, we
take the average of the individual counties’ indicators.
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Table 1.B.3: Counties around the cutoff (year 1997)













KS Cottbus 99.926 high
Dahme-Spreewald 99.926 low
Halle (Saale) 100.003 low
Landkreis Leipzig 100.069 low
Nordsachsen 100.069 low
Schwerin 100.096 low









Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs.
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Table 1.B.4: Counties around the cutoff (year 2000)























Weimarer Land 100.144 low
Wartburgkreis 100.151 low
Eisenach 100.151 low
Halle (Saale) 100.169 low












Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs.
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Table 1.B.5: Counties around the cutoff (year 2011)
county NUTSII region priority group GDP per capita
...
Magdeburg, Stadt Magdeburg high 20,822e
Jerichower Land Magdeburg high 20,822e
Altmarkkreis Salzwedel Magdeburg high 20,822e
Boerde Magdeburg high 20,822e
Harz Magdeburg high 20,822e
Salzlandkreis Magdeburg high 20,822e
Stendal Magdeburg high 20,822e
Vogtlandkreis Chemnitz high 20,914e
Chemnitz, Stadt Chemnitz high 20,914e
Zwickau Chemnitz high 20,914e
Mittelsachsen Chemnitz high 20,914e
Erzgebirgskreis Chemnitz high 20,914e
Mansfeld-Suedharz Halle low 21,228e
Burgenlandkreis Halle low 21,228e
Halle (Saale), Stadt Halle low 21,228e
Saalekreis Halle low 21,228e
Elbe-Elster Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Cottbus Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Teltow-Flaeming Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Dahme-Spreewald Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Havelland Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Brandenburg an der Havel, Stadt Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Potsdam-Mittelmark Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Oberspreewald-Lausitz Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Spree-Neisse Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Potsdam Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
...
Source: Statistical Offices of German States , Deutscher Bundestag (2007).
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Table 1.B.6: Automatically eligible and non-eligible industries for GRW subsidies
Industries that are excluded from GRW subsidies
Agriculture, forestry and fishing
Mining
Energy and water supply
Construction
Retail except for mail order
Transportation and warehousing
Hospitals
Industries that are automatically eligible for GRW subsidies
Manufacture of chemical products
Manufacture of plastic products
Manufacture of rubber products
Manufacture of ceramic products
Manufacture of concrete products
Manufacture of concrete products
Manufacture of cement products
Manufacture of glass products
Manufacture of signs
Manufacture of iron and steel products
Manufacture of non-ferrous metals
Casting of steel and iron
Casting of non-ferrous metals
Manufacture of machinery and technical devices
Manufacture of office machines and data processing equipment
Manufacture of vehicles
Manufacture of boats
Manufacture of electronics and electric technology
Manufacture of precision engineered, optical and surgical products
Manufacture of clocks
Manufacture of sheet metal products
Manufacture of toys, jewellery, musical instruments and sports equipment
Manufacture of timber products
Manufacture of forms, tools and models
Manufacture of pulp, groundwood, paper cardboard
Manufacture of print products





Production of food for sale outside of the county
Production of animal feed
Mail order
Import and export wholesale
Data processing
Administration of industry firms or supra-regional service firms
Organizing congresses
Publishers
Research and experimental development for industry firms
Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities
Market research and public opinion polling
Business and management consultancy
Laboratory services for industry firms
Logistics
Tourism
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007) Notes: Industries which
are neither automatically eligible nor excluded from the subsidies have to show that the conditions mentioned in
Section 1.2 are met. 59
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1.C Additional Results









-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
log total investment log equipment investment
Source: AFiD Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log total and
equipment investment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (1.5). The sample includes the
55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
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low-skilled medium-skilled high-skilled
Source: SIAB Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log median
wages by skill level on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55
counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure 1.C.3: Event study estimates: wages by sector and mean wages




















-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
manufacturing non-manufacturing all sectors
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log median wage log average wage
Source: SIAB Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log
manufacturing wages by sector (Panel a) and log average wages (Panel b) on leads and lags of a change in the maximum
assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at
the county level.
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Figure 1.C.4: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by cutoff sample and
with controls
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baseline: M = 30 (55 counties) M = 20 (44 counties)
M = 40 (64 counties) full sample (76 counties)
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baseline including controls
including lagged controls
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate using different samples (Panel a) and including control
variables (Panel b) as in equation (1.5). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression
of changes in log other subsidies on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample
includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure 1.C.6: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment with binary treatment
and without partially treated
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baseline binary treatment scaled with average reforn
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baseline drop partial
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate with a binary treatment definition as in equation (1.1)
(Panel a) and without the partially treated counties (Panel b) as in equation (1.5). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and
plant level.
Figure 1.C.7: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by number of lags and
in first differences
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fixed effect first difference
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate with different lag windows (Panel a) and in first
differences (Panel b) as in equation (1.5). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level.
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Figure 1.C.8: Event study estimates: local tax revenues and tax bases
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log business tax base log property tax base
Source: Statistical Offices of German States Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression
of changes in the log local business and property tax revenues (Panel a) and the log local business per capita and property tax base
per capita (Panel b) on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55
counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure 1.C.9: Marginal value of public funds including wage effects and by discount
rate





















baseline + sectoral spillover + trade spillover + benefits + local taxes
baseline + wage effects





















baseline + sectoral spillover + trade spillover + unemployment benefits + local taxes
2% discount rate 3% discount rate 4% discount rate
Source: own calculations Notes: Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws.
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Figure 1.C.10: Counterfactual regional inequality: bottom 15% and bottom 25%
a) bottom 15%
H0(GRW  cash transfers):
p-value = 0.0002





































H0(GRW  cash transfers):
p-value = 0.0003




































Source: BHP, SIAB Notes: The first bar displays the effect of an increase in the GRW subsidy back to 1996 levels for counties in the
bottom 15% (Panel a) and bottom 25% (Panel b) of the labor income distribution on regional inequality within East Germany. The
second bar displays the effect a revenue-neutral policy that pays cash transfers to all unemployed within East Germany. The third
and forth bar show the effects of the two policies if they were applied to Germany as a whole. East Germany excludes Berlin.
Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws. The p-values refer to one-sided tests whether the effect of the GRW
policy is larger than the effect of cash transfers.
Figure 1.C.11: Counterfactual regional inequality: imposing different MVPFs and Gini
coefficients
a) imposing different MVPFs
H0(GRW  cash transfers):
p-value = 0.0002









































H0(GRW  cash transfers):
p-value = 0.0002
































Source: BHP, SIAB Notes: The first bar displays the effect of an increase in the GRW subsidy back to 1996 levels for counties in the
bottom 20% of the labor income distribution on regional inequality within East Germany. Panel (a) does not impose that the MVPF
of the GRW and cash transfer policy have to be the same and Panel (b) uses the Gini coefficient as an alternative measure of
regional inequality. The second bar displays the effect a revenue-neutral policy that pays cash transfers to all unemployed within
East Germany. The third and forth bar show the effects of the two policies if they were applied to Germany as a whole. East
Germany excludes Berlin. Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws. The p-values refer to one-sided tests whether
the effect of the GRW policy is larger than the effect of cash transfers.
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Chapter 2
Preferences over Taxation of
High-Income Individuals: Evidence
from a Survey Experiment
Joint with Dirk Engelmann, Eckhard Janeba and Lydia Mechtenberg.
2.1 Introduction
In the year 2012, president Hollande announced a 75% tax on high incomes in France.
Despite being a national figure, famous French actor Gérard Dépardieu reacted by ex-
changing his French for the Russian citizenship. While often seen as confirming the
textbook argument that globalization entails tax competition for high-income earners,
this well-covered move hardly constitutes more than anecdotal evidence. Indeed, more
systematic evidence is surprisingly rare and hard to generate. To be more specific, two
immediate questions arise: First, are the rich really as ready to act upon their advantage
and migrate for tax reasons as predicted by the textbook argument, or are Dépardieu-
like migration decisions rare exceptions? The well-established concept of home bias
suggests that not all would migrate when it pays in monetary terms (see, e.g., Feld-
stein and Horioka, 1980; Ogura, 2006). Second, do net beneficiaries of the tax-transfer
system anticipate the degree of mobility of the rich and choose tax rates accordingly?
The answer to the second question is not obvious since evidence in experimental pub-
lic economics suggests that voters are less than rational when choosing taxes (see, e.g.,
Sausgruber and Tyran, 2011). Moreover, it is neither evident that the rich will migrate
nor that the voters will vote as predicted, because a consensus has emerged in the liter-
ature on behavioral public economics that redistribution is driven by subjective beliefs
about givers and receivers, as well as by social preferences.1
1 For the role of beliefs, see, e.g., Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006). For the role
of preferences, see Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 2007) and Höchtl, Sausgruber, and Tyran (2012).
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Importantly, both such beliefs and preferences are heterogeneous. It is hence plau-
sible that political ideology - as a composite of redistribution-related beliefs and prefer-
ences - may play a major role when it comes to taxing the rich and the migration choices
of the rich. Almås, Cappelen, and Tungodden (2020) provide support that ideology
matters for redistribution preferences. They compare in an experiment Norwegian and
US citizens (two populations who arguably differ in their political ideology) when they,
in the role of an unaffected third party, make distributional choices. They find that Nor-
wegians are much more in favor of redistribution than US citizens when inequality is
based on luck, but both samples do not differ in the degree to which merit makes them
more inequality accepting. In a survey experiment in Sweden, Karadja, Mollerstrom,
and Seim (2017) find that informing participants that they rank higher in the income
distribution than they thought makes them prefer less redistribution and a more con-
servative party. Interestingly, this effect is entirely driven by participants who are right-
of-center to begin with. Furthermore, in a class-room experiment with students as well
as in surveys of politicians, Janeba (2014) finds that party preferences correlate with
tax choices of students while party affiliation correlates with beliefs of politicians about
tax-induced mobility of firms.
We therefore underpin our above two reasearch questions by a related triple: Do
those on the left and those on the right of the political spectrum differ in their expecta-
tions regarding the mobility of the rich and therefore in their views on how progressive
taxes should be? Do they even hold on to purely ideological views about appropriate
taxation that are independent of their beliefs about migration of the rich? Finally, do
the left-leaning and the right-leaning rich differ in their tendency to make Dépardieu-
like migration decisions? Answering these questions is important for evaluating the
race-to-the-bottom argument that the increasing mobility of labor (and capital) leads to
suboptimally low taxes and public spending (Keen and Konrad, 2013). If in practice,
however, on average households migrate less and stick to more progressive taxes than
what would be expected in a situation without the influence of political biases, the race
to the bottom and the link between globalization and inequality are attenuated.
We address the above questions in a large incentivized survey experiment with a
representative sample of subjects. It implements a stylized setting in which rich and
poor voters collectively choose the tax rate to impose on the rich, conditional on which
tax rate prevails in a (ficticious) neighboring country into which the rich may migrate.
Embedding the experiment in the 18th wave of the German Internet Panel (GIP), a large
online panel representative on observable variables of the German population aged 16
to 75, we elicit experimental tax choices, migration beliefs, and migration choices of
more than 3,000 individuals.
We randomly assign participants to the roles of rich and poor by providing them
with high and low endowments, respectively.2 While the poor are always immobile,
mobility of the rich varies across treatments. For them, incentives to migrate when
2 Hereafter, we will refer to subjects in the role of the poor as “the poor” and to subjects in the role of the
rich as “the rich”.
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mobile can be positive or negative. These migration incentives depend on the domestic
tax rate that the rich and the poor collectively choose by vote for their fictitious home
country and the exogenous tax rate in a fictitious neighboring country (the potential
destination of rich migrants). The latter tax rate varies across treatments. After the
domestic tax is chosen, the rich may migrate into the foreign country, then bearing some
migration costs. Apart from voting and migration decisions, we also elicit beliefs about
the choices of subjects in the other role, i.e., what the poor believe about the choices of
the rich, and vice versa.
We match our experimental data with response data obtained in earlier waves of
the German Internet Panel, in particular self-declared attitudes on redistribution, party
adherence, and demographic variables like age, gender, and education. Using regres-
sions, we analyze the determinants of tax and migration choices to isolate treatment
effects and effects of political ideology. Eliciting beliefs of the poor about migration
choices of the rich allows us to investigate whether beliefs and, once we control for
these, tax choices vary with political ideology. Hence, we can separate whether possible
differences in tax choices between more left-leaning and more right-leaning subjects are
driven by differences in beliefs about migration choices or by differences in preferences.
Reassuringly, the roles of being poor or rich determine experimental choices while
the actual positions in the income distribution do not. Hence, our experiment seems
internally valid. With regard to our research questions regarding the role of political
ideology, we find that it matters, although more clearly for the rich than for the poor:
the left-leaning rich are less willing to migrate than the right-leaning rich when it pays
in material terms. The left-leaning rich also vote for higher taxes than the right-leaning
rich. These effects do not depend on how we measure ideology, as attitudes toward
redistribution or as self-declared support for left-of-center or right-of-center political
parties. The poor, in their turn, choose higher taxes when generally in favor of redistri-
bution, although their party preference has no significant effect on tax choices. The effect
of a pro-redistribution attitude, however, holds even when conditioning on the poor’s
migration beliefs. We also find that migration beliefs are not systematically related to
political attitudes. Hence, we conclude that political ideology relates to preferences
rather than beliefs. These findings are in line with the comparative-static predictions of
a simple model of inequality aversion when the aversion parameters vary with ideol-
ogy.
The comparative-statics predictions of our model are supported by the observed
treatment effects. They reveal that the poor understand the migration incentives of
the rich and react to these incentives when choosing domestic taxes. The rich, in their
turn, also react to migration incentives but much less so than expected by the poor. By
contrast, and as predicted by our model, they are willing to forego material gains to
benefit their poor fellow-citizens, both when choosing domestic taxes and when decid-
ing whether to migrate or stay. Tax choices are also more benevolent than expected for
selfish agents since both poor and rich tend to vote for medium taxes. In fact, the poor
tend to choose medium taxes even in the absence of migration incentives for the rich,
and although they seem to understand these incentives well. Hence, the poor refrain
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from exploiting the rich even when exploitation is possible, and although being poor or
rich in our experiment is entirely due to luck. This generosity of the poor toward the
rich exceeds what can be rationalized by our model.
Finally, our work relates to a large theoretical and empirical literature on taxation
and migration. As Mirrlees (1971, p. 176) famously noted, “the threat of migration is a
major influence on the degree of progression in actual tax systems”. Spelling out this
idea in more detail, the theoretical literature robustly finds that if labor is mobile, partic-
ularly at the top of the income distribution, then tax competition between governments
reduces redistribution from high-income earners to lower segments of the income distri-
bution.3 However, this literature largely ignores behavioral factors such as social pref-
erences or biased beliefs. If, for instance, low-income voters are inequality-averse with
respect to the inhabitants of their own country but do not take other countries into ac-
count, they may tend to vote for highly progressive taxes even if such taxes drive the top
earners out of the country. Alternatively, if high-income earners are sufficiently averse
towards advantageous inequality, they may refrain from migrating despite high taxes
in their domestic country. Moreover, beliefs about the willingness to migrate might be
biased among voters. Hence, it is important to turn to empirically testing the standard
predictions about tax competition in an open political economy.
In fact, the question how taxation affects migration choices of high-income individ-
uals has already been the subject of empirical research. For example, Kleven, Landais,
and Saez (2013) analyze the role of taxes on the incentives of professional football play-
ers to play abroad. They find that the elasticity of the number of foreign players with
respect to their net-of-tax rate is around one, and substantially higher for younger and
top players. Qualitatively, the result is in line with Kleven et al. (2014) who estimate
high elasticities of migration of foreign high-income individuals with respect to the net-
of-tax rate of around 1.5 to 2 in a study of preferential income taxation in Denmark.
Similarly, Muñoz (2019) finds an elasticity of above 1 in Europe for the responsiveness
of the number of foreign top earners with respect to the net of tax rate. A (stock) elastic-
ity around 1 is reported by Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva (2016) for foreign super-
star inventors, while much lower elasticities prevail for domestic inventors. Agrawal
and Foremny (2019) conclude that the tax-induced mobility is large within Spain, in
particular in certain industries like the health sector, but with only moderate tax rev-
enue consequences. Overall, empirical studies suggest that mobility of top earners is
substantial (see Kleven et al., 2020, for an overview).
3 The standard approach to optimal income taxation by Mirrlees (1971) applied to a closed economy situ-
ation. While also early contributions like Wilson (1980) considered the problem of optimal linear income
taxation when workers are mobile, later work has advanced Mirrlees’ approach. Simula and Trannoy
(2010) analyze the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule when workers are mobile at a cost, while hold-
ing tax policy in the outside country fixed. Other authors have analyzed income taxation when govern-
ments of several countries compete, which is modeled as a Nash game (Bierbrauer, Brett, and Weymark,
2013; Blumkin, Sadka, and Shem-Tov, 2015; Lehmann, Simula, and Trannoy, 2014; Morelli, Yang, and Ye,
2012; Piaser, 2007).
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It is difficult, however, to construct counterfactuals regarding mobility conditions
with field data only; and it is difficult to correctly estimate the tendency to migrate
without the construction of counterfactuals. Here, experimental work can complement
standard empirical research. In an experiment, it is possible to construct counterfac-
tuals and pin down causality for individual decisions, such as migration and voting
decisions, by treatment comparisons. Hence, we experimentally test a simple model of
optimal taxation and migration in the presence of inequality aversion to investigate to
which extent behavioral factors such as social preferences or biased beliefs shall become
part of the story.
In doing so, we contribute to a growing experimental literature on tax choices through
voting (see Lorenz, Rauhut, and Kittel, 2015, p. 2, for a review of this literature). Saus-
gruber and Tyran (2011) ascertain that biased beliefs on price effects of taxes distort
collective tax choice. Höchtl, Sausgruber, and Tyran (2012) find that inequality aversion
affects democratic redistribution if and only if high-income earners are in the major-
ity, while a poor majority does not expropriate the rich. This latter finding is in line
with the (standard) model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and resonates with recent ex-
periments and surveys, including our own. For instance, Weinzierl (2017), in a survey
among 2,500 U.S. citizen, reports that between 50 and 95 percent of respondents believe
that full equalization of endowments that are due to luck would be unjust. Instead,
they advocate the idea that post-tax incomes should depend on pre-tax endowments
and that there is an entitlement to one’s own endowments even in the absence of ef-
fort. Relatedly, Charité, Fisman, and Kuziemko (2015) report results from two experi-
ments suggesting that subjects redistribute less when knowing pre-tax endowments of
the better-off or when reference points are more deeply engrained.4
We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we experimentally investigate an
open economy in which the top earners can avoid excessive taxation if they migrate.
Second, we relate individual tax and migration choices in our survey experiment to
survey data about political attitudes and beliefs.
Our work is complementary to the literature on preferences for redistribution in
the presence of immigration (see, for example, Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva, 2018;
Alesina and Stantcheva, 2020; Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist, 2012; Hainmueller
and Hiscox, 2010; Martinangeli and Windsteiger, 2019). In this literature, immigra-
tion is typically taken as given and thus not endogenous to government policy in the
host country. Furthermore, preferences for redistribution are elicited through unincen-
tivized survey questions, in contrast to our approach, where participants make choices
that have material consequences, albeit with a small probability. For example, using
evidence from a large-scale survey in six countries, Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva
(2018) document that native respondents overestimate the number of immigrants in
4 Casal, Grimm, and Schächtele (2019) experimentally analyze the role of preferential tax treatment of
high-income earners, motivated by mobility, for the tax compliance decisions and equity perceptions of
low income earners. They find that exogenously given motivations for tax preferences for the rich have
negative effects on tax compliance and equity perceptions of the poor.
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their country. Simply reminding respondents of immigration decreases support for re-
distribution. Behavioral biases thus appear to play a role in the context of immigration.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
simple model of redistributive taxation that mirrors the experimental implementation.
In Section 2.3 we first explain in detail the setup of the survey experiment within the
German Internet Panel and then discuss the hypotheses based on the comparative-static
predictions of our model. We present the main results and discuss deviations from the
point predictions of our model in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Redistributive Taxation with Inequality-Averse Agents
A country (home) is populated by two types of individuals {p, r}, called poor and rich,
with exogenously given gross incomes yp = 20 and yr = 90. In the base case (closed
economy: no mobility) the country has two poor and one rich inhabitant. We model
a purely redistributive tax-transfer system. The set of feasible tax rates is limited to
three - low, medium, high - with the following values: tL = 10, tM = 20, tH = 40. A
rich individual pays the tax t ∈ {tL, tM , tH}, which is then divided among the two poor.
Under a balanced government budget without other spending, the transfer to each poor
individual becomes t
2
. Net income as a function of the tax rate is therefore zp = 20 + t2
for a poor and zr = 90 − t for a rich individual. Notice that even under the highest tax
the ranking of pre-tax incomes is preserved post tax and transfer, that is, zp < zr holds
under any tax.
Next, consider an open economy. Here, we allow for migration of the rich to a second
country, called foreign, in which the rich earns the same gross income yr = 90. The tax
rate in the foreign country is exogenously given and from the same set of feasible tax
rates: t∗ ∈ {10, 20, 40}. Migration is costly for the rich, however, involving a loss of
m = 15. If the rich emigrates to the other country, there is no tax revenue generated at
home. Then, the net income of a poor in his domestic country equals his gross income:
zp = yp.
As an abundant literature on social preferences has shown, experimental partici-
pants in the laboratory and the field often exhibit social preferences, i.e., they tend to
care about what others earn, too. Given that our experiment involves simple redistri-
bution choices, it makes sense to model participants’ social preferences as inequality
aversion, following Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The standard Fehr-Schmidt utility func-
tion for person i is given by










max(xi − xj, 0) (2.1)
where x is the payoff vector and n the number of players in the game. Note that, by
design, in our game the rich always earns more than the poor do. Hence, the poor’s in-
equality aversion can only pertain to disadvantageous inequality (α), while the reverse
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holds true for the rich. The resulting utility function takes the following form (with Up
denoting the utility of the poor and Ur the utility of the rich):
Up = zp −
α
2
(zr − zp) (2.2)
and
Ur = zr − β(zr − zp). (2.3)
We assume that inequality aversion relates to the net income of the rich and poor and
consider the migration cost m as monetary so that it enters net income zr = yr − t∗ −m
if the rich migrates.
In the experiment, the tax rate is chosen by a random dictator mechanism. Hence,
beliefs about the other players’ tax choices are irrelevant for one’s optimal choice be-
cause whenever one’s own choice matters, those of the others do not. We now derive
the preferred tax rate for each type in both the no-mobility and the mobility regime.
2.2.1 No-Mobility Setting
The utility level of a poor player in absence of mobility (nm) is




















Utility of the poor is strictly increasing in the tax rate as long as the net income of the
rich still exceeds the net income of the poor, which holds for our admissible tax rates.
Hence, the preferred tax rate of a poor is tp = 40. By contrast, the utility of a rich is given
by















Utility of the rich is a linear function of t, and the sign of the derivative of equation 2.5
with respect to the tax rate depends on the level of inequality aversion. For β < 2/3,
the preferred tax rate is the lowest, as inequality concerns are relatively unimportant.
When β is larger than 2/3, the rich favors the highest possible tax rate. For β = 2/3, the
rich is indifferent between all admissible tax rates.
We summarize preferred tax rates for each type:













2.2. REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION WITH INEQUALITY-AVERSE AGENTS
2.2.2 Mobility Setting
In the mobility setting, we first analyze under which condition the rich migrates. As-
suming that the domestic tax rate is t and the foreign tax rate is t∗, the rich migrates if
the utility at home, Uhr , is smaller than the utility in the foreign country, U fr .5








< 90− t∗ −m− β(90− t∗ −m− 20) = U fr
⇐⇒ m < t− t
∗ + β(t∗ − 3t/2)
1− β
(2.8)
The interpretation is straightforward: migration takes place when the migration costs
(weighted by 1 − β) are smaller than the differential between the domestic and for-
eign tax, adjusted by a term reflecting the difference in realized inequality between the
two situations. We assume that inequality aversion is experienced with respect to the
citizens of the home country, not the foreign country, even if a rich player migrates.6
Following the standard assumption of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) that β < 1 (i.e., aversion
towards advantageous inequality does not dominate concerns for own payoffs), the sign
of the right-hand side of equation 2.8 depends only on the numerator. Hence, implausi-
ble migration outcomes are avoided where the rich would migrate because paying the
migration costs reduces inequality. Under this assumption, it is now easy to show how
migration depends on the degree of inequality aversion.
Lemma 1: Migration is weakly decreasing in the parameter for inequality aversion
β of the rich:
• For β ∈ [0, 1/5), the rich will migrate if and only if t = 40 and t∗ ∈ {10, 20}.
• For β ∈ [1/5, 3/7), the rich will migrate if and only if t = 40 and t∗ = 10.
• For β ∈ [3/7, 1), the rich will not migrate.
We now analyze the preferred tax rate of a rich and a poor, when all anticipate migra-
tion behavior. The rich knows their own type β, which then directly yields the migration
decision in equation 2.8. A poor, by contrast, needs to form a belief about the rich type’s
inequality aversion. We denote this belief by Ep[β], where E is the expectation. We
note that by the same argument as for the no-mobility case, the utility of the poor is
increasing in the tax rate as long as the rich does not migrate. Migration leads to lower
payoffs for the poor. A poor player could hence only prefer the rich to migrate if he is so
5 We assume that a rich person who is indifferent between migrating or not will stay in the domestic coun-
try. Under the reasonable assumption on the continuous distribution of the inequality aversion parame-
ters, indifference is a zero probability event, so that the assumption on how the rich break indifference is
immaterial.
6 In our experimental setting, where one can influence the payoffs of the participants in the home country,
but there are not actual participants in the foreign country, this is arguably plausible.
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inequality-averse that the reduction of inequality that is caused by the migration costs
exceeds the loss in material payoff.7
Preferred tax of the poor
The preferred tax rate of an extremely inequality-averse poor player (α > 4) is 40 if the
foreign tax rate is medium or high. For poor players with α ≤ 4 the preferred tax rate
is 40 if either t∗ = 40 or t∗ = 20 and additionally Ep[β] ≥ 1/5, because in both situations
no migration is expected for any domestic tax rate. If t∗ = 20 and Ep[β] < 1/5, the
migration threat is credible and the highest possible tax rate subject to no migration is
chosen by the poor, which is t = 20. Finally, when the foreign tax rate is low, the highest
tax rate is preferred if the poor believes the rich to be sufficiently inequality averse, that
is Ep[β] ≥ 3/7. To summarize:
tmp (t
∗ = 40) = 40
tmp (t





Ep[β] ≥ 1/5 or α > 4
Ep[β] < 1/5 and α ≤ 4
(2.9)
tmp (t







Fehr and Schmidt (1999) estimate that extreme aversion towards disadvantageous in-
equality (α ≥ 4) pertains only to about 10% of typical experimental subject pools, which
is also confirmed in a direct test by Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011). We there-
fore expect the inequality aversion of the poor to be of minor importance, such that the
poor will typically prefer tax rates that will prevent the rich from migrating.
Preferred tax of the rich
For the rich, the preferred tax rate can in principle also depend on their own migration
choices and hence on the foreign tax rate. Note, however, that choosing a tax rate that
would drive oneself out of the country is never optimal. Paying tax t∗ abroad leads to
additional costs m compared to paying t = t∗ at home and the additional reduction in
inequality is less than m. Hence, since β < 1, paying t = t∗ at home is preferred over
paying t∗ abroad for any β ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, the preferred tax rate for the rich is the
7 This can only be the case if t∗ = 20. If t∗ = 10, the payoff of a rich who migrates will only be lower by 5
compared to staying at home and paying t = 20, but the poor would each lose 10 and hence inequality
increases. Therefore, a poor player would never want a rich to migrate if the foreign tax is low. In case
of the medium foreign tax, a poor player would prefer the high over the medium domestic tax, such
that the rich migrates and pays migration costs if and only if Up(rich leaves) > Up(rich stays) ⇐⇒
20− α2 (70− 15− 20) > 30−
α
2 (70− 30) ⇐⇒ α > 4.
74
2.3. SURVEY EXPERIMENT
same as without mobility and depends only on the rich’s inequality aversion but not












Based on the above insights, we can establish the following comparative statics with
respect to our treatments and the inequality aversion parameters α and β.
1. The preferred tax rate of a rich is weakly increasing in their inequality aversion β
(follows from equations 2.7 and 2.10).
2. a) The preferred tax rate of a poor is weakly lower when the rich is mobile and
the foreign tax is low or medium compared to when the rich is not mobile or
the foreign tax is high (follows from equations 2.6 and 2.9).
b) The preferred tax rate of a poor under mobility is weakly increasing in the
expected inequality aversion β of the rich when the foreign tax is medium or
low (follows from equation 2.9).
c) The poor’s preferred tax rate is independent of their inequality aversion α if
she is not extremely inequality-averse (follows from equations 2.6 and 2.9).
3. a) When the domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is low or medium, a rich’s
propensity to migrate is weakly decreasing in their inequality aversion β
(follows from Lemma 1).
b) In all other cases, inequality aversion β of the rich should not matter for mi-
gration decisions (follows from Lemma 1).
It is also useful to make explicit predictions for the benchmark specification of our
model when subjects are selfish (α = β = 0). It is easy to see that a selfish rich will
always prefer the low tax and will migrate if and only if the domestic tax is high and
the foreign tax is not. A selfish poor, expecting the rich to be selfish, too, will prefer the
medium tax if the rich is mobile and the foreign tax is not high. Otherwise, the selfish
poor will prefer the high tax rate.
2.3 Survey Experiment
2.3.1 German Internet Panel (GIP)
We implement the above-described model of optimal redistributive taxation in an ex-
perimental setting using the German Internet Panel (GIP), a probability-based longitu-
dinal panel survey conducted by the Collaborative Research Center “Political Economy
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of Reforms” (SFB 884) at the University of Mannheim. Although the GIP is online-
based, it is representative for the general population in Germany aged from 16 to 75 liv-
ing in private households. This is achieved by providing households without internet
connection with the necessary devices to participate in the panel, as well as clear tech-
nical instructions on their usage (Blom, Gathmann, and Krieger, 2015). The selection
of the panel is based on a stratified random sample of both the online and offline pop-
ulation. In comparison to other population statistics, the GIP shows high congruence
with regard to personal characteristics like age, unemployment, urbanity, and regional-
ity (Blom et al., 2016; Blom, Gathmann, and Krieger, 2015).
All participants of the GIP are first recruited in face-to-face interviews and then take
part in bimonthly surveys of around 20 minutes resulting in a panel data set. The GIP
started in September 2012 and has a special focus on opinions and preferences with re-
gard to political reforms. The surveys are accompanied by quality-assurance measures
such as extensive plausibility tests conducted by an expert team of the GIP, as well as
a pre-test concerning the technical implementation. These provisions are in place to
ensure the comprehensibility of questions about complex issues for the general popula-
tion. In order to maintain the GIP’s high retention rates (73% - 80%) there is an incentive
scheme in place (Blom, Gathmann, and Krieger, 2015). Participants are getting 4e for
every survey that they take part in and on top of that there is a bonus for those who
participated in every survey of the year (10e) and those who only missed one survey
(5e), respectively.
2.3.2 Design
In the experiment, every participant of the panel is randomly assigned to a treatment.
One quarter of the panel is acting as the control group by playing under the no-mobility
treatment condition, which is referring to the model without migration option, while the
rest plays under the mobility treatment condition. Within both the mobile and immobile
partition of the panel, two-thirds are assigned to be poor and one third to be rich.8 The
mobility types are also exogenously assigned to a foreign tax rate. 40% are facing a low
foreign tax rate, 40% are facing a medium foreign tax rate and 20% are facing a high
foreign tax rate (see Table 2.3.1 for an overview).9 Respondents are told that they are
part of a hypothetical country, which they share with two other participants such that
each country consists of one rich and two poor respondents. Because of the nature of an
online survey, the respondents cannot interact directly and are matched only ex post to
their respective country by a random mechanism. Therefore, questions that condition
on others’ choices are asked using the strategy method. The questions are described in
more detail later in this section.
8 Note that we do not use the value-laden term “poor” in the instructions. Instead, we use the more neutral
term of a low-income earner.
9 We assigned fewer participants to the high foreign tax rate, because in this case mobility does not affect
the optimal domestic tax rate and is therefore less interesting to study.
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Table 2.3.1: Treatment and role assignment
mobility no yes yes yes total
foreign tax – low medium high
N in % N in % N in % N in % N in %
poor 513 16.99 614 20.33 609 20.17 302 10.00 2,038 67.48
rich 257 8.50 293 9.70 285 9.44 147 4.87 982 32.52
total 770 25.50 907 30.33 894 29.60 449 14.87 3,020 100.00
Notes: Slight deviations from the expected share of treated individuals occur because of individuals not completing the
whole survey. 40 out of 3,060 participants did not complete the whole survey.
All participants of the panel are required to go through a detailed explanation of
the experiment specifically tailored to their type and treatment. This includes detailed
step-by-step descriptions and multiple examples of possible outcomes written in easy
language as well as simple graphics illustrating the timing of events and the voting
system. Furthermore, tables visualizing all potential outcomes of the model are not only
presented during the explanation, but also depicted when individuals have to make
their decisions. Participants took an average time of about eleven minutes to complete
the survey.
After reading the description of the available choices and consequences and before
making their tax-rate and migration choices, the participants are made aware that there
is an extra incentive scheme on top of the general GIP scheme described above. After
the experiment, 20 (out of 1,020) experimental countries are randomly drawn and the
participants who were part of these countries are getting their hypothetical income from
the game as a bonus payment. This translates into 60 out of 3,060 participants receiving
an average bonus payment of 41.33e. Depending on their type, treatment, and their
own decisions, this payment can range between 20e (poor type when the rich migrates)
and 80e (rich type if she does not migrate and the low tax is chosen).
Finally, all participants are asked the following questions: (1) What tax do you vote
for? (2) Which tax do you think will the respective other type vote for? Participants
in the mobility treatment who are of the rich type are additionally asked whether they
would migrate conditional on every single possible tax rate in their domestic country
(low, medium and high). Analogously, participants of the mobility treatment who are of
the poor type are asked whether they believe that the rich in their country will migrate,
again conditional on every possible domestic tax rate. The full questionnaire can be
found in Appendix 2.C.
To sum up, we collect data not only on tax and migration decisions, but also on the
beliefs about the behavior of other participants. The random assignment of treatments
and roles allows us to identify the treatment effects of mobility, type, and foreign tax
rate on the tax and migration choices, as well as tax and migration beliefs by (ordered)
logistic regressions.10 Using our rich data set, we can link these variables to various
10 Results are very similar when using (ordered) probit regressions. See Appendix 2.B for details.
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questions about political opinions and party preferences as well as personal character-
istics such as gender, age, and education level (see Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A for sum-
mary statistics).11 With regard to political ideology, we can observe participants’ stated
party preference and distributive preference. In order to study the effect of party pref-
erences in a more systematic way, we follow the sorting of parties by the Comparative
Manifesto Project12 on an economic left-right scheme. The center-left Social Democrats
SPD, the environmentalist Greens, the Pirate party and the most far-left party The Left
(“Die Linke”) are coded as left-wing, while all other parties13 are coded as right-wing.
In order to infer an individual’s preference for redistribution, respondents are asked
directly: “Should the government employ policies to lower income inequality?” We
group those who stated to be “in favor” or “strongly in favor” as in favor of redistribu-
tion, those who answered “against” or “strongly against” as against redistribution and
those who chose “neither in favor nor against” as indifferent towards redistribution. We
find that redistribution and political preferences are correlated in the expected direction.
Left-wing participants are 25.6 percentage points (p < 0.01) more likely to be in favor
of redistribution than right-wing participants. It is important to differentiate these vari-
ables from our treatment variables since they are not randomly assigned. Their effect
should therefore be interpreted as (conditional) correlations, not causal effects.
2.3.3 Hypotheses
The comparative statics of our model, combined with the assumption that participants
in favor of redistribution as well as left-leaning participants are more inequality-averse,
yield testable hypotheses with respect to both tax and migration choices. This assump-
tion is supported by Kerschbamer and Müller (2020) who find implementing the equal-
ity equivalence test of Kerschbamer (2015) in the GIP that participants classified as self-
ish are more likely right-leaning, whereas preference types that are benevolent towards
players with lower payoffs are more likely left-leaning. For the ease of exposition, we
will call both left-wing participants and those in favor of redistribution left-leaning and
other participants right-leaning. The tax choices of the poor players depend on their
beliefs about the migration choices of the rich, whereas the tax and migration choices
of the rich are independent of their beliefs about the choices of the poor. Therefore, we
begin with the tax and migration choices of the rich, then move to the beliefs of the poor
about the migration choices of the rich and conclude with the tax choices of the poor.
Our first hypothesis follows directly from comparative statics 1.
11 Given the context of our experiment, one might want to control for actual migration experiences of par-
ticipants. The closest proxy for this variable is information on citizenship. However, only 5% of partici-
pants have a non-German passport, and of those almost half have dual citizenship, making a systematic
analysis difficult.
12 Data and information at https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/
13 These include the center-right CDU/CSU, the liberal (free market-oriented) democrats FDP, the right-
wing populist AfD, and the far-right NPD.
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Hypothesis 1 (tax choices and political preferences of the rich). Left-leaning rich players
vote for a higher tax rate than right-leaning rich players.
Consider now migration choices of the rich. Again, we derive predictions from our
model in a straightforward way, as summarized in our next hypothesis below. First,
Lemma 1 implies that for any level of inequality aversion, the rich should only mi-
grate if the domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is not because under this condition
migration pays materially whereas otherwise migration does not pay materially and
also increases inequality. Assuming that not all our participants are strongly inequality
averse, this implies Hypothesis 2a. Second, Lemma 1 further implies that when migra-
tion pays materially, sufficiently inequality-averse rich players may still decide not to
migrate (see also comparative statics 3a). Assuming that the left-leaning participants
are more inequality averse than the right-leaning participants, we thus derive Hypothe-
sis 2b. By contrast, if migration does not pay materially, migration choice is not affected
by a rich player’s inequality aversion (see comparative statics 3b). Under the assump-
tion that political preferences do not affect migration choices in this situation other than
through differences in inequality aversion, this yields Hypothesis 2c.
Hypothesis 2 (migration choices and political preferences of the rich).
a) Rich players more frequently migrate when the domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is
not high than in the remaining constellations.
b) When the domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is not high, the left-leaning rich are less
likely to migrate than the right-leaning rich.
c) If the domestic tax is not high or the foreign tax is high, migration choices of the rich do
not vary with their political preferences.
Given that the domestic and foreign tax rates affect the incentives for the rich to
migrate, they should also affect the beliefs of the poor about the migration choices of
the rich. This in turn affects the optimal tax level from the perspective of the poor. We
first address the beliefs of the poor. If the poor understand the material incentives of
the game and expect at least some of the rich to be affected by these material incentives,
the poor should expect the rich to be more likely to migrate when domestic taxes are
high and foreign taxes are not than otherwise (Hypothesis 3a). In our model, the beliefs
of the poor about the migration choices of the rich are independent of the poor players’
own political ideology. However, a more leftist political perspective might also make
participants more optimistic that the rich will not migrate even when it pays materially,
for example because the left-leaning expect others to be more inequality averse.14 This
implies Hypothesis 3b.
14 If the left-leaning are more averse towards advantageous inequality than the right-leaning participants,
it is also plausible that they expect others to be more averse towards advantageous inequality due to the
(false) consensus effect, (Engelmann and Strobel, 2000), i.e., a correlation of a participant’s expectation
about other participants with their own type.
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Hypothesis 3 (migration beliefs and political preferences of the poor).
a) The expectation of the poor that the rich will migrate is higher when the domestic tax is
high and the foreign tax is not high than in the remaining constellations.
b) When migration pays (high domestic tax and low or medium foreign tax), left-leaning poor
players tend to be less convinced than right-leaning ones that the rich will migrate.
The material migration incentives of the rich and the beliefs of the poor whether the
rich will act on these incentives are expected to affect the tax choices of the poor. Specif-
ically, if the poor expect the rich to be more likely to migrate when it pays materially as
predicted in Hypothesis 3a, the poor should vote for lower taxes (or more precisely, be
less likely to vote for high taxes and more likely to vote for medium taxes) if the rich
are mobile and foreign taxes are low or medium than if the rich are immobile or foreign
taxes are high, implying Hypothesis 4a (see also comparative statics 2a). The poor may,
however, also expect the rich not to migrate even when it pays, or they may also expect
the rich to migrate when both domestic and foreign taxes are high. Assuming that the
poor maximize their expected earnings, then for any level of foreign taxes, if they be-
lieve the rich will migrate when domestic taxes are high, the poor should be less likely
to choose high taxes, implying 4b (see also comparative statics 2b).
Now consider the impact of political ideology on tax choices. If the left-leaning poor
are indeed more optimistic than the right-leaning poor that the rich will not migrate
even if this pays materially (Hypothesis 3b) and if in their tax choices the poor take
their beliefs about the migration choices of the rich into account (Hypothesis 4b), then
the left-leaning poor should choose higher taxes than the right-leaning poor, leading to
Hypothesis 4c.15 High tax choices by the left-leaning poor compared to the right-leaning
poor that are not explained by differences in beliefs (i.e. support for Hypothesis 4c, even
though 3b is violated) could be interpreted that the left-leaning are more likely than the
15 As pointed out above, it is also plausible that the belief data will be subject to the (false) consensus effect.
There is substantial evidence for the presence of the consensus effect in the experimental literature and
the consensus effect can be responsible for patterns in the choice data that may be misinterpreted as ev-
idence of certain preferences patterns. For example, Blanco et al. (2014) show that a correlation between
cooperation in the role of first mover and second mover in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma is explained to
a large degree by cooperative second movers expecting others to cooperate as well rather than by a gen-
eral preference for cooperation. Similarly, in our setting, the consensus effect would allow for a different
underlying channel for support of Hypothesis 4c. It is possible that some strongly inequality-averse poor
might vote for high taxes due to their inequality aversion and expect the rich to be strongly inequality
averse (and hence not to migrate) due to the consensus effect. Then a correlation between tax choice and
migration beliefs would result, even though the beliefs are not causal for the tax choices. Note, however,
that this channel requires that the poor are strongly averse towards disadvantageous inequality but ex-
pect the rich to be strongly averse towards advantageous inequality. Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann
(2011) observe essentially no correlation between estimated parameters for aversion towards advanta-
geous and disadvantageous inequality, making it implausible that due to the consensus effect the poor
who are averse towards disadvantageous inequality expect the rich to be averse towards advantageous
inequality. Hence this alternative channel is unlikely to play a major role in our data.
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right-leaning to be extremely inequality averse (α > 4 in our model, see comparative
statics 2c).
Hypothesis 4 (tax choices and political preferences of the poor).
a) The poor vote for lower tax rates in the mobility treatment with the foreign tax being low
or medium compared to no mobility or the foreign tax being high.
b) The poor are less likely to vote for high taxes if they believe that the rich will migrate when
domestic taxes are high.
c) Left-leaning poor participants vote for higher taxes than right-leaning participants.
2.4 Results
As a first step, in order to make sure that the randomization worked properly, we regress
treatment dummies on observable characteristics and reassuringly, we do not find any
significant effects (see Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix). Following standard conventions,
we understand statistical significance being at the 5% level and will note weak signifi-
cance at the 10% level explicitly. We now move on to testing our hypotheses.
2.4.1 Testing the Comparative-Static Predictions
Following the order of our hypotheses, we begin with the analysis of the tax choices
of the rich and continue with their migration choices. We then address whether the
comparative statics of the migration choices of the rich are reflected in the beliefs of the
poor and whether these beliefs are affected by the political ideology of the poor. Finally,
we investigate whether these migration beliefs and the poor’s ideology affect their tax
choices.
We test Hypothesis 1 by examining the relationship between tax choices of the rich
and their political party preferences and redistribution preferences. In line with the
hypothesis, the rich who support left-of-center parties are 6.8 percentage points less
likely to choose the low tax rate and 4.6 percentage points more likely to choose the high
tax rate than rich who support right-of-center parties (see columns 1 to 3 in Panel A of
Table 2.4.1).16 Similarly, those participants who state to be in favor of redistribution are
significantly less likely to choose the low tax rate and more likely to choose the medium
or high tax rate than those opposed to redistribution, with participants who state to be
indifferent in between (see columns 1 to 3 in Panel B of Table 2.4.1). We summarize
these findings in
16 The lower number of observations in Panel A compared to Panel B is because of a higher number of
participants not stating their party preference. Results for the individual political parties can be found in
Table 2.B.1 in Appendix 2.B.
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Table 2.4.1: Tax choices and ideology: by role
only rich players only poor players
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
low medium high low medium high
Panel A ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing -0.068*** 0.022** 0.046*** -0.022 0.001 0.020
(0.025) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.002) (0.014)
N 686 686 686 1,429 1,429 1,429
Panel B redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.062** 0.020* 0.042** -0.024 0.001 0.023
(0.030) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.002) (0.018)
pro redistribution -0.084*** 0.027** 0.058*** -0.062*** 0.002 0.060***
(0.027) (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016)
N 887 887 887 1,825 1,825 1,825
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average
marginal effects of ordered logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Each horizontal line indicates a new regression. Controls include dummies
for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39, 40-49, 50-59,
> 60), and two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more household members).
Result 1 (tax choices and political attitudes of the rich). In the role of the rich player, left-
leaning participants vote for higher tax rates than right-leaning participants, as predicted in
Hypothesis 1.
Next, we turn to Hypothesis 2a, i.e., we test whether the rich understand and act on
the migration incentives given by different domestic and foreign tax rates. We first plot
migration rates of the rich both for the setting in which migration pays in material terms
(high domestic tax and low or medium foreign tax) and for the setting in which it does
not pay. As Figure 2.4.1 shows, 62.6% of rich players migrate if it pays. By contrast,
if migration does not pay, only 9.8% do migrate. The regression analysis in column
1 of Table 2.4.2 confirms these findings and reveals their significance. Compared to
the constellation where migration does not pay materially, i.e., where foreign taxes are
high or domestic taxes are not, the propensity to migrate increases significantly when
migration pays in material terms. To summarize, the rich seem to understand and react
to migration incentives, confirming Hypothesis 2a.
While the rich migrate much more often when it pays in material terms than when
it does not, more than a third of them still do not migrate even when it pays. In line
with our model, this can be driven by inequality aversion, which we expect to be re-
flected in their political ideology. We hence compare migration choices of the left- and
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migration pays migration does not pay







migration pays migration does not pay
migration belief of the poor
the right-leaning rich, both when migration pays and when it does not pay. As one
can see in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4.3, participants supporting left-of-center parties
or being in favor of redistribution are 12 to 14 percentage points less likely to migrate
than right-wing participants when migration pays, supporting Hypothesis 2b.17 When
migration does not pay, however, migration choices are unrelated to the political party
preferences (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4.3) or the redistribution preferences, as pre-
dicted in Hypothesis 2c. We summarize our results on the impact of political ideology
on migration choices in
Result 2 (migration choices and political attitudes of the rich).
17 When looking at individual political parties, the effect is mainly driven by supporters of the right-wing
populist party AfD. Ironically, thus, supporters of an anti-immigration party are most likely to be eco-
nomic migrants in our study (see Table 2.B.2 in Appendix 2.B). The rich made migration choices for each
possible tax rate. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4.3 include for each individual in the treatments with low
or medium foreign tax the migration choice for high domestic tax. Columns 3 and 4 include three data
points for the individuals in the treatment with high foreign tax (one for each domestic tax) and two data
points for the individuals in the treatments with low or medium foreign tax (one for low domestic tax
and one for medium domestic tax).
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Table 2.4.2: Migration choices and beliefs
(1) (2)
migration choice migration belief
migration incentives reference category: migration does not pay
migration does pay 0.348*** 0.492***
(0.007) (0.007)
N 2,175 4,442
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average
marginal effects of logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the individual level.
(i) The rich react to material migration incentives as predicted by Hypothesis 2a.
(ii) The reaction to incentives is mitigated by their political ideology with the left-leaning rich
being less likely to migrate than the right-leaning rich when migration pays materially,
confirming Hypothesis 2b.
(iii) There is no difference in the migration choices with respect to political ideology when
migration does not pay, confirming Hypothesis 2c.
We have seen that the rich react to the incentives to migrate. We have also seen,
though, that the degree to which they do so depend on their ideology. In order to
understand whether the migration incentives of the rich affect the tax choices by the
poor, we analyze whether the beliefs of the poor are affected by the incentives to migrate
for the rich. Further, in order to understand if and how the tax choices by the poor are
affected by their own political ideology, we need to understand whether it influences
their beliefs that the rich would migrate. Hence, we move on to test Hypothesis 3.
As a first step, we plot migration beliefs both for the setting in which migration pays
in material terms (high domestic tax and low or medium foreign tax) and for the setting
in which migration does not pay. As Figure 2.4.1 shows, the migration beliefs of the poor
closely align with our model with 90.2% of the poor expecting the rich player to migrate
when it pays materially, compared to only 18.1% when it does not pay. The difference
is shown to be highly significant by the regression analysis presented in column 2 of
Table 2.4.2. Hence, the migration threat seems to be perceived as credible by most of the
poor players, supporting Hypothesis 3a. In fact, the beliefs of the poor even vary more
with the migration incentives for the rich than the actual migration choices of the rich
themselves. This suggests that a substantial part of the rich in our sample are driven by
inequality aversion, given that only 62.6% of them migrate when it pays materially, but
that this is not anticipated by the poor, 90.2% of whom expect the rich to migrate.18
18 One could argue, of course, that the beliefs of the poor are well calibrated because we only elicited a




Table 2.4.3: Migration and ideology
migration pays migration does not pay









Panel A ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing -0.137*** -0.124*** 0.012 0.013
(0.046) (0.048) (0.018) (0.018)
N 405 401 1,146 1,123
Panel B redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.063 -0.054 -0.012 -0.036
(0.064) (0.063) (0.025) (0.024)
pro redistribution -0.137** -0.129** -0.009 -0.034
(0.055) (0.055) (0.022) (0.021)
N 536 529 1,477 1,448
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of logis-
tic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Each horizontal
line indicates a new regression. We asked the rich for each possible tax rate whether they would
migrate. Columns (1) and (2) show results when the domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is low or
medium, while columns (3) and (4) cover all other combinations of the domestic and foreign tax rate.
Controls include dummies for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39,
40-49, 50-59, > 60), and two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more household members).
That the migration threat is perceived to be real by the majority of the poor raises
the question whether this perception is affected by their ideology. As Table 2.4.4 shows,
there is no difference in migration beliefs by political party preference or redistribution
preferences when we restrict the analysis to the constellations in which migration pays
(high domestic tax and low or medium foreign tax).19 When migration does not pay,
there is also no difference by party preference, but those who are indifferent towards
redistribution are significantly more likely to state that they expect the rich to migrate
than those who oppose redistribution. Given that there is no good reason to migrate
in this setting, this difference is likely just due to random variation Therefore, we reject
Hypothesis 3b. We can hence rule out differential migration beliefs as a possible reason
for potential differences in tax choices between the left- and the right-leaning poor. We
summarize the results on the poor players’ beliefs about the rich players’ migration
choices in
Result 3 (beliefs and political attitudes of the poor).
19 Results for the individual parties can be found in Table 2.B.3 in Appendix 2.B.
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Table 2.4.4: Migration beliefs and ideology
migration pays migration does not pay









Panel A Ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing 0.003 0.002 0.025 0.023
(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
N 872 855 2348 2300
Panel B Redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.028 -0.025 0.057*** 0.045**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
pro redistribution -0.004 -0.004 0.033* 0.026
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
N 1,113 1,086 2,990 2,921
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of
logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Each hor-
izontal line indicates a new regression. We asked the poor for each possible tax rate whether they
believe the rich will migrate. Columns (1) and (2) show results when the domestic tax is high and
the foreign tax is low or medium, while columns (3) and (4) cover all other combinations of the do-
mestic and foreign tax rate. Controls include dummies for gender, marital status, higher education,
four age dummies (30-39, 40-49, 50-59, > 60), and two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more
household member).
(i) The poor believe the rich to be more likely to migrate when it pays in material terms than
when it does not, confirming Hypothesis 3a.
(ii) Migration beliefs do not differ between the left- and the right-leaning poor, contrary to
Hypothesis 3b.
Finally, we turn to Hypothesis 4 and investigate how migration incentives for the
rich, migration beliefs of the poor and political attitudes of the poor affect the tax choices
of the poor. Given the credible threat of the rich to leave the country, the poor have an
incentive to vote for a lower tax rate (Hypothesis 4a). We test this hypothesis by com-
paring the tax choices of the poor in the mobility treatment with low or medium foreign
taxes to the tax choices of the poor pooled from the no-mobility treatment and from the
mobility treatment with a high foreign tax. Figure 2.4.2a shows that the threat of migra-
tion indeed induces the poor to be less likely to vote for the high tax. As panel A of Table
2.4.5 shows, this difference amounts to 5.9 percentage points and is statistically signif-




Table 2.4.5: Tax choices, mobility and migration beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
low medium high
Panel A mobility reference category: immobile or foreign tax high
foreign tax low or medium 0.062*** -0.004 -0.059***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.013)
N 2,038 2,038 2,038
Panel B migration belief reference category: rich does not migrate if domestic tax is high
rich migrates if domestic tax is high 0.099*** -0.018** -0.081***
(0.024) (0.008) (0.021)
N 1,416 1,416 1,416
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of ordered
logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
In line with Hypothesis 4b, we also find that the poor are significantly less likely to
vote for the high tax if they believe that the rich will migrate when taxes are high (see
Panel B of Table 2.4.5), but again the effect is quantitatively small.20
Regarding the impact of political ideology on the tax choices of the poor, we con-
sidered two possible channels how the political ideology of the poor could affect their
tax choices. First, the left-leaning poor could be more optimistic than the right-leaning
poor about the migration choices of the rich. Second, the left-leaning poor could be
more likely to be extremely inequality averse. Since we do not find an impact of the
political ideology of the poor on their beliefs about the migration choices of the rich
(see Result 3(ii)), there is no evidence for the belief difference underlying the first chan-
nel. Hence, support for 4c would point to the second channel. We find mixed support
for this hypothesis. While there is no difference between the poor who support left-of-
center parties and right-of-center parties (see columns 4 to 6 of Panel A in Table 2.4.1),
we do find that the poor who are in favor of redistribution are significantly more likely
to vote for the high tax than those opposed to redistribution (see Panel B of Table 2.4.1).
This could indicate that some participants have extreme inequality aversion and that
this affects both stated redistribution preferences as well as tax choices in our experi-
ment. The incidence of extreme inequality aversion, however, does not appear to be
systematically related to party preferences. We summarize our results on political ide-
ology and tax choices of the poor in
Result 4 (tax choices and political attitudes of the poor).
20 We note that the optimal tax rate is the medium one when the rich migrate if and only if it pays, while we
observe an increase in choosing the low tax rate in both panels of Table 2.4.5 and even a decrease in the
frequency of choosing the medium tax rates in Panel B. This may be caused by calculating the optimal
tax incorrectly or by an expectation that the rich might even be spiteful and also migrate for medium
domestic taxes.
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b) Tax choices of the rich
(i) The tax choices of the poor react to the possibility of the rich migrating as predicted by
Hypothesis 4a, but the effect is quantitatively small.
(ii) The poor are less likely to choose high taxes if they believe that the rich will migrate when
domestic taxes are high, supporting Hypothesis 4b, but the effect is quantitatively small.
(iii) The poor players’ political party preference is not significantly related to their tax choices,
but those with a high preference for redistribution vote for a higher tax rate. Hence, we
find mixed evidence with respect to Hypothesis 4c.
As the main insight regarding the role of political ideology in tax choices, we find
that it matters when our participants are in the role of the rich but it does not when they
are in the role of the poor. This is in line with our model as far as inequality aversion
relates to political ideology because for the rich already moderate levels of inequal-
ity aversion can affect their choices, while only extreme levels do so for the poor. We
do find some weak evidence of extreme aversion towards disadvantageous inequality,
which does not seem to be systematically related to political party orientation, though.
An alternative channel that predicts political preferences to impact tax choice of the
poor via their beliefs does not find support, either. Our results therefore suggest that
political attitudes can moderate the effects of mobility on tax competition and a race
to the bottom. The channel is not, however, over-optimistic beliefs or ideology-driven
taxation choices of the (left-leaning) poor but rather benevolence of a sizable part of the
(left-leaning) rich.
Overall, our findings confirm the hypotheses derived from the comparative statics of
our model. However, one finding is notable. Although the poor, when choosing taxes,
react to migration incentives of the rich as predicted, the effect is quantitatively small
(Result 4(i)). This is puzzling in light of the fact that migration beliefs of the poor react
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strongly to migration incentives (Result 3(i)). In the next section, we discuss this result
in more detail.
2.4.2 Levels of Tax Choices
Considering levels of tax choices in our experiment, we find a strong concentration on
the medium tax and a relatively weak difference between player types and treatments
(see Figure 2.4.2). Why is this a puzzle? The choice of the rich, choosing medium instead
of low taxes, is in principle consistent with our model, because for an intermediate level
of inequality aversion they could be indifferent between all tax rates (see comparative
statics 1). However, it appears surprising that such a high share of the rich is concen-
trated on the intermediate level of inequality aversion that just makes them indifferent
and makes them break indifference in favor of the medium tax.21 More importantly, the
poor also primarily choose medium taxes even when the rich are not mobile or foreign
taxes are high; and this can no longer be rationalized within our model.22 Hence, we
find a notable and unpredicted pattern: A large part of the rich and the poor choose
medium taxes, with only a small reaction to treatment conditions (see Result 4(i)).
A possible reason for the concentration of tax choices on the medium tax rate that
comes to mind is a potential misunderstanding of the experimental task. This is ar-
guably more likely in a survey experiment than in a laboratory experiment: First, par-
ticipants in the former cannot ask clarifying questions. Second, a sample with a larger
variety in terms of education and age than a typical student sample may on average
have more problems understanding the task (Snowberg and Yariv, 2021).
However, for two reasons, we do not believe that misunderstanding is the dominant
factor behind our relatively weak support for the point predictions of our model. To see
this, consider the benchmark equilibrium of our model with zero inequality aversion,
i.e., the equilibrium in which monetary incentives fully determine decisions. First, note
that beliefs are much closer to the point predictions of this benchmark equilibrium than
choices are (see Figure 2.4.3). This suggests that most participants do understand the
monetary incentives in the tax game. At least they appear to understand the incentives
for the other type, which makes it implausible that they would not understand them for
their own type.
Second, we run robustness checks for our tests, excluding participants who appear
most likely to be confused, namely those who are either the fastest or the slowest in
completing the experiment. Very fast participants are likely to not have carefully read
the instructions and to not have thought deeply about their decisions. Very slow par-
21 The inability to explain intermediate choices is a problem that is often encountered in applications of the
Fehr-Schmidt model due to its linearity. Assuming instead that the utility loss is convex in the inequality
allows for explanations of intermediate choices by intermediate levels of inequality aversion.
22 As we argued in our model section, the inequality aversion of the poor is irrelevant in these cases, because
even with high taxes, the rich still have higher payoffs than the poor. Choosing high taxes therefore
increases a poor’s own payoff while also reducing inequality. Hence, the inequality-averse poor should
choose high taxes when the rich are not mobile or foreign taxes are high.
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b) Tax beliefs of the rich
ticipants are likely to have thought long because they have had trouble understanding.
Excluding both the fastest 10% and the slowest 10% does not overall affect our test
results much.23 Furthermore, we create a dummy for deviating from the benchmark
equilibrium. We regress this dummy on the respondents’ education level, the time they
took to complete the survey, and a dummy equaling one if the respondent interrupted
the survey at some point. As one can see in Table 2.B.4 in Appendix 2.B, none of these
factors can explain deviations from the benchmark equilibrium both in tax choices and
beliefs. Hence, none of these factors points towards a possible misunderstanding of
incentives, either.
Nonetheless, for many of our participants the experiment was probably an unusual
situation. Hence, they may have been unsure about the appropriate action. Choosing
the “middle” may then have appeared to them a good compromise that made them
look or feel neither too greedy nor like a fool for forgoing too much. Choices that avoid
extremes and favor compromises between various motives have frequently been ob-
served in other contexts, notably marketing research (for a discussion of extremeness
aversion and compromise effects, see, e.g., Simonson and Tversky (1992) and Simon-
son (1989).) We therefore check whether answers to questions in the GIP that are not
related to our experiment have a tendency to center in the middle, too. We find that
other questions with three or five item response options show a tendency towards the
center, though much weaker. Across all questions with three items in waves 17 and
18 of the GIP, the distribution across left, middle, and right is 37%, 41%, and 23%, re-
spectively. Participants shy away more from extremes in questions with five items,
where the distribution of answers across the five options from left-most to right-most is
(11%/36%/27%/26%/2%). These questions were typically less complicated than ours




and hence participants may have felt less unsure and thus may have shown a weaker
tendency towards the center.
One further possibility is that participants take real tax rates as sensible benchmarks
into account. For instance, they may refer to their personal tax rate as a guidance of what
is appropriate. If that was true, we would expect that tax-rate choices in the experiment
correlate with actual household income, because that correlates with the personal tax
rate. However, we do not find such an effect (see Table 2.B.5 in Appendix 2.B for detailed
results).24
The most plausible explanation for the concentration of tax choices on the medium
level seems to be that people confronted with unusual decisions exhibit a tendency to-
ward a compromise between conflicting motives. This leaves the question, however,
why beliefs about tax choices of the other type are much closer to the predictions for ra-
tional selfish individuals than actual choices are. Possibly, while our participants trade-
off the motives of maximizing earnings with a desire not to appear too greedy (by only
sharing the minimum if they are rich or asking for the maximum if they are poor), they
may underestimate how much others also want to avoid to appear too greedy. When
thinking about what other people do, it is easy to understand their material incentives,
but much more difficult to predict which further, more complex, motives affect choices.
People often have complex motivations, but may underestimate how complex others’
motivations are as well.
2.5 Conclusion
We study voting on taxation in the presence of mobility of high-income earners in a
simple game that we implemented in an online survey experiment, based on a fairly
large, representative sample of the German population. Tax-induced mobility has been
at the center of recent theoretical and empirical research, as it is a key component in
understanding and quantifying the link between international economic integration on
the one hand and the government’s ability to provide public goods and to shape the
degree of inequality on the other hand. We contribute to this literature by analyzing
the role of political attitudes that may correlate with the preferred choice of tax rates,
migration decisions, and beliefs of participants in our experiment. Controlling for de-
mographic characteristics such as age, income, and education, we find that behavior
does correlate with political attitudes, and in a predictable way. In the role of the rich,
left-leaning participants tend to be more likely than right-leaning ones to vote for higher
taxes despite hurting themselves. Compared to the right-leaning, the left-leaning also
24 Alternatively, one might argue that 20/90 = 22.2% is a reasonable approximation for the average tax
rate of the median-income person in Germany, while 40/90 = 44.4% is much higher. However, people
have a tendency to confuse average and marginal tax rates (De Bartolome, 1995). Coupled with the
fact that we explicitly talk about taxing the “rich” in this experiment and that Germany has a “rich tax”
with a marginal tax rate of 45% (for incomes above 250,000e for unmarried individuals and 500,000e for
married couples), the 44.4% tax rate actually appears rather appropriate.
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migrate less when migration pays, but exhibit no difference when it does not. Beliefs of
the poor about the migration choices of the rich, however, are not systematically related
to political attitudes. Our finding that the right-leaning are less prone to redistribution
when it hurts them is in line with the result by Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim (2017)
that only those right of center become more averse to redistribution when they learn
that they rank higher in the income distribution than they thought.25
There are three interesting implications of our results. First, our findings attenuate
the race-to-the-bottom argument that the increasing mobility of labor (and capital) leads
to sub-optimally low taxes and public spending (for a survey of this literature, see Keen
and Konrad, 2013). A sizable share of participants migrate less and stick to higher tax
rates than would be expected in the absence of social preferences. Second, political at-
titudes do not simply reflect easily measurable demographic characteristics. Third, the
possible impact of political attitudes on behavior does not seem to be the result of polit-
ically biased expectations about others’ behavior but of a correlation between political
attitudes and social preferences.26 We note that in our experiment, the income distribu-
tion depends purely on luck and not on effort or skill. In the study by Almås, Cappelen,
and Tungodden (2020) Norwegians and US-citizens differ in their redistribution pref-
erences when inequality is based on luck but not in the degree to which they acknowl-
edge merit. Similarly, left-leaning participants might be less inequality-accepting than
the right-leaning when inequality is based on luck. We do not know, however, whether
they would also be less inequality-accepting when it was driven by merit.
This chapter also provides a methodological contribution to the analysis of the role
of political attitudes. Stated preferences in surveys lack incentive compatibility. A stan-
dard alternative to surveys are therefore laboratory experiments. Our study, however,
reveals advantages of a survey experiment over a laboratory experiment. Prior to con-
ducting our survey experiment, we had studied the impact of migration on tax choices
and their relation to political attitudes in a laboratory experiment. In this laboratory
experiment, choices are overall much closer to the selfish equilibrium prediction than
in our survey experiment.27 Furthermore, we find little impact of political preferences
on the choices in the laboratory experiment. This is apparently due to the fact that most
of our participants support one of three main parties (CDU, SPD, Greens) who tend to
have moderate views on economic issues. There is some indication in our data that sup-
porters of smaller parties make different choices, but they are too rare in our laboratory
sample for a meaningful statistical analysis.28
25 In an earlier study, Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) found that informing survey participants that
they are poorer than they thought increases their support for redistribution but they did not assess the
relationship to political ideology.
26 Klimm (2019) finds in a laboratory experiment with a treatment variation whether outcomes can be af-
fected by cheating that left-leaning participants redistribute more when cheating is possible, whereas
right-leaning participants do not react to the treatment. In line with our results, he finds that this differ-
ence is not driven by differences in beliefs.
27 See Appendix 2.D for detailed results and a discussion of possible reasons for the differences.
28 Our results are overall in line with those of a study by Esarey, Salmon, and Barrilleaux (2012). They
also find that the behavior of participants in a laboratory experiment on voting about redistribution with
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More important than the difference in the overall pattern of choices between the
survey experiment and the laboratory experiment is thus the insight that the labora-
tory sample is not suitable to study the relation of political ideology, tax, and migration
choices. Our survey experiment suggests that while the effects of political ideology are
relevant, they can only be detected if two conditions are met. First, sample sizes have
to be sufficiently large in order to have a sizable share of supporters also for smaller
parties, which are more likely to hold strong views. This holds in particular in Ger-
many and similar countries where the majority of people support economically moder-
ate parties. Second, political ideologies need to be sufficiently firmly established. The
first condition is hard to meet in a laboratory experiment due to constraints on the bud-
get and subject-pool size.29 The second condition is arguably also harder to satisfy with
a student pool. In contrast to a typical laboratory experiment, our survey experiment
is based on a large representative sample of the adult German population, enhancing
the external validity of our results. Therefore, for studying the impact of ideology, in-
tegrating the experiment into online surveys is a more fruitful approach. It is a general
insight that surveys, field experiments, and laboratory experiments are complementary.
Survey experiments may be a good compromise for research questions such as ours.
They provide exogenous variation, can be incentivized and have the necessary sample
size as well as variation in political ideology to permit a thorough investigation of the
effects of political attitudes.
earned income is well explained by selfishness and that participants that are more pro-redistribution ac-
cording to a set of questions from a questionnaire do not vote for higher taxes in general. Interestingly,
though, they find that those participants more opposed to redistribution react more to their selfish in-
centives, which is broadly in line with the more selfish voting and migration behavior of the right-wing
participants in our survey experiment.
29 Selective recruiting based on party preferences does not appear to be a viable way either.
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2.A Summary Statistics and Randomization Check
Table 2.A.1: Summary statistics
variable mean sd min max N GIP wave
tax choice 1.97 0.54 1 3 3,020 18
tax belief 1.68 0.76 1 3 3,015 18
migration 0.24 0.43 0 1 2,175 18
migration belief 0.38 0.48 0 1 4,442 18
female 0.49 0.50 0 1 3,019 18
age: 16 - 29 0.17 0.40 0 1 3,018 18
age: 30 - 39 0.15 0.42 0 1 3,018 18
age: 40 - 49 0.20 0.43 0 1 3,018 18
age: 50 - 59 0.24 0.49 0 1 3,018 18
age: > 60 0.24 0.50 0 1 3,018 18
married 0.60 0.49 0 1 3,019 18
higher education 0.48 0.50 0 1 2,955 18
household size: 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 3,014 18
household size: 2 0.43 0.50 0 1 3,014 18
household size: 3 or more 0.41 0.49 0 1 3,014 18
left-wing 0.51 0.50 0 1 2,160 16
NPD 0.01 0.09 0 1 2,349 16
AfD 0.10 0.30 0 1 2,349 16
FDP 0.06 0.23 0 1 2,349 16
CDU/CSU 0.28 0.45 0 1 2,349 16
SPD 0.22 0.41 0 1 2,349 16
Green Party 0.16 0.36 0 1 2,349 16
Pirate Party 0.02 0.12 0 1 2,349 16
The Left 0.09 0.29 0 1 2,349 16
non voter 0.07 0.25 0 1 2,349 16
redistribution: in favor 0.54 0.50 0 1 2,776 16
redistribution: indifferent 0.25 0.44 0 1 2,776 16
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Table 2.A.2: Randomization check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






gender reference category: male
female -0.024 0.030* -0.001 -0.006 0.006
(0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
N 3,019 3,019 2,250 2,250 2,250
age reference category: < 30
30 to 39 -0.021 -0.003 0.006 -0.017 0.011
(0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.037) (0.030)
40 to 49 -0.007 -0.001 0.035 -0.030 -0.005
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027)
50 to 59 -0.025 -0.042 -0.029 -0.012 0.041
(0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027)
> 60 0.004 -0.037 0.023 -0.020 -0.003
(0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.026)
N 3,018 3,018 2,249 2,249 2,249
marital status reference category: not married
married -0.013 -0.032* 0.012 -0.008 -0.004
(0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
N 3,019 3,019 2,249 2,249 2,249
educational status reference category: lower education
higher education 0.006 0.009 0.022 -0.032 0.009
(0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
N 2,955 2,955 2,205 2,205 2,205
household size reference category: 1
2 0.020 -0.006 -0.034 0.005 0.029
(0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.030) (0.024)
3 or more 0.023 -0.011 -0.048 0.027 0.021
(0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.024)
N 3,014 3,014 2,249 2,249 2,249
ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing 0.009 -0.000 -0.007 0.003 0.004
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020)
N 2,160 2,160 1,624 1,624 1,624
redistribution preferences reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.027 0.027 0.007 -0.008 0.001
(0.024) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.025)
pro redistribution -0.001 0.029 -0.002 -0.037 0.039*
(0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022)
N 2,776 2,776 2,079 2,079 2,079
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented results are based on a linear regression of the form Yi = β0 + βcovariatei + εi , where Yi is a dummy for the
respective treatment variable (mobile, rich, foreign tax low, foreign tax medium, foreign tax high) and covariatei is the respective covariate. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Each horizontal line indicates a new regression.
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Table 2.B.1: Tax choices and party preference: by role
only rich players only poor players
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
low medium high low medium high
Panel A party preference reference category: far-left (The Left)
right-wing populist (AfD) 0.112* -0.036 -0.076* 0.080** -0.004 -0.076**
(0.064) (0.023) (0.044) (0.033) (0.006) (0.031)
liberal (free market) democrats (FDP) 0.159** -0.051** -0.108** 0.112*** -0.006 -0.106***
(0.062) (0.023) (0.045) (0.036) (0.008) (0.034)
christian democrats (CDU/CSU) 0.124** -0.040** -0.084** 0.081*** -0.004 -0.077***
(0.054) (0.020) (0.038) (0.026) (0.006) (0.025)
social democrats (SPD) 0.097* -0.031* -0.066* 0.106*** -0.005 -0.100***
(0.053) (0.018) (0.038) (0.027) (0.008) (0.026)
environmentalist (Green Party) 0.039 -0.012 -0.026 0.040 -0.002 -0.038
(0.056) (0.018) (0.038) (0.028) (0.003) (0.027)
N 740 740 740 1,560 1,560 1,560
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of or-
dered logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each horizontal line indicates a new
regression. Results for very small parties (NPD and Pirate Party) as well as non-voters are not presented.
Controls include dummies for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39, 40-49,




Table 2.B.2: Migration and party preference
migration pays migration does not pay









Panel A party preference reference category: far-left (The Left)
AFD 0.239** 0.237** 0.010 0.008
(0.113) (0.113) (0.036) (0.034)
FDP 0.181 0.181 0.010 0.014
(0.127) (0.121) (0.051) (0.047)
CDU/CSU 0.053 0.034 -0.049 -0.059**
(0.085) (0.083) (0.031) (0.030)
SPD -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 -0.019
(0.087) (0.086) (0.030) (0.028)
The Greens -0.062 -0.070 -0.038 -0.031
(0.092) (0.091) (0.035) (0.033)
N 443 439 1,231 1,208
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects
of ordered logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual
level. Each horizontal line indicates a new regression. We asked the rich for each possible
tax rate whether they would migrate. Columns (1) and (2) show results when domestic taxes
are high and foreign taxes are low or medium, while columns (3) and (4) cover all other
combinations of domestic and foreign taxes. Results for very small parties (NPD and Pirate
Party) as well as non-voters are not presented. Controls include dummies for gender, marital
status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39, 40-49, 50-59, > 60), and two dummies for
household size (2 and 3 or more household members).
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Table 2.B.3: Migration beliefs and party preference
migration pays migration does not pay









Panel A Panel A party preference reference category: far-left (The Left)
AFD 0.027 0.026 0.012 0.014
(0.053) (0.053) (0.034) (0.034)
FDP -0.028 -0.026 -0.060 -0.040
(0.053) (0.053) (0.042) (0.042)
CDU/CSU -0.043 -0.043 -0.044 -0.035
(0.039) (0.039) (0.028) (0.028)
SPD -0.012 -0.014 -0.002 -0.002
(0.042) (0.042) (0.028) (0.029)
The Greens -0.052 -0.052 -0.001 0.019
(0.041) (0.042) (0.030) (0.030)
N 939 920 2,548 2,498
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects
of ordered logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual
level. Each horizontal line indicates a new regression. We asked the poor for each possible tax
rate whether they believe the rich will migrate. Columns (1) and (2) show results when the
domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is low or medium, while columns (3) and (4) cover
all other combinations of the domestic and foreign tax rate. Results for very small parties
(NPD and Pirate Party) as well as non-voters are not presented. Controls include dummies
for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39, 40-49, 50-59,> 60), and
two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more household member).
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Table 2.B.4: Deviation from the selfish equilibrium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deviation from EQ tax choice tax choice tax belief tax belief
educational status reference category: lower education
higher education -0.0327* -0.0282 -0.0356 -0.0219
(0.0187) (0.0217) (0.0188) (0.0219)
interruption reference category: did not interrupt the survey
interrupt 0.0022 0.0058 0.0165 0.0208
(0.0317) (0.0345) (0.0316) (0.0343)
minutes spend on the survey 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
N 2,754 2,299 2,750 2,296
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of
logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The mean time spend on the survey is
11 minutes. Controls include dummies for gender, marital status, four age dummies (30-39, 40-49,
50-59, > 60), two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more household members) and party
dummies.
Table 2.B.5: Tax choice and income
low low medium medium high high
Income reference category: < 2000e
2000e - 4000e -0.011 -0.005 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.005
(0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.012)
> 4000e 0.015 0.034 -0.002 -0.005 -0.012 -0.029
(0.024) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.022)
N 2,331 2,285 2,331 2,285 2,331 2,285
controls no yes no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each
horizontal line indicates a new regression. The presented coefficients are average
marginal effects.
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Table 2.B.6: Tax choices and ideology: by role (drop 10% slowest and fastest partici-
pants)
only rich players only poor players
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
low medium high low medium high
Panel A ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing -0.066** 0.021* 0.045** -0.019 -0.001 0.020
(0.027) (0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.002) (0.016)
N 550 550 550 1,134 1,134 1,134
Panel B redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.034 0.010 0.024 -0.034* -0.002 0.035*
(0.032) (0.010) (0.023) (0.020) (0.003) (0.021)
pro redistribution -0.088*** 0.025** 0.063*** -0.066*** -0.003 0.069***
(0.029) (0.012) (0.022) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018)
N 706 706 706 1,447 1,447 1,447
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average
marginal effects of ordered logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Each horizontal line indicates a new regression. Controls include dummies
for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39, 40-49, 50-59,
> 60), and two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more household members).
The 10% slowest and fastest participants are dropped from the sample.
100
2.B. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS




Panel A mobility reference category: immobile or foreign tax high
foreign tax low or medium 0.072*** 0.001 -0.073***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.014)
N 1,602 1,602 1,602
Panel B migration belief reference category: rich does not migrate if domestic tax is high
rich migrates if domestic tax is high 0.117*** -0.017 -0.100***
(0.027) (0.011) (0.023)
N 1,109 1,109 1,109
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of ordered logis-
tic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 10% slowest and fastest participants are dropped
from the sample.
Table 2.B.8: Migration choices and beliefs (drop 10% slowest and fastest participants)
(1) (2)
migration choice migration belief
migration incentives reference category: migration does not pay
migration does pay 0.343*** 0.479***
(0.006) (0.009)
N 1,794 3,476
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average
marginal effects of logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the individual level. The 10% slowest and fastest participants
are dropped from the sample.
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Table 2.B.9: Migration and ideology (drop 10% slowest and fastest participants)
migration pays migration does not pay









Panel A ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing -0.171*** -0.150*** 0.005 0.002
(0.051) (0.053) (0.020) (0.020)
N 322 319 902 893
Panel B redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.036 -0.022 -0.001 -0.024
(0.068) (0.069) (0.027) (0.027)
pro redistribution -0.118** -0.108* 0.001 -0.018
(0.059) (0.060) (0.024) (0.023)
N 420 414 1,155 1,140
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of logis-
tic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Each horizontal
line indicates a new regression. We asked the rich for each possible tax rate whether they would
migrate. Columns (1) and (2) show results when the domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is low or
medium, while columns (3) and (4) cover all other combinations of the domestic and foreign tax rate.
Controls include dummies for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39,
40-49, 50-59, > 60), and two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more household members). The
10% slowest and fastest participants are dropped from the sample.
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Table 2.B.10: Migration beliefs and ideology (drop 10% slowest and fastest participants)
migration pays migration does not pay









Panel A Ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing -0.021 -0.020 0.041** 0.040**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018)
N 681 670 1,843 1,813
Panel B Redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.004 0.003 0.043* 0.032
(0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023)
pro redistribution -0.003 -0.005 0.030 0.020
(0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019)
N 875 858 2,356 2,313
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of
logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Each hor-
izontal line indicates a new regression. We asked the poor for each possible tax rate whether they
believe the rich will migrate. Columns (1) and (2) show results when the domestic tax is high and
the foreign tax is low or medium, while columns (3) and (4) cover all other combinations of the do-
mestic and foreign tax rate. Controls include dummies for gender, marital status, higher education,
four age dummies (30-39, 40-49, 50-59, > 60), and two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more
household member). The 10% slowest and fastest participants are dropped from the sample.
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Table 2.B.11: Tax choices and ideology: by role (probit)
only rich players only poor players
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
low medium high low medium high
Panel A ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing -0.065*** 0.018** 0.047*** -0.022 0.001 0.021
(0.024) (0.008) (0.017) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014)
N 686 686 686 1,429 1,429 1,429
Panel B redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.062** 0.017* 0.045** -0.025 0.001 0.024
(0.030) (0.009) (0.022) (0.019) (0.002) (0.018)
pro redistribution -0.083*** 0.022** 0.060*** -0.062*** 0.002 0.060***
(0.027) (0.009) (0.020) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016)
N 887 887 887 1,825 1,825 1,825
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average
marginal effects of ordered probit regressions. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Each horizontal line indicates a new regression. Controls include dummies
for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39, 40-49, 50-59,
> 60), and two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more household members).
Table 2.B.12: Tax choices, mobility and migration beliefs (probit)
(1) (2) (3)
low medium high
Panel A mobility reference category: immobile or foreign tax high
foreign tax low or medium 0.062*** -0.003 -0.058***
(0.013) (0.003) (0.012)
N 2,038 2,038 2,038
Panel B migration belief reference category: rich does not migrate if domestic tax is high
rich migrates if domestic tax is high 0.094*** -0.015** -0.079***
(0.023) (0.007) (0.020)
N 1,416 1,416 1,416
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of ordered probit
regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.B.13: Migration choices and beliefs (probit)
(1) (2)
migration choice migration belief
migration incentives reference category: migration does not pay
migration does pay 0.368*** 0.526***
(0.009) (0.006)
N 2,175 4,442
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average
marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the individual level.
Table 2.B.14: Migration and ideology (probit)
migration pays migration does not pay









Panel A ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing -0.138*** -0.125*** 0.012 0.013
(0.046) (0.048) (0.018) (0.018)
N 405 401 1,146 1,123
Panel B redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.062 -0.054 -0.012 -0.041*
(0.063) (0.062) (0.025) (0.024)
pro redistribution -0.136** -0.128** -0.009 -0.037*
(0.054) (0.055) (0.022) (0.021)
N 536 529 1,477 1,448
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are average marginal effects of a
probit regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Each horizontal
line indicates a new regression. We asked the rich for each possible tax rate whether they would
migrate. Columns (1) and (2) show results when the domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is low or
medium, while columns (3) and (4) cover all other combinations of the domestic and foreign tax rate.
Controls include dummies for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies (30-39,
40-49, 50-59, > 60), and two dummies for household size (2 and 3 or more household members).
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Table 2.B.15: Migration beliefs and ideology (probit)
migration pays migration does not pay









Panel A Ideology reference category: right-wing
left-wing 0.003 0.000 0.025 0.022
(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
N 872 855 2,348 2,300
Panel B Redistribution preference reference category: against redistribution
indifferent -0.028 -0.025 0.057*** 0.043**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
pro redistribution -0.004 -0.004 0.033* 0.024
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
N 1,113 1,086 2,990 2,921
controls no yes no yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The presented coefficients are estimated by a linear probability
model. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Each horizontal line
indicates a new regression. We asked the poor for each possible tax rate whether they believe the rich
will migrate. Columns (1) and (2) show results when the domestic tax is high and the foreign tax is
low or medium, while columns (3) and (4) cover all other combinations of the domestic and foreign
tax rate. Controls include dummies for gender, marital status, higher education, four age dummies




The following survey differs from the usual format. You are participating in an experi-
ment about taxation and redistribution in a fictitious scenario.
The experiment works as follows: You are assigned a role, make decisions and get re-
wards depending on your own decision as well as the decisions of other participants.
You do not need any prior knowledge to answer any of the questions. You get the usual
payment of 4e for participating in the GIP survey. On top of that you can win up to
80e based on the decisions that you make. You cannot lose any money under any cir-
cumstances.
Imagine that you are living a small country (henceforth called home country) consisting
of three people: One person with a high income and two people with low income.
Your role, poor or rich, will be assigned to you randomly. The rich has to pay a tax that
is redistributed by the government to the two poor. The rich has an income of 90 and
the poor both have an income of 20. The tax on the rich can take three values: low, the
rich pays 5 to each of the poor (10 in total), medium, the rich pays 10 to each of the poor
(20 in total) and high, the rich pays 20 to each of the poor (40 in total).
[Only for mobility treatment] There is a second foreign country. The rich can migrate to
the foreign country. If she does so, she does not have to pay taxes in the home country.
Instead, she has to pay taxes in the foreign country. The tax rate in the foreign country
is (low/medium/high). Furthermore, she has to pay migration costs of 15.
We will ask you to vote on the tax rate in the home country. The tax rate is then deter-
mined by a randomly choosing the preferred tax rate of one of the three people in the
home country.
[Only for mobility treatment] The rich can decide to migrate after observing the chosen
tax rate.
You are in the role of the (poor/rich). We will form countries by randomly choosing
groups of three participants (one rich, two poor) after all participants have finished the
survey. You will get notice of the tax rate chosen in your country via email. Furthermore,
we will randomly choose 20 countries, in which all participants will be paid according
to their after-tax income.
What tax rate are voting for in your home country? (low/medium/high)
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Figure 2.C.1: Instruction example
What tax rate do you think will the (rich/two poor) vote for? (low/medium/high)
[Only for mobility treatment and role of the poor] Do you think the rich will migrate?
The rich will migrate if the home tax rate is high. (yes/no)
The rich will migrate if the home tax rate is medium. (yes/no)
The rich will migrate if the home tax rate is low. (yes/no)
[Only for mobility treatment and role of the rich] Will you migrate to the foreign country?
I will migrate if the home tax rate is high. (yes/no)
I will migrate if the home tax rate is medium. (yes/no)
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I will migrate if the home tax rate is low. (yes/no)
2.D Laboratory Experiment
2.D.1 Experimental Design
Prior to the survey experiment we ran a more conventional laboratory experiment, in
which 108 individuals (mostly students) participated. The general setup parallels the
one described above in Section 2. In particular, we kept the composition of a country
with one rich and two poor individuals, the distribution of gross incomes, the set of
tax rates, the cost of mobility, and the random-dictator voting mechanism. There were,
however, also important differences conceptually and in the implementation.
At the conceptional level, there are a number of important differences. One con-
cerns the nature of strategic interaction. In the survey experiment we paired subjects
ex post to determine payoffs and used the strategy method to see how subjects make
choices conditional on assumed behavior elsewhere. By contrast, in the lab experiment
we paired subjects into countries during the experiment and thereby created full strate-
gic interaction. This also allowed us to match countries into pairs where tax choices
were endogenously chosen in both rather than being matched with a foreign country
with exogenously given tax rate. As a result, countries could not only lose a rich player,
but also attract one from another country. A further consequence is that tax payments
of a rich player who migrates are not lost because they are paid in another country con-
sisting of experimental participants. As a further difference, the laboratory setting with
strategic interaction allowed us to study behavioural dynamics as we repeated rounds
of tax and migration choices. After each round subjects are informed about tax rate
and migration choices in both countries. Role assignments and the matching of partic-
ipants into countries and countries into pairs remained fixed during the course of the
experiment.
In addition, the assignment of roles differed. In the lab experiment the roles of rich
and poor were based on the outcome of a simple, five-minute calculating exercise. The
best performing third of subjects in adding four two-digit numbers were awarded the
role of a rich person, who has much higher gross income. Finally, in the survey experi-
ment we have a representative sample of the German adult population, while subjects
in the lab experiment are mostly students.
In the lab experiment we considered two treatments. In the ImmobMob treatment
subjects repeated the no mobility setup with no migration option for the rich 15 rounds,
followed by another 15 rounds of the mobility setup with potential migration of the rich.
In the second treatment MobMob, subjects interacted 30 rounds in the same setup with
the migration option. In both treatments subjects were informed about the nature of the
interaction in the second phase only after phase 1. At the beginning of the experiment,
however, subjects were told that the experiment lasts for 30 periods and new instruc-
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tions are provided after 15 rounds of play. The two treatments allow us to compare the
role of mobility both across subject pools (periods 1-15 in the two treatments) as well as
within the same subject pool (periods 16-30 versus periods 1-15).
Subjects were paid on the basis of one randomly chosen period of each phase. Four
points in the experiment translated into one Euro payout. No show-up fee was paid.
The experiment was conducted in the computerized mLab at the University of Mannheim,
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
2.D.2 Results
Table 2.D.1 displays the distribution of tax votes by treatment, phase, and type. A large
majority of tax votes is in line with the equilibrium prediction assuming selfishness.
Particularly noteworthy are the 92% of poor voting for high tax rates in the absence
of mobility, as well as the almost fully selfish play by rich subjects who choose almost
always low tax rates, although there are some votes for medium tax rates in the absence
of mobility. Interestingly there are also some votes for high taxes among the poor when
the rich are mobile. Note that phase-2 behavior is nearly identical across treatments.
Table 2.D.1: Tax choices in the lab
Poor Rich
Treatment Phase Low Medium High Low Medium High
ImmobMob no mobility 2.4% 5.6% 92.0% 88.5% 11.1% 0.4%
mobility 7.0% 73.0% 20.0% 97.8% 2.2% 0.0%
MobMob mobility 5.4% 57.2% 37.4% 99.6% 0.4% 0.0%
mobility 5.2% 69.3% 25.6% 97.4% 2.6% 0.0%
We test for treatment differences using linear and ordered probit regressions with
standard errors clustered at individual level and linear regression with individual-level
random effects. For poor subjects we find that they vote for higher taxes without mo-
bility (as expected) and vote for lower taxes in the second than in the first phase of
treatment 2 (MobMob). As for rich subjects, they vote for higher taxes without mobil-
ity (contrary to expectation), and there are no differences across phases, as well as no
treatment difference in the second phase.
We also take a closer look at the role of party preference for the tax vote. We use
linear regressions with individual-level random effects in which the omitted category
are those without stated party preference. In the role of poor players, voters of the Green
Party choose higher taxes (p < 0.05), while FDP (p < 0.05) and Left Party (p < 0.1)
voters choose lower taxes. Among rich players Pirate-party supporters choose higher
taxes (p < 0.05). There are no other significant differences. In general, these results
are derived from a low number of observations and thus have little statistical power
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(40 out of 108 subjects in the lab experiment did not answer the question about party
preference). An exception are the results for supporters of the Green Party.
As substitute for party preference, we use survey questions on political attitudes
among participants in the lab experiment. We ask to rate various statements such as (1)
socialism/capitalism is a good idea, (2) the rich should show solidarity with the poor,
and (3) society is largely fair. Essentially none of them has a significant impact once
we control for dependence of observations. Only the attitude toward socialism and a
dummy for the role of luck for economic outcomes are significant for the tax choice of
the rich if we include treatment and other controls. However, many coefficients do not
even have the expected sign. An example is that the belief that luck determines income
is related to lower tax choices of the rich.
We finally turn to an analysis of the migration behavior by rich subjects. Rich play-
ers almost always switch when they should: When the tax rate in the own country is
high, while low or medium in the other country, and thus the condition for profitable
migration is met, the switch rates are between 82% and 100%. Rich players very rarely
switch when they should not. Exceptions are the following: Migration rates are 19%
from a medium tax country to a low tax country, and 12.5% between high tax countries.
These choices could be attempts to try to force poor participants in one’s own country to
vote for lower taxes even if these migrations choices are costly in the short term. Over-
all, out of 131 migration choices made by rich players only 19 are not in line with the
equilibrium prediction assuming selfishness.
More systematic analysis using probit regression with individual-level random ef-
fects shows that the probability to migrate increases in the tax rate in own country
and decreases in the tax rate in other country, as one would expect. Supporters of the
center-left Social Democrats (SPD) are more and supporters of center-right Christian
Democrats are less likely (p < 0.05) to migrate than those without stated party prefer-
ence.
2.D.3 Discussion
There are several potential reasons related to differences in design and implementation
why we see fewer deviations from the selfish equilibrium predictions in the laboratory
than in the survey experiment. First, it is (primarily) a student sample. However, there
are also a number of students among the participants of our survey experiment and they
do not show substantially different behavior than the non-student participants. Second,
the game in the laboratory is repeated. However, play in the first period is not substan-
tially different than in later periods. Third, roles are earned. Possibly, this may have
created a feeling of entitlement for those players in the “rich” role, in line with earlier
findings for dictator games by Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), whereas those
in the “poor” role do not agree that the “rich” deserve their better position. This may
be driven by a self-serving interpretation whether effort and skill or luck determine the
outcome of the real-effort task. Fourth, participants in the laboratory experiment are
111
Preferences over Taxation of High-Income Individuals
experienced and self-selected into taking part in the experiment and might therefore be
more in a mode to earn money while the participants in the online survey might con-
sider it more appropriate to answer what is “right”. This is consistent with the finding
of Snowberg and Yariv (2021) that generosity in student populations reflects a lower
bound of generosity in the overall population.
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Chapter 3
Austerity and Distributional Policy
Joint with Matteo Alpino, Zareh Asatryan and Sebastian Blesse.
3.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, increasing debt levels around the world have
put austerity measures on the agenda of many policy-makers and academics. While
efficiency aspects have been widely debated (see, among others, Alesina, Favero, and
Giavazzi, 2019), much less is known about the distributional effects of austerity. At the
same time, distributional concerns played a large role in the public debate, with most
people arguing that austerity hurts the poor disproportionately (Blyth, 2013; Mendoza,
2014; Varoufakis, 2016).
The aim of this chapter is to provide the first quasi-experimental evidence on the
effect of fiscal austerity on distributional policy.1 To do so, we study a large exogenous
reduction of the fiscal space of Italian municipalities caused by the imposition of a fiscal
rule, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), by the national government. More specifically,
our quasi-experiment relies on a reform in 2013 that extended the budget surplus re-
quirement to previously exempted municipalities based on a population cutoff, giving
rise to a difference-in-discontinuity design. Italy is well-suited to study our research
question due to the substantial autonomy that Italian municipalities have over local
non-linear income taxes as well as redistributive spending.
We find that local governments respond to the introduction of the fiscal rule by in-
creasing tax rates in a progressive way: the increase in tax rates increases in income and
only becomes significant for taxpayers located above the median taxable income. This
finding is consistent with the median voter predictions of Meltzer and Richard (1981)
1 Previous quantitative work has mostly appeared in response to the global financial crisis, and it usually
finds that periods of fiscal austerity are associated with an increase in income inequality (Ball et al., 2013;
Heimberger, 2018; Woo et al., 2013). The microsimulations of Avram et al. (2013) and Paulus, Figari,
and Sutherland (2016) on several European countries present a more nuanced picture on the distributive
effects of austerity that depend on country contexts and measures of austerity.
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and Bierbrauer, Boyer, and Peichl (2021). The relative effects are sizeable, with tax rates
on earners in the top decile of the municipal income distribution increasing by 13% com-
pared to the sample mean, and by about 3.5 times more compared to the lowest decile.
Part of this effect is driven by municipalities switching to a progressive schedule in tax
rates, and part of it is due to increases in the level of the exemption threshold.
Since local income tax rates are small in absolute magnitude in Italy, these reform-
induced tax rate changes imply only small increases in realized tax revenues. Whereas
annual income tax revenues increase on average by about 5e per capita, revenues from
the top bracket increase by an order of magnitude more, amounting to about 73e per
capita on average. Contextual evidence supports the conjecture that, unlike its small
absolute size, the local income tax is politically a very salient tax tool of redistribution
at the local level.2 We do not find evidence that the reform affects other local taxes or
non-tax revenues raised by municipalities, including the property tax.3 We also do not
find evidence for adjustments in overall or redistributive spending, suggesting that a
reduction of public goods provision is unlikely to offset the progressive effects of the
local income tax.
Next, we study whether mayors, the crucial decision makers at the local level, re-
spond to austerity in a heterogeneous manner. Our analysis is motivated by the the-
oretical work of Bierbrauer and Boyer (2013), who introduce vote-share maximizing
politicians with ex-ante valence differences in a Mirrleesian model of income taxation.
They show that the high-valence candidate is able to capitalize on her advantage and
target the majority consisting of relatively poorer voters by proposing a progressive tax
schedule, whereas the low-valence politician is left to lobby for the votes of the rich.
Consistent with these results, we find that the increase in tax progressivity is driven
by mayors with a college degree or working in a high-skill occupation, while other ob-
servable characteristics, such as age, gender, party affiliation, do not play a meaningful
role. On the contrary, mayors without a college degree or those working in low-skilled
occupations rely on flat increases in the local income tax to comply with the reform. To
address the issue of selection of mayors, we compare the outcomes of the two types of
politicians elected in close races and find similar results.
Finally, we test whether the introduction of the DSP had electoral consequences for
the incumbents. While we do not find such evidence for the average mayor, we show
that differences in adjustment strategies between high- and low-skilled mayors caused
large differences in electoral outcomes. In the first election following the imposition
of the fiscal rule, low-skilled incumbents were on average 30 to 37 percentage points
less likely to be reelected conditional on running for office again, whereas high-skilled
mayors did not experience a significant decline in their reelection prospects. Crucially,
these differences in reelection odds only manifest after the reform, and not before. These
2 For example, the deputy mayor of Corciano said in 2019: “For those who like me earn 1,250e net per
month, the increase is equal to 19.32e per year” and concluded that “by giving up one pizza a year we
help 5,349 citizens who earn less than us”.
3 Potentially the property tax has distributive implications, but since 2013 there was limited scope to in-
crease revenues using this instrument. See Appendix 3.A.4 for more details.
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findings suggest that politicians implement progressive tax reforms in order to stay in
office, and that high-skilled mayors are more able or more willing to use such a strategy
than low-skilled mayors.
We interpret our findings as the impact of austerity on distributional policy. Consid-
ering the introduction of the DSP as a case of austerity is natural because it necessarily
required a fiscal adjustment in municipalities where the rule bound. Consistent with
this interpretation, previous evidence shows that the DSP induces substantial fiscal con-
solidation (Chiades and Mengotto, 2015; Coviello et al., 2019; Grembi, Nannicini, and
Troiano, 2016). Contextual details of the Italian economic situation of the time further
reinforce our interpretation: the reform took place in the midst of a severe recession
caused by the sovereign crisis, with Italian real GDP shrinking by 3% in 2012 and by
1.8% in 2013, while the central government cut transfers to municipalities several times
between 2009 and 2015 (see Figure 3.B.1). The DSP, vertically imposed by the national
administration upon municipalities, became a symbol of austerity in the eyes of local
administrators and was very unpopular among mayors across the political spectrum.4
While it is very challenging to identify reduced-form causal effects of austerity mea-
sures in a cross-country setting, an important question is whether our estimates can be
generalized beyond the municipal context. To probe the external validity of our mu-
nicipal findings, we show that a similar relationship holds in a cross-country regression
using the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a measure of austerity (Alesina et al.,
1998). As Figure 3.A.1 and Table 3.A.1 show, conditional on country and year fixed
effects a 1% percentage point increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance is sig-
nificantly associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase in the marginal income tax
rate at the top, while we observe no correlation between austerity and marginal income
tax rates at mean levels of income.
This chapter contributes to a large and important strand of literature studying the
political economy of taxation (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Persson and Tabellini, 2002) by pro-
viding an empirical evidence to a largely theoretical literature. Past research is based on
models of voting over tax schedules with competition between parties (Downs, 1957)
and candidates (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Panunzi, Pavoniz,
and Tabellini, 2020). While most of this literature, such as Meltzer and Richard (1981),
analyze the political economy of linear income taxes, our contribution is to study non-
linear taxes, which are much more prevalent in practice. In particular, our baseline
result that upon an exogenous shock governments increase marginal tax rates for tax-
payers located above the median income is consistent with Bierbrauer, Boyer, and Peichl
(2021) who characterize the conditions of politically feasible non-linear tax reforms. In
addition to this theoretical work, our evidence is in line with historical explanations
for the occurrence and rise of progressive taxation. This literature emphasizes the role
of compensatory arguments as the main mechanism behind the popular support and
4 For example, at a rally against the DSP in November 2012 hundreds of mayors from all major parties
rallied behind a banner saying “Let us set our municipalities free from the stupidity pact.” According to
news accounts, the extension of the DSP to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants in 2013 sparked similar
outrage among mayors of these towns.
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ultimately the implementation of progressive taxes (Scheve and Stasavage, 2012). The
idea is that high taxes on the rich allow politicians to compensate the majority of rel-
atively poor voters for some fundamental unfairness induced by the state. Given that
in our sample period Italy endured a double dip recession and that the DSP was very
unpopular, this line of argument is also consistent with our results.
Our findings also relate to a rather polarized literature interested in understanding
the political costs of fiscal austerity. One strand of this literature finds that incumbent
politicians do not face electoral costs when implementing fiscal consolidations at the
national level (Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce, 2012; Arias and Stasavage, 2019; Brender
and Drazen, 2008).5 On the other hand, a number of papers show that fiscal austerity
has negative effects on voter support for the incumbent (Hübscher, Sattler, and Wagner,
2018; Talving, 2017) as well as on broader socio-political outcomes such as increasing
support for right-wing populism (Dal Bo et al., 2018; Fetzer, 2019), or increasing social
unrest (Ponticelli and Voth, 2019). We contribute by showing that austerity can indeed
carry significant electoral costs, but that these costs depend on the consolidation strat-
egy. In particular, we show that electoral costs can be mitigated by mainly increasing
taxes on high-income earners.
Last, we contribute to the literature on the effects of fiscal rules. Grembi, Nannicini,
and Troiano (2016) find that an earlier reform of the DSP significantly reduced mu-
nicipal deficits. Asatryan, Castellon, and Stratmann (2018) show constraining effects of
balanced budget rules on debt, but only for a class of rules that are enshrined in national
constitutions, while Eliason and Lutz (2018) show that a comprehensive state-level rule
in Colorado does not affect public finances, which is partly due to non-compliance with
the rule. A meta-study by Heinemann, Moessinger, and Yeter (2018) finds that numer-
ical fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy, but this result weakens if only refined identifi-
cation strategies are considered. Fiscal rules have also been shown to curb corruption
(Daniele, Giommoni, and Orlando, 2021), to alleviate political budget cycles (Repetto,
2018) and to worsen the selection of politicians (Gamalerio, 2019).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the
institutional framework of Italian municipalities and the reform of the fiscal rule that we
are exploiting. We outline our identification strategy and the data in Sections 3.3 and
3.4, respectively. Section 3.5 presents the main empirical results and their robustness
tests, while Section 3.6 studies their political economy implications. We conclude with
Section 3.7.
5 Possible explanations are that voters are fiscally conservative (Peltzman, 1992), that leaders implement
fiscal austerity in times and as part of policy packages that allow them to electorally survive these reforms
(Bansak, Bechtel, and Margalit, 2020), or that the divergent framing of the same issue provided by partisan




3.2.1 Municipal Fiscal Rule
Since 1999, Italian municipalities have been subject to a fiscal rule, the Domestic Stability
Pact (Patto di stabilita’ dei comuni), introduced by the national government. Originally, all
municipalities were subject to the fiscal rule, but in 2001 those below 5,000 inhabitants
were excluded. In 2013, the threshold was lowered to 1,000, which is the reform that
we exploit. Finally, in 2016, the Domestic Stability Pact was abolished and a balanced
budget rule for all municipalities was introduced.
In our period of analysis, the Domestic Stability Pact’s target object has always been
the Saldo Finanziario, which is defined as the difference between expenditures and rev-
enues, net of repayment of outstanding debt and of lending. Some budget items were
always or occasionally excluded from the Saldo Finanziario (e.g. spending for natural
disaster relief, EU structural funds). The formula to calculate the numerical target var-
ied over the years, but it was usually defined as a function of budget items in previous
years (see Table 3.B.1).
Monitoring of compliance by the central government was tightened in 2008 with
the introduction of a compulsory reporting system, and of severe punishment for non-
compliers by the central government (Coviello et al., 2019). For instance, punishments
include bans on hiring, cuts of transfers from the central government (proportional to
the deviation from the rule), salary cuts to mayors and city councilors, a growth cap on
current spending at zero percent as well as a ban on new municipal debt. Qualitative
evidence from the Ministry of the Interior suggests that the central government imple-
mented the reform quite thoroughly.6 Dovis and Kirpalani (2020) show that the fiscal
behavior of local governments will crucially depend on central government’s reputa-
tion, and the strict regulations and enforcement practices of the Italian context suggest
that it is very unlikely that Italian local governments tried not to comply with the DSP.
3.2.2 Municipal Governance
Municipal governments are composed of a city council, an executive committee, and
the mayor. In municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, each candidate for the
mayoral office has to be supported by a list of candidates for the city council. Voters
cast a single vote for a mayoral candidate, and can express one preference vote for one
council candidate within the same list. The mayoral candidate who gets the most votes
is elected as mayor. The seats in the city council are split as follows: 2/3 to the list of
the mayor, and 1/3 split across the other lists in proportion to their votes shares. The
mayor appoints the members of the executive committee, and can also remove them
from office at any time. The mayoral term is five year long, and the mayor cannot serve
6 More than one hundred municipalities faced legal procedures according to ministerial decrees available
on the website of the Ministry of the Interior.
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for more than two consecutive terms.7 These institutional details make the mayor the
most important player in municipal politics, while the city council’s influence is more
limited. The list supporting a mayoral candidate is sometimes backed by national-level
parties or coalitions, but is often independent (so-called civic lists), especially in small
municipalities. Also, since being a politician in a small town is not a full-time job, most
mayors work in their normal job while being in office.
3.2.3 Municipal Fiscal Policy
The municipal budget is financed with transfers from higher levels of government and
international institutions, and by municipal resources such as local taxes and fees con-
nected to the use of public services. Local taxation plays an important role in municipal
revenues, averaging about 21% of total revenues in our sample period (see Figure 3.B.1).
The three largest tax instruments in terms of revenues are the property tax, the local in-
come tax and the waste tax, accounting for 8.7%, 4.4% and 7.9% of total revenues in
2015 respectively. In this paper, we focus on the local income tax surcharge, as it allows
different degrees of progressivity and its distributional impact is straightforward. The
property tax and the waste tax potentially also have distributional consequences, but
those are more complicated to detect and to analyze.8 Furthermore, the upper bound
on the main local property tax rate was significantly decreased by the national govern-
ment in 2013 and 2014, leaving limited scope to increase revenues from this instrument
in response to the introduction of the DSP.9
In 1999, the local income tax was introduced as a municipal surcharge on the na-
tional income tax to grant municipalities more tax autonomy. In our sample period, the
income brackets of the national income tax were split at 15,000e, 28,000e, 55,000e, and
75,000e, with their respective marginal tax rates being 21%, 27%, 38%, 41% and 43%.10
In general, the tax base is composed of wage income, pension income, self-employed
income, capital income, rents, and other sources of income. However, income from sev-
eral sources can be subject to alternative and more favorable taxation (e.g. rents from
real estate, investment in government bonds, self-employed income below a certain
threshold), so the bulk of the taxable income consists of wage and pension income.11
The revenues from the municipal surcharge are based on the residency principle and
flow completely to the municipal budget. Starting in 1999, the law allowed municipal-
ities to apply uniform tax rates of up to 0.5% of taxable income on top of the national
7 This was extended to three terms in 2014 for municipalities below 3,000 inhabitants.
8 For more information on the distributional consequences of these fiscal instruments see Messina and
Savegnago (2014) and Messina, Savegnago, and Sechi (2018).
9 We test the effects on the property tax and report the results in Appendix 3.A.4 together with additional
institutional details.
10 The final tax bill is the gross tax bill net of deductions (detrazioni). The gross tax bill is calculated applying
the tax rates on taxable income. The taxable income is calculated as total income net of exemptions
(deduzioni).
11 Approximately 80% both in terms of taxpayers and of taxable income in 2011.
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tax rates. In the period from 2007 to 2011, the cap was raised to 0.8% and municipalities
were given the autonomy to set an exemption threshold: tax payers with income below
the threshold were fully exempted from the tax, while those above would pay a tax cal-
culated on their total income. Since 2012, municipalities can also set differentiated tax
rates in every bracket of the national income tax schedule. In other words, since 2007
municipalities can levy non-linear income taxes. The increase in flexibility of this tax
instrument was coupled with technical assistance from the Ministry of Finance: at least
since 2011, municipal officials have access to an online calculator that uses individual
level data from the tax administration allowing to simulate how revenues and tax base
respond to changes in tax rates and in the exemption threshold. In particular, users
can vary the following parameters: tax revenues, tax rates, the exemption threshold,
and the number of exempted tax payers (broken down by employees, retirees and self-
employed). This setting allows us to study the progressivity of income taxation at the
local level.
The adoption of differentiated tax rates by municipalities has evolved quickly over
time and increased even further with the 2012 reform (Giommoni, 2019). Restricting
attention to small municipalities (below 2,500 inhabitants), no municipality operated
under a regime with an exemption threshold and a flat tax, 67% implemented a flat
tax without exemption, and 33% did not introduce any surcharge in 2007. In 2015, 8%
operated a system with five tax rates, with or without exemption, 12% implemented a
flat tax with exemption, 56% implemented a flat tax without exemption, and 24% did
not have any surcharge. Conditional on having a exemption threshold, the average
threshold is about 10,000e with considerable variation around the mean (see Figure
3.B.2).
Municipalities account for about 10% of total public expenditures (Grembi, Nan-
nicini, and Troiano, 2016). They are responsible for providing a variety of public ser-
vices, such as administrative services (30% of municipal expenditures in our sample
period 2007-2015), waste and water management (24%), public transport and mainte-
nance of municipal roads (15%), social services (8%), education services (7%), culture
and recreation (5%), economic development and tourism (3%), and local police and ju-
diciary (2%).
Spending on social and educational programs is of special importance to us, given
their potential redistributive nature and Italian municipalities’ relatively large discre-
tion over these items. Social spending includes, among others, assistance to poor peo-
ple, child care, or care for elderly. Education expenditures on the municipal level com-
prise of spending for pre-school and primary school services, such as refectories and
school buses. In our sample period, Italian municipalities are only allowed to take up
loans to finance new investment expenditures if the total amount of interest paid was
lower than a certain fraction of revenues from taxes, fees and transfers.12 The main
source of borrowing for small municipalities are loans from the Italian Public Invest-
ment Bank (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti) accounting for almost 80% of debt holdings.
12 The fraction varied over time, from 15% in 2007 to 10% in 2014.
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3.2.4 The Local Income Surcharge in Municipal Politics
Anecdotal evidence from newspapers, social media, electoral platforms and council’s
minutes suggest that incumbent mayors often refer to the local income surcharge tax
in public statements. When raising the exemption threshold as well as the tax rates
for high incomes, mayors underline that these reforms increase progressivity, are fair,
and help disadvantaged people with little cost for others. For example, the mayor or
Brandico wrote in his 2014 electoral platform: “To help disadvantage people, we need
to raise the exemption threshold [...] and to introduce progressivity (by raising tax rates
more for higher brackets)”. The mayor of Milano wrote on Facebook in 2019: “[...] The
exemption threshold raises from 21,000 to 23,000 euros, extending the no tax area to
50,000 more citizens. [...] It is the right thing to do to support households and workers.”
There are also instances when opposition politicians blame incumbents for not exploit-
ing the tax flexibility and implementing a flat tax instead.13 These anecdotes suggest
that the local income surcharge is an important topic in municipal politics, and are con-
sistent with recent empirical evidence that the introduction of differentiated rates gen-
erated an election cycle: the surcharge tends to decrease before elections and increase
afterwards (Giommoni, 2019). As documented in the same paper with data on google
searches and surveys, the municipal income surcharge is a salient fiscal instrument for
taxpayers. This is consistent with the fact that the amount paid due to this tax is usually
clearly visible on the monthly payslips received by employees and retirees.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Sample
Our sample starts in 2007, the first year municipalities were allowed to levy non-linear
income taxes, and ends in 2015, since all municipalities were subject to a new rule in
2016. We apply a number of restrictions on our sample. First, we drop all observa-
tions that are part of a union for inter-municipal cooperation (Unione dei Comuni) and
at the same time have less than 1,000 inhabitants, since these municipalities are subject
to the fiscal rule irrespective of their population (931 municipalities). Second, we drop
all municipalities located in one of the five autonomous regions (Friuli-Venezia Giulia,
Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Valle d’Aosta), since they are granted a special
status by the Italian constitution allowing them to set their own rules (1,392 municipal-
ities). Third, we drop all municipalities that merged in the sample period (79 munici-
palities). Altogether, our final sample consists of 6,638 municipalities, which represent
about 82% of all Italian municipalities.
Our empirical strategy relies on comparing municipalities that are above and below
the 1,000 population threshold (see next section). Our estimating sample will always ex-
clude municipalities with more than 2,500 inhabitants, as they are too close to the next
13 For example, the opposition group Borgo in Comune in Borgo San Lorenzo (18,000 inhabitants).
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Figure 3.3.1: Map of Italian municipalities
policy-relevant threshold at 3,000 inhabitants.14 Figure 3.3.1 shows a map of munici-
palities in our sample, distinguishing between municipalities below 1,000 inhabitants
(blue) and those between 1,000 and 2,500 (red). Due to our population restrictions, our
sample is composed mainly by municipalities located on the Alps or on the Apennines,
the two main Italian mountain ranges. The map suggests also that blue and red munic-
ipalities are distributed rather uniformly along these two mountain ranges. Table 3.B.3
in the Appendix shows summary statistics of all variables for the whole sample as well
as for municipalities below and above 2,500 inhabitants.
14 Note that our estimates actually leverage on variation from an even smaller sample of municipalities
located around the 1,000 population threshold, and selected using the optimal bandwidth by Grembi,
Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). See section 3.4 for more details.
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3.3.2 Municipal Tax Rates
We collect annual information on the local income tax from the Italian Ministry of Fi-
nance. This includes marginal tax rates for all income brackets and exemption levels
at the municipal level. We also obtain the (approximate) municipal-level income tax
base distribution from the Italian Fiscal Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate). In particular,
for every municipality we observe both the number of taxpayers and the tax base in
a number of income brackets.15 We make the simplifying assumption that taxpayers
are uniformly distributed within the brackets in order to construct income deciles on
the municipality level. This allows us to know the tax rates that apply to each income
decile of the respective municipality, e.g., the statutory tax rate that a household earning
as much as the 90th percentile of the municipal income distribution has to pay. Using
these tax rates as outcome variables allows us to gauge which part of the distribution
is affected by changes in tax policy.16 As discussed above, one can distinguish between
three different tax regimes: a uniform tax, an exemption level and a uniform tax, or a
fully differentiated tax schedule. We plot the sample mean of the average tax rates for
municipalities in the three tax regimes before (Figure 3.3.2a) and after the fiscal rule re-
form (Figure 3.3.2b). As the blue line indicates, the average uniform tax rate is about
0.48%. For both municipalities with an exemption threshold and those with a fully dif-
ferentiated tax schedule, the mean tax rate monotonically increases along the municipal
income distribution.
To test the distributional effect of the fiscal rule we employ several outcome mea-
sures. First, we directly look at the tax rates at the nine income deciles of the municipal
income distribution. Second, we study the level of the exemption threshold. Third, we
use a binary indicator of whether a given municipality has a progressive tax system or
not. Fourth, to obtain a comprehensive measure of progressivity, we use two indica-
tors from the literature: the average and marginal rate progression (Peter, Buttrick, and
Duncan, 2010). We construct these variables by running the following regression for
each municipality-year pair (i, t) separately:
TaxRateyit = β0 + β1log(y) + εity ∀ y ∈ {1000, 2000, ..., 99000, 100000} (3.1)
where TaxRateyit is the average (marginal) tax rate at income y in municipality i in year
t, and β1 is an estimate of the average (marginal) rate progression. We normalize the
progressivity measures with their sample standard deviations to ease interpretation.
The resulting coefficient is by construction negative for regressive, zero for flat, and
positive for progressive tax schedules.
Furthermore, we calculate income tax revenues by income brackets. Specifically,
we take the product of the total tax base and the average tax rate for each individual
bracket. To derive the average tax revenues per taxpayer, we then divide by the number
of tax payers in the specific bracket.
15 See Figure 3.B.3 for a histogram of the number of taxpayers in each bracket.
16 We also use the average tax rate paid on annual incomes from 5,000 to 75,000e as alternative outcomes.
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Notes: The figure presents the mean average tax rates in the deciles of the municipal income distribution for three groups of
municipalities: those with a uniform tax (blue line), those that have an exemption level and a uniform tax rate that applies to
income exceeding the exemption level (red line), and those with a fully differentiated tax schedule (green line). The sample
includes only municipalities with less than 2,500 residents. Panel (a) presents data for the period 2007-2012; panel (b) for the
period 2013-2015.
3.3.3 Municipal Budget
We complement the data above with municipal budget data from the Italian Ministry
of the Interior (Certificati Consuntivi). These include detailed accounts of revenues and
expenditures. Budgets report figures according to two accounting criteria: cash and
accrual bases. We use the latter, since policy changes are reflected in accrual accounts
more quickly. We convert all monetary values into 2015 euro and per capita figures
using the CPI series and annual population counts from the Italian National Institute of
Statistics (ISTAT). Furthermore, we winsorize all budget variables at the first and 99th
percentile to account for outliers.
Expenditure figures are split between capital and current spending, and are further
disaggregated in broad categories (e.g. education, social). Revenues are available by
their source (e.g. local income tax surcharge, transfers from central government). We
rely on the officially defined deficit (disavanzo) in the accounts, which is the difference
between revenues and expenditures plus the difference between revenue carry-overs
and expenditure carry-overs from preceding years. Carry-overs are the difference be-
tween the figures calculated according to the cash and accrual bases (e.g. credit vis-a-vis
taxpayers, or debt vis-a-vis suppliers). Therefore, the official deficit accounts for obliga-
tions originated in previous years, which still weight on the public finances. According
to this official measure of deficits, 54% of all municipalities in our sample are in surplus.
3.3.4 Politician and Election Data
We collect information on local elections from the historical electoral archive, and in-
formation on politicians from the registry of local public office holders. Both datasets
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are maintained by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The first database includes the
names of all the candidates and of the lists supporting them, and reports information
on election results. This allows us to construct both a rerun and reelection dummy for
incumbents. The former is equal to one if the incumbent is not term-limited and runs
again, and equals zero in case the incumbent is not term-limited but does not run again.
The latter variable equals one for incumbents that run again and are reelected, and is
zero for those who rerun and fail to be reelected.
The second database has demographic information on all individuals who ever held
municipal public office, that is mayors, members of the executive committee, and coun-
cilors. Usually runners-up are elected to the city council, so that we also have informa-
tion on them unless they give up their seat immediately after the election. Therefore, we
have information on birthplace, party, (potential) term limit, gender, (former) occupa-
tion and education level for both the mayor and the runner-up. Using these variables,
we construct our two measures of politician’s quality, a dummy for having a college
degree and a dummy for being employed in a high-skill profession before becoming a
politician.17 We merge the two databases by matching on name, surname, year and mu-
nicipality code in order to obtain background information on mayors and runners-up.
The matching is successful in 70% of the cases.18
3.3.5 Municipal Characteristics
We collect several further (time-invariant) variables on municipal characteristics from
the 2011 census: the share of female, college-educated, and inhabitants older than 60
years as well as geographic variables such as altitude, geographic area and a dummy for
coastal location. The annual population numbers are retrieved from ISTAT. We calculate
the yearly share of income held by the top income earners (more than 55,000e) from the
tax base data by the Italian Fiscal Agency.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Difference-in-Discontinuity Design
Our empirical strategy relies on a natural experiment resulting from the extension of
the fiscal rule in the year 2013 to municipalities that were previously exempted. In our
sample period of 2007-2015, the Domestic Stability Pact applied to municipalities with
17 For the latter, we rely on the ISTAT classification of occupations (ISTAT, 2013). We classify occupations in
category 1 (legislators, entrepreneurs and managers) and 2 (intellectual, scientific and highly specialized
occupations) as high-skill occupations. Among mayors from high-skill occupations, 76% hold a college
degree, whereas among those from other occupations only 27% have a college degree.
18 Non-matches are likely due to second-placed candidates not joining the city council. Table 3.B.4 of the
Appendix compares the covariates of matched and non-matched mayors.
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5,000 or more inhabitants until 2013, and to municipalities with 1,000 or more inhabi-
tants from 2013 to 2015. One possible strategy could be a comparison of municipalities
around the 1,000 threshold using only data for the period 2013-2015 in a classic regres-
sion discontinuity design. However, other policies change discontinuously at the 1,000
cutoff (see Table 3.B.2 for details) and thus the standard continuity assumption is vio-
lated.
In order to isolate the effects of the fiscal rule, we employ a difference-in-discontinuity
design (Asatryan et al., 2017; Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano, 2016). The intuition be-
hind this empirical strategy is that a confounding policy jump can be netted out if the
policy is time-constant. This assumption holds in our setup, as all of the confounding
policy discontinuities are constant over the whole sample period. This implies that
one can estimate the confounding effect at the 1,000 threshold in the years before 2013
and subtract it from the compounded fiscal rule and confounding effect estimated at
the 1,000 threshold between 2013 and 2015. In other words, this strategy amounts to a
difference-in-differences design evaluated at the 1,000 threshold.19
More formally, let Yit be an outcome variable in municipality i at time t (e.g. tax
progressivity) and p̃it = pit − 1, 000 its normalized population in the previous year.
According to the law, the treatment status of a municipality is based on the population
of the preceding year.20 We therefore use p̃it−1 as our forcing variable, where at the
cutoff the treatment status jumps sharply from 0 to 1. The difference-in-discontinuity





E[Yit|p̃it−1 = p, t ≥ 2013]− lim
p→0−





E[Yit|p̃it−1 = p, t < 2013]− lim
p→0−
E[Yit|p̃it−1 = p, t < 2013]
)
where the first row describes the jump in the outcome variable at the threshold between
2013 and 2015 (i.e. the compounded fiscal rule and confounding effect), and the sec-
ond row subtracts the jump in the outcome variable before the reform (i.e. only the
confounding effect).
We implement this estimator using a local linear regressions as in Grembi, Nannicini,
and Troiano (2016) and estimate the following equation:21
Yit =β0 + β1p̃it−1 + Tit(β2 + β3p̃it−1) +Reformt[(β4+
β5p̃it−1) + Tit(β6 + β7p̃it−1)] + εit ∀ (i, t) s.t. |p̃it−1| < h? (3.2)
where Tit takes the value of one if municipality i is subject to the fiscal rule in year t,
Reformt is a dummy equaling one from 2013 to 2015, and h? is the optimal bandwidth
19 We do not evaluate the change of the 5,000 inhabitants threshold, since there is a simultaneous policy
change of gender quotas in local elections in 2013 (see Table 3.B.2).
20 Consistent with the institutional framework, we are using the yearly population numbers from ISTAT.
21 We also estimate global polynomial regressions with varying polynomial degrees.
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determined by the algorithm suggested by Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016).22
Since the results of local linear regressions may be sensitive to the choice of the band-
width, we also estimate results obtained with different bandwidths. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level to account for arbitrary serial correlation in the error
term. The local average treatment effect (LATE) of the fiscal rule is then identified by
the coefficient β6.
The difference-in-discontinuity estimator identifies the effect of interest if the fol-
lowing identifying assumptions are met. First, as discussed above, other confounding
variables can change discontinuously at the threshold, but we must assume that the
change is time-constant. We test this assumption of local parallel trends by means of
placebo reforms. That is, we pretend that the reform was implemented in some earlier
year instead of 2013, and then re-do the baseline analysis on the pre-reform sample.
Second, in contrast to a classical regression discontinuity design, where there cannot
be any manipulation of the running variables, the difference-in-discontinuity estimator
allows for time-constant sorting unrelated to the reform. If municipalities were to re-
act to the reform by manipulating their population numbers in order to avoid the fiscal
rule, we would have selection bias in the treatment and control assignment. We test
this assumption with McCrary density tests both before and after the reform, as well
as with a density test of the change in density because of the reform. One important
caveat is that, even when our identifying assumptions hold, we are estimating the local
average treatment effect of the fiscal rule. That means our results only apply to small
municipalities and are not representative for all Italian local governments.
3.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects
To examine the mechanisms driving our results, we also test for heterogeneous effects.
We put special focus on the mayor’s quality measured by having a college education or
coming from a high-skill occupation. Following the literature on heterogeneous effects
in an RD setup (see Becker, Egger, and Ehrlich, 2013), we interact every term in equation
3.2 with a dummy for being a high-skilled mayor Dit:













5 p̃it−1 + Tit(β
int
6 +
βint7 p̃it−1)]] + γi +Xit + εit ∀ (i, t) s.t. |p̃it−1| < h? (3.3)
The heterogeneous treatment effect is then measured by βint6 . Xit includes dummies
indicating whether the mayor is female, has a college degree, is backed by a left-wing,
right-wing or centrist party, is term-limited, her age and her win margin in the last
22 We conduct a standard RD before and after the reform using the STATA command rdrobust (see Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014) and then take the average of the two optimal bandwidths.
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election, the number of years to the next election, as well as the top income share and
pre-reform deficits of the municipality.23
We also include municipality fixed effects γi to absorb any time-invariant hetero-
geneity. Nevertheless, we cannot fully exclude the possibility of unobserved time-
varying confounding variables determining both the mayor’s quality and our outcome
of interest. For example, if municipalities whose population has a higher preference for
redistribution tend to elect more skilled mayors, then we would erroneously attribute
the estimated increase in progressivity to mayoral quality rather than to the popula-
tion’s preferences.
For this reason, we turn to a more exogenous source of variation in the mayor’s
quality. We exploit close mixed elections, i.e. races in which the winning candidate and
runner-up have a different educational level.24 First, we restrict our sample to munici-
palities whose mayors have been elected in a mixed election. Next, we subtract the vote
share of the non-college candidate from that of the college-educated candidate to get
the vote margin vmit, which acts as our running variable. For positive vmit, the college-
educated candidate wins the election, whereas if vmit is negative, the non-college can-
didate wins. Our identifying variation then stems from close elections, comparing mu-
nicipalities, in which the college-educated candidate barely won, to those in which she
barely lost. More formally, let Dit be an indicator that takes the value one if the mayor
of municipality i in year t is college-educated. We then estimate the following equation:
Yit =β0 + β1vmit +Dit(β2 + β3vmit) +Xit + εit ∀ (i, t) s.t. |vmit| < h (3.4)
where Xit includes all control variables described above, as well as additional charac-
teristics of the second-placed candidate (gender, age and party), and h is the chosen
bandwidth. The effect of having a college-educated mayor is then identified by β2. The
most important identifying assumption is that the education level is the only character-
istic that changes at the threshold. We test this by using other observable characteristics
from Xit as outcome variables to see whether they also jump at the threshold.
In a last step, we combine equations 3.3 and 3.4 to identify our heterogeneous effects
model using only the variation in the quality of the mayor induced by close elections.
That is, we interact every term in equation 3.3 with the vote margin between college-
educated and non-college-educated candidates and estimate it on the sample of mixed
elections. By comparing college-educated and non-college mayors that barely won in a
mixed election, we effectively control for unobserved confounders that could possibly
drive both the mayor’s educational level and tax policy.
23 In some specifications, we add additional interaction terms from Xit other than Dit to test their relative
importance in a “horse race”.
24 This strategy has been extensively used in the literature on the effect of female mayors (see, for example,
Baskaran and Hessami, 2018). We focus on mixed races between mayors of different education levels
since the number of races between mayors from low- and high-skill occupations is considerably smaller.
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Each graph is a regression discontinuity plot for pre-reform years
(2007-12, on the left) and post-reform years (2013-15, on the right). The outcome variable is reported underneath each graph. The running variable is lagged normalized
population. Plots are obtained with the STATA command rdplot (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015)) organizing the data in 10 bins on each side of the threshold. The lines
are linear fits estimated separately on each side of the threshold.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Baseline Results
We start by presenting some graphical evidence of our results. Figure 3.5.1 shows stan-
dard RD graphs estimated separately on the pre-reform (2007-12, on the left) and post-
reform (2013-15, on the right) samples for four outcome variables in sub-figures: a)
income tax rate at the first decile, b) income tax rate at the ninth decile, c) average rate
progression, and d) a dummy for a progressive tax. Each graph plots local means of the
outcome variable in ten normalized population bins on each side of the threshold, and a
linear fit of the data estimated separately on each of them. Before the reform, the figure
does not show a visible jump at the threshold for any of the outcome variables. After the
reform, we observe a positive jump in the average tax rate at the first decile, and a more
sizable one for the tax rate at the ninth decile. This preliminary graphical evidence sug-
gests that the reform induced a disproportionate increase in the tax for higher incomes.
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The figure plots the local average treatment effects also reported in
Table 3.5.1 and their 95% confidence bands. The LATEs are from difference-in-discontinuities models estimated with a separate local linear regression for each tax rate and
correspond to β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). The deciles refer to the income distribution in each
municipality.
The finding is confirmed by the fact that both measures of progressivity display a posi-
tive jump at the threshold in the post-reform years, but not in pre-reform years (panels
c and d).
Next, we turn to the estimates obtained from the difference-in-discontinuity estima-
tion (equation 3.2). Figure 3.5.2 plots the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the
reform on the average tax rates at all deciles of the municipal income distribution (es-
timates are shown in Table 3.5.1). We find that, first, all point estimates are positive.
This is consistent with the interpretation that municipalities raise local income taxes to
comply with the fiscal rule. Second, the size of the point estimates is monotonically in-
creasing along the municipal income distribution. Third, the estimated effect on the top
tax rate translate to about 13% of the sample mean, and is about 3.5 times as large as the
estimated tax rate effect on the lowest earners.
To test whether the estimated effects on high-earners are statistically larger than the
effects on low-earners, we re-estimate equation 3.2 for all nine tax rates jointly, with
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).25 We then implement several one-sided Wald
tests with a null hypothesis that the effect on higher incomes is not larger than the effect
25 We use SUR because the tax rates along the income distribution are jointly determined by the municipal
government, and thus can not be considered as independent outcome variables. As such, the confidence
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Table 3.5.1: Effect of the reform on the income tax rate at different income deciles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile
LATE 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.032* 0.036** 0.039** 0.043** 0.045** 0.047**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
> 1st decile - 0.488 0.216 0.061 0.035 0.022 0.012 0.008 0.007
> 2nd decile - - 0.194 0.049 0.027 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.005
> 3rd decile - - - 0.063 0.034 0.018 0.008 0.005 0.004
> 4th decile - - - - 0.192 0.091 0.034 0.019 0.018
> 5th decile - - - - - 0.049 0.005 0.003 0.008
> 6th decile - - - - - - 0.014 0.007 0.015
> 7th decile - - - - - - - 0.028 0.050
> 8th decile - - - - - - - - 0.157
mean 0.331 0.335 0.347 0.358 0.364 0.366 0.367 0.368 0.370
bandwidth 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661
N 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the local average
treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for each outcome variable (reported at
the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). The
deciles refer to the income distribution in each municipality. The middle panel displays p-values for pairwise one-sided tests (estimated by seemingly
unrelated regression) whether the effect is higher than the effect on the tax rate at the first to eighth municipal income decile, respectively. In the bottom
panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
on lower incomes. We present the p-values of all these tests in Table 3.5.1. Overall, we
can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% or 10% level for almost all comparisons.
Alternatively, we also use the average tax rates at annual incomes from 5,000e to
75,000e as outcomes. The effects are again positive for all tax rates and monotonically
increasing in income, but only significant at the 95% level for incomes above the national
median income (see Figure 3.C.2). As before, one-sided Wald tests reject the hypothesis
that there are no differences between the effects on high- and low-earners (see Table
3.C.1).
As a final test for the effect of introducing the fiscal rule on tax progressivity, we es-
timate the difference-in-discontinuity design (equation 3.2) using our four measures of
progressivity: the average rate progression, the marginal rate progression, the exemp-
tion level (in e), and a dummy equal to one if the overall income tax schedule is pro-
gressive. Table 3.5.2 shows that the reform induces an increase in the average (marginal)
rate progression of 0.14 (0.16) standard deviations, corresponding to 80% (86%) of the
sample mean. The reform also increases the probability of adopting a progressive tax
system by six percentage points (Table 3.5.2, column 2). This large increase in progres-
sivity is partly driven by the effect on the exemption level, which increases by 600e,
that is approximately by 67% of the sample mean (Table 3.5.2, column 4).
Exploiting information on the municipal income distribution, we also estimate the
effects on tax revenues levied from taxpayers assigned to different brackets both in ag-
intervals plotted in Figure 3.5.2 are not useful for testing whether effects on different tax rates are signifi-
cantly different from each other.
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Table 3.5.2: Effect of the reform on progressivity measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
average rate progression progressive tax marginal rate progression exemption level
LATE 0.140** 0.056** 0.155** 600*
(0.062) (0.027) (0.066) (316)
mean 0.175 0.087 0.181 892
bandwidth 668 650 668 635
N 17,775 17,319 17,775 16,955
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the local average
treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for each outcome variable
(reported at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini,
and Troiano (2016). The average and marginal rate progressions are estimates of the slope of the average and marginal income tax schedules.
Progressive tax is a dummy for whether the municipality has a tax rate which is not uniform. Exemption level is the amount of income (in e)
exempted from the income tax. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations
are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: *p¡0.1, **p¡0.05, ***p¡0.01
gregate and in per taxpayer terms (see Section 3.3). In line with the progressive nature
of the income tax rate adjustment, our findings suggest that individuals from upper tax
brackets contribute more to the extra revenues generated by the reform. The average tax
increase for a taxpayer in the top income bracket (above 120,000e) amounts to 73e (47%
relative to the sample mean) which is about an order of magnitude larger than the effect
on a taxpayer in the 15,000e to 26,000e bracket. In general, the additional tax revenues
per taxpayer induced by the reform are strictly increasing in taxable income (see Table
3.5.3)
However, since only few taxpayers have large taxable incomes (on average 15 in-
dividuals have taxable incomes above 55,000e), more than half of the extra revenue is
levied from tax payers with taxable income between 15,000e and 55,000e. Our findings
also suggest that individuals with taxable income below 10,000e (on average 38% of the
total taxpayers) are the only ones to almost entirely escape the tax rate increase. This
result is consistent with our previous findings of an increase in exemption levels.
Furthermore, we also test the effects of the reform on the tax base, and we do not
find evidence that taxable income changed (see Table 3.C.2). Taken together with the
evidence of a positive effect on revenues, this finding suggest that mayors were able
to raise additional income tax revenues without substantially hurting their tax base.
Finally, we also compute the upper pareto bounds proposed by Bierbrauer, Boyer, and
Peichl (2021) to test whether the pre-reform tax systems were on the left or on the right
of the peak of the Laffer curve. We find that, even assuming a large elasticity of taxable
income, more than 95% of the municipalities were on the left of the peak, making thus
possible for mayors to raise revenues by increasing tax rates (see Appendix 3.A.3 for
details.).
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Table 3.5.3: Effect of the reform on income tax revenues by bracket
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<10ke 10ke-15ke 15ke-28ke 28ke-55ke 55ke-75ke 75ke-120ke >120ke
tax revenues per taxpayer
LATE 0.78 4.92** 7.80** 15.88** 22.49* 52.88** 73.05**
(1.02) (2.36) (3.69) (6.25) (13.53) (21.81) (30.60)
mean 18.14 47.11 76.11 129.62 177.36 195.38 154.85
mean # of taxpayer 308 136 241 109 8 5 2
bandwidth 664 654 665 660 618 479 726
N 17,684 17,444 17,709 17,587 16,544 13,163 19,180
total tax revenues
LATE 6.24 596.17* 1561.08* 1938.44** 406.45*** 486.49*** 627.70***
(307.52) (317.41) (919.09) (760.57) (149.98) (182.34) (239.48)
mean 4,857.04 5,796.83 16,824.49 12,589.17 1,747.59 1,566.40 1,020.69
bandwidth 700 657 628 647 653 608 688
N 18,550 17,508 16,776 17,247 17,408 16,287 18,279
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the local average treatment
effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for each outcome variable. The LATE corresponds to
β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). The outcome variables are per capita (upper panel) and total
(bottom panel) tax revenues in 2015 Euros generated by tax payers with taxable income included in the bracket reported on top of each column. The table
reports also the sample mean of the outcome variable, the average number of taxpayers in each bracket, the used bandwidth and the number of observations.
Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
3.5.2 Sensitivity Checks
In this section, we discuss the validity of the two major identifying assumptions as
described in Section 3.4. We also perform a number of additional robustness tests with
respect to the choice of bandwidth size and polynomial degrees, and a permutation test
using placebo thresholds.
First, the local parallel trends assumption states that any difference at the threshold
other than the fiscal rule has to be time-constant. To formally test whether the local
common trends assumption holds, we use a dynamic version of equation 3.2, where
we replace the Reformt dummy with year dummies. Normalizing our effects to the
pre-reform year of 2012, this allows us to track the local trends before the reform and
the dynamic effects after the reform. As Figure 3.5.3 shows, there is no significant pre-
treatment trend in the bottom tax rate (Panel a), top tax rate (Panel b), the average rate
progression (Panel c), or the probability of a progressive tax system (Panel d).26 After
the reform, there is an immediate significant increase in all variables, but the bottom tax
rate. As a further robustness check, we conduct placebo reforms in every pre-reform
year of our sample. Specifically, we restrict our sample to the pre-reform period and re-
estimate equation 3.2 with the Reformt dummy taking the value 1 from year t onward
with t ∈ {2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012}. If any confounding effect was not time-constant,
one would expect to pick up a significant effect by at least one of these placebo reforms.
Figure 3.D.2 plots the results of the five placebo estimations as well as that of the base-
line results. The results show zero effects for every placebo reform and every tax rate. As
26 This also holds for our other outcomes variables (see Figure 3.D.1).
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Each panel plots estimates from the dynamic model on a different
outcome variable, reported underneath each plot. The dynamic model is an extension of the baseline difference-in-discontinuities model that includes year dummies instead
of the reform dummy. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Each dot is the estimate of the deviation of the outcome variable in the
year reported on the horizontal axis relative to the pre-reform year 2012. Dotted bars are 95% confidence bands.
expected, the placebo estimates exhibit a constant rather than a monotonically increas-
ing relationship between the estimated tax rate effect and the level of income. Next, we
test the continuity assumption by using pre-determined variables as outcomes. Table
3.D.1 shows that none of the 16 variables are significantly influenced by the reform at
conventional levels.
Our second identifying assumption is that there is no manipulation of the population
numbers in reaction to the reform. In order to test this claim, we present standard
McCrary graphs (McCrary (2008)) displaying the density of municipalities around the
threshold before and after the reform, as well as a “dynamic” McCrary graph, which
shows the difference between the density around the threshold before and after the
reform (see Asatryan et al., 2017; Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano, 2016).27 We do not
find evidence of a significant jump in the density of observations at the 1,000 population
27 For the “dynamic” McCrary, we first divide normalized log population size in bins of width 0.01. Then
we calculate the change in the total number of observations within each bin from the pre- to the post-
reform period. Finally, we fit local polynomial plots using a quadratic degree and a triangular kernel.
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threshold either before (Figure 3.D.3a) or after (Figure 3.D.3b) the reform. This evidence
of no manipulation of population numbers in response to the reform is confirmed by the
results of the “dynamic” McCrary test presented in Figure 3.D.4.
Our results are also robust to the selection of different bandwidths. Figure 3.D.5
plots the effect on low- and high-earners for bandwidths ranging from 400 to 1,000. As
expected, the standard errors somewhat decrease with larger bandwidth, but the point
estimates remain stable. Furthermore, Figure 3.D.6 and Table 3.D.2 show that global
polynomial regressions yield very similar results to local linear regressions. Addition-
ally, we conduct permutation tests by re-estimating equation 3.2 at placebo thresholds
and show that our baseline effect on high incomes is larger than any of the placebo
estimates (see Figure 3.D.7). Finally, we show in Appendix 3.A.2 that a difference-in-
difference approach yields estimates very similar to our main estimates.
3.6 Mechanisms and Electoral Implications
We have thus far established that local governments increase tax progressivity in re-
sponse to exogenous consolidation requirements induced by the fiscal rule. This section
first explores heterogeneity in the treatment effects estimated in the previous section.
In particular, we study whether the type of tax adjustment is different depending on
mayor characteristics, with a special emphasis on her skill level. We then study whether
introducing the fiscal rule affects reelection chances of mayors.
3.6.1 The Role of High-Skilled Mayors
Following the literature on competence of politicians and its effects on policy outcomes
(see Section 3.1), we proxy skill with the politician’s education level, specifically if she
holds a college degree.28 As a robustness check, we also use a dummy for being em-
ployed in a high-skill profession. About 45% of the mayors in our sample have a college
degree and 38% work in a high-skill occupation (see Table 3.B.3).
We first test whether highly-educated mayors are driving our progressivity results
as measured by both of our progression measures, the exemption level, and a dummy
for progressive rather than flat tax systems. Table 3.6.1 presents estimates of equation
3.3, where the interaction variable Dit is a dummy equal to one if the mayor holds a
college degree. It turns out that college-educated mayors drive almost all of the increase
in progressivity estimated in our baseline model. Columns 1 shows that mayors with
a college education increase the average rate progression by 0.30 standard deviations
in response to the fiscal rule, whereas non-college-educated mayors do not change the
28 In this measurement choice we follow the literature that most often approximates the skill of politicians
by their level of education (see, for example, Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Gagliarducci and Nannicini,
2013). Other papers measure the skill of politicians by utilizing data on politicians’ experience, pre-office
market income, quality (rather than only level) of education or the skill level of their occupation (Bertrand
et al., 2020; Besley et al., 2017; Fisman et al., 2015).
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Table 3.6.1: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill

















LATE 0.012 0.013 -0.004 -0.016 0.010 0.015 -0.009 -0.010
(0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.167) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.162)
LATE x college degree 0.298** 0.293** 0.231** 0.229**
(0.120) (0.119) (0.106) (0.108)
LATE x high-skill job 0.359*** 0.339** 0.294** 0.281**
(0.133) (0.133) (0.120) (0.119)
LATE x female mayor 0.069 0.076
(0.163) (0.168)
LATE x left-wing mayor 0.025 0.020
(0.154) (0.155)
LATE x right-wing mayor -0.360 -0.344
(0.297) (0.300)
LATE x centrist mayor -0.489 -0.605
(0.342) (0.388)
LATE x low win margin 0.097 0.088
(0.114) (0.117)
LATE x term limit -0.041 -0.060
(0.100) (0.101)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 0.133 0.129
(0.132) (0.132)
LATE x low top income share -0.177 -0.174
(0.132) (0.132)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
mean 0.176 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.173 0.177 0.177 0.177
bandwidth 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 668
N 17,378 17,092 17,092 17,092 17,292 16,741 16,741 16,741
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models extended to estimate
heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local
average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 )
in equation 3.3. We measure mayors’ skills using two dummies: college degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one; and high-skill job, which is equal to one in case the mayor was
employed in a managing position or in an intellectual profession (e.g. lawyer, medical doctor). Details on all covariates are described in Section 3.4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The
bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown.
Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
progressivity of the income tax at all. This result holds when including municipality
fixed effects and several other interactions with potential confounders, such as gender,
a proxy for electoral competition, political orientation, binding term limits, pre-reform
fiscal position, and income structure (see columns 2 to 4 of Table 3.6.1). Furthermore,
results look very similar when using the skill level of the mayor’s occupation as an
alternative measure (see columns 5 to 8 of Table 3.6.1). Tables 3.C.3, 3.C.4 and 3.C.5
show that this heterogeneous effect also holds for the introduction of progressive tax
systems, exemption levels and the marginal rate progression. These results do not mean
that low-skilled mayors did not raise local income taxes in response to the reform, but
rather that they increased tax rates uniformly (see Figure 3.C.3).
The heterogenous effects estimated so far in this section using equation 3.3 do not
have a causal interpretation because mayors’ education is not assigned at random to
different municipalities. As such, unobserved factors at the mayor or municipal-level
might induce omitted variable bias and thus drive the estimated heterogeneity. To tackle
this issue, we focus on mixed elections, in which the winner and runner-up have dif-
ferent education levels. Using this sample, we estimate the heterogeneous effect at the
election threshold by interacting all variables with the vote margin between the two
candidates. In other words, we combine equations 3.3 and 3.4.
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Table 3.6.2: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill: mixed election RD











LATE -0.035 -0.223 -0.391
(0.100) (0.332) (0.302)
college degree -0.048 -0.002 0.167 -0.019 0.145
(0.032) (0.094) (0.264) (0.042) (0.100)
LATE x college degree 0.310** 1.033** 0.954**
(0.146) (0.466) (0.400)
controls yes yes yes yes yes
mixed election RD yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.179 0.168 0.168 0.081 0.081
population bandwidth 668 668 668 668 668
close election bandwidth 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
N 12,355 2,621 2,621 1,861 1,861
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The sample is restricted to observations for
which we were able to match the main dataset with the election data. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report estimates of the difference-in-discontinuities
model extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. In rows with “mixed election RD” switched on, the model is augmented with the margin of
victory and its interaction with all other terms, and the sample is further restricted to municipality-year observations, in which the incumbent mayor was
elected in a race against a runner up with a different education level (college vs. non-college). Population bandwidths are selected following Grembi,
Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Election bandwidths are selected using the using the STATA command rdrobust. Columns (5) and (6) report estimates
of the college effect from regression discontinuity models where the running variable is the margin of victory, the treatment dummy is equal to one if
the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform (β2) in equation 3.4. Details on all covariates are described in
Section 3.4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidths and the number of observations are shown. Statistical
significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
This empirical strategy accounts for any municipal level unobserved differences be-
tween municipalities with or without a college-educated mayor, such as unobserved
preference for redistribution or differences in the income distribution. However, it does
not account for mayoral characteristics correlated with education. We thus start by test-
ing whether any characteristic besides the education level of the mayor changes dis-
continuously at the election threshold. Table 3.D.3 in the Appendix shows that out of
16 variables only the mayor’s gender varies significantly between college-educated and
non-college mayors. Educated mayors are more likely to be female. Since there was no
effect of gender in Table 3.6.1 and we control for gender in all of our previous speci-
fications, we do not regard this imbalance as a serious threat to our empirical strategy.
We include all these mayoral characteristics as control variables in the regression models
that combine our baseline difference-in-discontinuity with close elections. Furthermore,
Figure 3.D.8 shows that there is no discontinuity in the density of the margin of victory.
Estimates from these models are shown in Table 3.6.2 for the average rate progres-
sion. Columns 1 and 2 show that the heterogeneous effect estimated on the sample
of municipalities, in which the mayor was elected in a mixed election, is very similar
to the estimates obtained on the full sample in Table 3.6.1. Next, we present the re-
sults of equation 3.3 interacted with the vote margin between the college-educated and
non-college-educated candidate in columns 3 and 4. The result confirms our previous
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findings. The reform-induced increase in progressivity is driven entirely by municipali-
ties ruled by college-educated mayors.This result also holds when using other measures
of progressivity (see Tables 3.C.6, 3.C.7 and 3.C.8) or varying the bandwidth of the close
election RD (see Table 3.D.9). We also test whether the interaction effect is driven by any
specific job category by dropping one job category at the time. As Figure 3.D.11 shows,
the effect does not change notably for any job category.
The findings in this section have established that college-educated mayors react to
the introduction of the fiscal rule by increasing income taxes progressively, while other
mayors increase taxes uniformly. We can rule out that college-educated mayors favor
more tax progressivity in general. Using a simple regression discontinuity design based
on close elections (equation 3.4) and restricting our attention to years before the in-
troduction of the fiscal rule, we do not find any evidence that municipalities ruled by
college-educated mayors have more progressive tax systems (see columns 5 and 6 of
Table 3.6.2).
3.6.2 Political Costs of Austerity
We now test whether the introduction of the fiscal rule was associated with a political
cost for the incumbent mayor. In particular, we estimate the baseline differences-in-
discontinuities model (equation 3.2) with the reelection and rerun dummies as outcome
variables (see Section 3.3 for a detailed description of these variables). Note that the
mayor’s skill level is a predetermined characteristic with respect to the reform in 2013,
since we only consider the first election after the reform.
Based on a standard median-voter model, progressive taxation should be less costly
than uniform taxation, since only a minority of rich households are taxed at a higher rate
(Bierbrauer, Boyer, and Peichl, 2021). Additionally, in our context of austerity, compen-
satory arguments behind progressive taxes (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016) would suggest
to shift the tax increase away from the poorest households if the fiscal austerity imposed
by the national government is perceived as unfair towards the poor.
The near zero point estimate in column 1 of Table 3.6.3 suggests that there is no ev-
idence of political costs for the average incumbent. However, this average effect hides
interesting heterogeneity. When allowing for heterogeneity in mayoral education in
columns 2 and 3, we find that mayors without a college degree experienced a severe
drop of 30 to 37 percentage points in reelection probability, while educated mayors do
not undergo these costs at all. Both point estimates are significant at conventional lev-
els.29 The probability of running for office again drops on average, driven by mayors
without a college degree, but these effects are not significant at conventional levels (see
columns 5 to 7 of Table 3.6.3). This is consistent with non-college mayors also self-
selecting out of office, but our results seem to be mainly driven by voter selection.
Again, results point in the same direction when using the mayor’s occupation as an
alternative measure of skill (see Table 3.C.9).
29 The effect is very stable when varying the bandwidths (see Figure 3.D.10).
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Table 3.6.3: Effects of the reform on mayors’ reelection odds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reelection reelection reelection reelection re-run re-run re-run re-run
LATE -0.004 -0.297** -0.370*** -0.090 -0.085 -0.138
(0.059) (0.142) (0.132) (0.060) (0.111) (0.111)
college degree -0.073 -0.036 -0.025 0.209* 0.180 -0.019
(0.226) (0.218) (0.021) (0.119) (0.118) (0.022)
LATE x college degree 0.472** 0.471** 0.105 0.102
(0.235) (0.230) (0.190) (0.193)
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.832 0.832 0.834 0.833 0.607 0.607 0.607 0.594
bandwidth 1059 1059 1059 1059 1088 1088 1088 1088
N 2,833 2,833 2,745 1,410 4,271 4,271 4,135 2,357
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Columns (1) and (5) report estimates of the local average treatment effect (LATE) in the baseline difference-in-discontinuities
model. Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) report estimates of the LATE for mayors without a college degree (LATE) and for mayors with a college degree (LATE x college degree), estimated using the difference-in-discontinuities model
extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Columns (4) and (8) report estimates of the college effect from a regression of the outcome on a dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is
restricted to years before the reform. Bandwidths are selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). The reelection outcome variable in columns (1) to (4) equals one for incumbents that run again and are reelected, and is
zero for those who rerun and fail to be reelected. The rerun outcome variable in columns (5) to (8) equals one for incumbents that are not term-limited and choose to run again, and is zero for those who do not and are not term-limited.
Control variables are described in Section 3.4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
Taken together, our findings suggest that more skilled politicians have avoided the
political cost of austerity by designing a fiscal adjustment based on progressive taxa-
tion. Although we can not provide a direct causal link from increased progressivity to
higher reelection odds, we can rule out that skilled politicians have higher re-election
odds in general. Using a simple regression discontinuity design based on close elections
(equation 3.4) and restricting our attention to years before the introduction of the fiscal
rule, we do not find any evidence that college-educated mayors are more likely to be
reelected or to run again (see columns 4 and 8 of Table 3.6.3). Any alternative explana-
tion for our findings must thus explain why the introduction of the DSP differentially
increased the skilled mayors’ re-election odds during our sample period. Existing evi-
dence on the lifting of the DSP in 2001, when implementing local tax progressivity was
not yet feasible, actually shows that the fiscal rule decreased the mayors’ education level
in that occasion (Gamalerio, 2019).30
3.6.3 Alternative Channels of Adjustment
As discussed in Section 3.2, the local income tax is not the only policy instrument that
Italian municipalities can use to comply with the fiscal rule. To shed more light on the
full adjustment behavior of affected municipalities, we estimate the effects of the fiscal
rule on all revenue and spending categories using our baseline model (equation 3.2) and
municipal account data.
30 According to the author’s interpretation, skilled politicians avoid entering the political arena when their
discretion over fiscal policy is constrained. The difference with our results can thus be explained by the
additional policy instrument of differentiated local tax rates, which was not available to mayors in 2001.
Furthermore, our results seem to be driven mainly by voters’ demand rather than purely by the supply
of politicians.
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In line with our findings on the local income tax rates, revenues from the local in-
come tax increase significantly (see column 1 of Table 3.6.4). We do not find significant
increases in any of the other revenue categories: property tax, waste tax, other taxes or
fees, sales, loans, and other revenues (see columns 2 to 7 of Table 3.6.4). We go into more
detail regarding property taxation in Appendix 3.A.4, where we discuss the institutional
setting and show that property tax rates did not change. We also do not find any sig-
nificant effects of the reform on capital nor current expenditures (see columns 8 to 10 of
Table 3.6.4). Placebo tests for both expenditure and revenue categories show that treat-
ment and control municipalities were on parallel trends before the reform (see Table
3.D.4). To test whether the average expenditure effect is masking heterogeneous effects
across different categories of expenditures, we estimate the impact of the fiscal rule
on each one separately. Looking at various expenditure items rather than just at social
transfers only allows us to take into account potential in-kind transfers which have been
shown to matter for inequality (Aaberge et al., 2019). Out of the twelve subcategories of
municipal expenditures, only tourism spending is reduced significantly with the other
point estimates fluctuating around zero (see Figure 3.C.4). Importantly, the two cate-
gories perhaps most associated with redistribution, social and education spending, are
hardly affected, with the point estimate of social spending even being positive. Still, this
null result might hide heterogeneity between high- and low-skilled mayors that could
also explain their differential political outcomes. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the
heterogeneous treatment effect of high-skilled mayors for all spending categories. Table
3.C.10 shows that there is no significant difference in any of the spending items. We
thus conclude that the redistributive effect of more progressive income taxes is unlikely
to be offset by adjustments on the expenditure side of local budgets.
Finally, we investigate the effects of the introduction of the fiscal rule on municipal
deficits. As one can see in column 11 of Table 3.6.4, we find that the official deficit is
reduced by 36e per capita (significant at the 1% level). Hence, it appears that the fiscal
rule was effective in terms of reducing municipal deficits.
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Table 3.6.4: Effect of the reform on municipal budget accounts













LATE 5.10*** -3.89 6.05 -6.22 -82.26 5.44
(1.89) (14.51) (6.70) (27.70) (78.20) (25.47)
mean 36.19 167.93 109.76 405.36 870.54 161.87
bandwidth 682 574 566 495 562 581
N 17,856 15,243 15,055 13,408 14,960 15,430










LATE -0.33 -98.21 -25.19 -52.02 -35.73***
(20.20) (84.17) (29.68) (65.13) (8.17)
mean 114.93 1360.23 824.49 513.61 5.87
bandwidth 616 515 473 563 666
N 16,255 13,923 12,929 15,111 17,642
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the local average treatment effect (LATE)
of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The LATE
corresponds to β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Outcome variables are reported on top of each column.
All revenue, expenditure, and deficit variables are expressed in per capita terms and 2015 Euros and are winsorized. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome
variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence that governments try to ease
the potential distributional implications of austerity by favoring the relatively poor
through more progressive income tax policies. Additional evidence suggests that this
strategy is used by more competent mayors and is subsequently rewarded in the polls.
These results are consistent with the view that progressive taxation is preferable to
uniform taxation for the median voter. We believe that our evidence is particularly
relevant for austerity episodes induced by external factors (e.g., resulting from the im-
position of budget constraints from a higher layer of government, or being due to inter-
regional spillovers in economic crisis), which can be seen as unfair from the perspective
of the local population. Our study suggests that governments can tune their fiscal re-
form packages to mitigate the distributional consequences of austerity, as recommended
by the IMF (2014), and that this adjustment strategy allows them to improve their re-
election odds.
Our findings are relevant for policy makers in countries subject to fiscal constraints,
but whose public opinion is growing critical of austerity policies. Although our evi-
dence from small Italian towns cannot be immediately extended to other settings, our
cross-country evidence on the positive relation between austerity and top income tax





Table 3.A.1: Cyclically adjusted primary balance and tax rates
(1) (2)
tax rate at mean incomes top tax rate
cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.071 0.615**
(in % of potential GDP) (0.089) (0.291)
country FE yes yes




Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. This table
shows estimates from the regression yit = γi + λt + βcapbit + δXit + εit , where yit is either
the tax rate at mean incomes (column 1) or at top incomes (column 2), capbit is the cyclically adjusted
primary balance in percent of potential GDP,Xit includes log GDP per capita and log population as control
variables, γi are country fixed effects andλt are year fixed effects. Top tax rates are drawn from Rubolino and
Waldenström (2019), tax rates at mean incomes are from Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2010), supplemented by
tax data from the OECD. The budget data comes from IMF DataMapper. Our sample consists of 40 countries
(Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States) over the period 1990-2017.
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cyclically adjusted primary balance (in % of potential GDP)
Notes: This graph shows estimates from the following regression yit = γi + λt + βcapbit + δXit + εit, where yit is either the tax
rate at mean incomes (left panel) or at top incomes (right panel), capbit is the cyclically adjusted primary balance in percent of
potential GDP, Xit includes log GDP per capita and log population as control variables, γi are country fixed effects and λt are year
fixed effects. The sample and data are described in Table 3.A.1.
3.A.2 Difference-in-Difference Analysis
In addition to our main empirical specification, we also run a classical difference-in-
difference regression. This allows us to investigate whether our effects can be general-
ized to broader set of municipalities than just those closely below or above the threshold.
To implement this strategy, we define municipalities between 1,000 and 2,000 inhabi-
tants as our treatment group (Tit = 1) and municipalities with 999 or less inhabitants as
our control group (Tit = 0). The regression equation reads as follows:
Yit = γi + ωt + βTitReformt + εit (3.5)
where Reformt is a dummy taking the value 1 for the year 2013, 2014 and 2015. γi rep-
resent municipality fixed effects, whereas ωt are year fixed effects. Standard error are
clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-difference estimate is then repre-
sented by the coefficient β.
Figure 3.A.2 plots the β coefficients for all nine income deciles. The pattern of the
estimates is very similar to the pattern of our main difference-in-discontinuity estimates.
The tax increase is monotonically increasing in income. The effect size is also close to
our main estimates, but standard errors are significantly smaller. In Table 3.A.2 we
also present difference-in-difference estimates for our four progressivity measures. The
estimates are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of size, the
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
municipal income decile
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The figure plots β from equation 3.5 and its 95% confidence bands.
The deciles refer to the income distribution in each municipality.
effects are slightly larger than our main estimates. Taken together, these results suggest
that our main estimates are not specific to municipalities at the threshold.
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Table 3.A.2: Difference-in-difference: progressivity measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
average rate progression progressive tax marginal rate progression exemption level
LATE 0.257*** 0.096*** 0.259*** 975***
(0.028) (0.011) (0.029) (132)
mean 0.173 0.084 0.178 870
N 24,081 24,081 24,081 24,081
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports β from
equation 3.5 estimated for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The average and marginal rate progressions are
estimates of the slope of the average and marginal income tax schedules. Progressive tax is a dummy for whether the municipality has a tax
rate which is not uniform. Exemption level is the amount of income (in e) exempted from the income tax. In the bottom panel, the sample
mean of the outcome variable and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
3.A.3 Pareto Bounds by Bierbrauer, Boyer, and Peichl (2021)
We construct upper pareto bounds as suggested by Bierbrauer, Boyer, and Peichl (2021),
that indicate a level of taxation that is inefficiently high. If tax rates are higher than
these bounds, cutting taxes (even for the rich) would lead to a Pareto improvement
because revenues would increase. Intuitively, if the upper Pareto bound is violated, the
marginal tax rate is on the right side of the Laffer curve. The upper bound is constructed





, where Fy(y0) is the cumulative distribution function
of taxable income y evaluated at y0, fy(y0) is the density function of taxable income y
evaluated at y0 and ε is the elasticity of taxable income (ETI). The bound is violated
if T
′(y0)
1−T ′(y0) > D
upper(y0) holds, where T ′(y0) is the marginal tax rate on income y0. We
construct T ′(y0) by adding up the federal, regional and municipality tax rates. Since
we only have information on the distribution of taxable income in brackets, we make
the simplifying assumption that income uniformly distributed within brackets. For the
elasticity of taxable income, we assume values from 0.25 (as reported in a survey of the
literature by Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) and in a meta-analysis by Neisser (2021))
to very high values like 1.25 as found by Rubolino (2019).
As Table 3.A.3 shows, the bounds are never violated for ε ≤ 1 and only 3% of our
sample municipalities violate them if we assume an ETI of 1.25. We additionally split
our sample into municipalities with a college-educated mayor and those without one.
The two groups of municipalities do not show any difference with respect to the share
of violators. Take together, these findings suggest that before 2013 taxation was not
inefficiently high, in the sense that after the introduction of the DSP, it was feasible to
increase revenues by raising tax rates. Furthermore, the scope for increasing revenues
was not different between municipalities with mayors with different skill levels, thus
ruling our the possibility that our heterogeneous results are driven by differences in the
income distributions or in the pre-reform tax systems. Additionally, we show that the
reform itself did not force municipalities to violate their pareto bounds. As Table 3.A.4
shows, we do not find any effect when we use a dummy for the pareto bounds being
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Table 3.A.3: Share of municipalities violating the upper pareto bounds
all municipalities college-educated mayor non-college-educated mayor
ETI 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25
tax on 1st decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tax on 2nd decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tax on 3rd decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tax on 4th decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tax on 5th decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tax on 6th decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tax on 7th decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tax on 8th decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
tax on 9th decile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The sample is the same as in our main analysis. We additionally restrict the sample to the year 2012 as it was the last year before
the reform.
Table 3.A.4: Effect of the reform on violating the pareto bounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tax inefficiently high tax inefficiently high tax inefficiently high tax inefficiently high tax inefficiently high
LATE -0.009 -0.024 -0.023 0.003 -0.035
(0.019) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.048)
LATE x college degree 0.040 0.038 -0.013 0.006
(0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
LATE x female mayor 0.069
(0.163)
LATE x left-wing mayor 0.025
(0.154)
LATE x right-wing mayor -0.360
(0.297)
LATE x centrist mayor -0.489
(0.342)
LATE x low win margin 0.097
(0.114)
LATE x term limit -0.041
(0.100)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 0.133
(0.132)
LATE x low top income share -0.177
(0.132)
controls yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
mean 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
bandwidth 663 663 663 663 663
N 17,433 17,048 17,048 17,048 17,048
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities model and the model
extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the baseline model.
The row LATE reports the local average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report the differential effects when the
interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation 3.3. We measure mayors’ skills using a dummy for college degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one. Details on all
covariates are described in Section 3.4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). In the bottom panel,
the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
violated as our outcomes variable. This holds both for municipalities with a college-
educated mayor and for municipalities without one.
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3.A.4 Property Taxation
Property taxation was reformed several times during our sample period 2007-2015 (see
Messina and Savegnago (2014) for a detailed review in Italian). The main property tax
at the start of our sample period was named ICI and its tax base was based on the
cadastral value, the cadastral zone and on the size as well as the type of the dwelling.
Municipalities had some flexibility in setting tax rates and they could set a different tax
rate for main dwellings (where the taxpayer has his regular registered residence) and
other dwellings. Municipalities also could set a flat reduction on the tax bill, which
was applied only on main dwellings. All revenues would accrue to municipalities. The
ICI on main dwellings was abolished in 2008, while it remained in operation on other
dwellings. In 2012, a new tax named IMU replaced ICI. In the first year IMU was levied
on both main and other dwellings, but already in 2013 a discount on main dwellings was
introduced. Since 2014 the IMU on main dwellings was abolished, while it remained in
operation for other dwellings. Next, a new tax, TASI, was introduced in 2014 in addition
to IMU. The tax base for TASI was the same as for ICI and IMU, but TASI was also
(partially) levied on renters. Municipalities could set different TASI tax rates for main
and other dwellings, as well as a flat reduction for main dwellings. The range of feasible
TASI tax rates and reductions was lower than for IMU. Due to these reforms, there was
limited scope for mayors to increase revenues by increasing property taxation in 2013
and later years, due to the abolition of IMU on main dwellings and the introduction of
the less remunerative TASI. However, we are going to test whether the introduction of
the DSP had any effect on property taxation using data on IMU (tax rates and reductions
on main dwellings, and tax rates on other dwellings), and on TASI (only the two tax
rates, as the data on reductions is not available). Recall that, in our setting the pre-
reform period is 2007-12, while the post-reform period is 2013-15. To test for effects
of property taxation on main and other dwellings, we restrict our sample to the year
between 2012 and 2015 and add up the IMU and TASI tax rates since they share the
same tax base.
Table 3.A.5 contains the difference-in-discontinuity estimates on the property tax
rates for both main dwellings and other dwellings as well as the flat reduction on the tax
bill. We do not find a significant effect on any of the tax instruments. This is consistent
with our result from Table 3.6.4 that property tax revenues did not change because of the
introduction of the fiscal rule. Furthermore, we also estimate our interaction model with
respect to the mayor’s skill. As Table 3.A.6 shows, high-skilled mayors choose (weakly)
higher property tax rates on other dwellings, whereas there are no no differential effects
with respect to the property tax on main dwellings. While these effects are very small
and only weakly significant, they are consistent with our main finding. In fact, people
subject to the rate on other dwellings are either residents elsewhere, and therefore not
eligible voters in the municipality, and/or owners of more than one dwelling, and so
likely wealthier than the median voter. We also do not find any differential effect by the
share of non-resident dwellings taken from the census (see Table 3.A.7).
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Table 3.A.5: Effect of the reform on property tax rates
(1) (2) (3)
property tax on main dwellings property tax on other dwellings deduction amount
LATE 0.127 0.103 1.026
(0.105) (0.083) (1.142)
mean 3.032 8.914 198.770
bandwidth 429 512 578
N 4,898 5,824 6,488
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the
local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression
for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth
is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Outcome variables are reported on top of each column. The sample
includes the years 2012 to 2015. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number
of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.A.6: Effect of the reform on property tax rates by mayor’s skill













LATE 0.122 -0.034 1.697 0.084 -0.005 1.847
(0.145) (0.114) (1.472) (0.135) (0.102) (1.654)
LATE x college degree -0.082 0.376* -1.766
(0.233) (0.196) (2.535)
LATE x high-skill job -0.054 0.329 -2.222
(0.258) (0.209) (2.121)
mean 3.030 8.913 198.777 3.021 8.911 198.715
bandwidth 429 512 578 429 512 578
N 4,797 5,709 6,362 4,689 5,586 6,214
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models
extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the
baseline model. The row LATE reports the local average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report the
differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation 3.3. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Outcome
variables are reported on top of each column. The sample includes the years 2012 to 2015. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth
and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The waste tax can be considered as a property tax in disguise, because in most in-
stances the tax bill is a function of the surface of the dwelling and the number of house-
holds components (Messina, Savegnago, and Sechi, 2018). Unfortunately, there exists no
digitized data on the waste tax. Therefore, we can not investigate effects on waste tax
rates. However, in Table 3.6.4 we show that revenues from the waste tax did not change
due to the reform. In total, we conclude that the reform had no impact on property
taxes.
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Table 3.A.7: Effect of the reform on property tax rates by share of non-residents
(1) (2) (3)
property tax on main dwellings property tax on other dwellings deduction amount
LATE 0.141 0.153 0.257
(0.121) (0.094) (1.131)
LATE x above-median non-resident dwellings -0.076 -0.264 4.224
(0.236) (0.205) (3.833)
mean 3.032 8.914 198.770
bandwidth 429 512 578
N 4.898 5.824 6.488
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models
extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the
baseline model. The row LATE reports the local average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report the
differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation 3.3. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Outcome
variables are reported on top of each column. The sample includes the years 2012 to 2015. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and
the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
3.B Institutions and Summary Statistics
Table 3.B.2: Population cutoffs in Italian municipalities before and after 2013






gender quota fiscal rule
before after before after before after before after before after before after
below 1,000 1,291 1,291 15% 15% 12 12 0 0 no no no no
1,000 - 2,000 1,446 1,446 20% 20% 12 12 30 30 no no no yes
2,000 - 3,000 1,446 1,446 20% 20% 12 12 40 40 no no no yes
3,000 - 5,000 2,169 2,169 20% 20% 16 16 40 40 no no no yes
5,000 - 10,000 2,789 2,789 50% 50% 16 16 80 80 no yes yes yes
Source: Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016), Vincent (2017), Baltrunaite et al. (2019). Notes: Policies varying at different legislative thresholds in the period
2007 - 2015. The before columns indicate the situation from 2007 to 2012, while the after columns refer to period from 2013 to 2015. Discontinuities at thresholds
over 5,000 inhabitants are omitted. Population is the number of resident inhabitants. The wage of both the mayor and the executive committee refer to monthly
gross wages and the latter is expressed as a percentage of the former. Size of city council is the number of seats in the city council. The signature requirement
refers to number of signatures a candidate for mayor requires to be allowed to run, while the gender quota refers to candidate lists and new a system of double
preference voting conditional on gender.
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Table 3.B.1: Fiscal rule details
year target target function of reference period pop. threshold
2007 Saldo Finanziario expenditures 2003-05 3,000
2008 Saldo Finanziario expenditures 2003-05 3,000
2009 Saldo Finanziario Saldo Finanziario 2007 5,000
2010 Saldo Finanziario Saldo Finanziario 2007 5,000
2011 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2006-08 5,000
2012 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2006-08 5,000
2013 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2007-09 1,000
2014 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2009-11 1,000
2015 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2010-12 1,000
Notes: The table reports details on the target of the fiscal rule for different years. Saldo Finanziario is defined as the difference
between expenditures and revenues, net of repayment of outstanding debt and of lending. The target Saldo Finanziario must be
below a target defined as a function of some budget account items measured in a reference period.


















2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
local taxes non−tax revenues
transfers other revenues
Notes: This figure plots the share of total revenue for different revenue categories of Italian municipalities below 2,500 inhabitants. Transfers also include revenues from the
solidarity fund, financed by the property tax. Source: Municipal budget accounts (Conti consuntivi, accrual basis, Ministry of the Interior.)
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Notes: This figure plots the density of exemption levels for the local personal income tax in Italian municipalities. The sample is restricted to municipalities that have a
positive exemption level and less than 2,500 inhabitants.

















< 10k 10k − 15k 15k − 26k 26k − 55k 55k − 75k 75k − 120k > 120k
Notes: This figure plots the percentage of tax payers in each taxable income bracket for municipalities with less than 2,500 inhabitants.
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Table 3.B.3: Descriptive statistics
full sample population≤ 2500 population> 2500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N difference
area (in km2) 34.384 47.298 58,323 23.364 23.063 28,335 44.795 60.209 29,988 -21.431***
coast dummy 0.068 0.252 58,323 0.022 0.147 28,335 0.112 0.315 29,988 -0.090***
altitude (in m) 334.405 275.099 58,323 448.871 292.956 28,335 226.249 204.985 29,988 222.622***
mayor: age 51.912 10.138 57,278 52.018 10.550 28,068 51.811 9.725 29,210 0.207***
mayor: female 0.118 0.322 57,278 0.117 0.322 28,068 0.118 0.322 29,210 -0.001***
mayor: college degree 0.454 0.498 56,581 0.364 0.481 27,642 0.540 0.498 28,939 -0.176***
mayor: high-skill occupation 0.378 0.485 55,517 0.306 0.461 27,335 0.448 0.497 28,182 -0.142***
mayor: political 0.295 0.456 56,481 0.154 0.361 27,646 0.430 0.495 28,835 -0.275***
mayor: last win margin 0.259 0.256 57,346 0.318 0.306 28,098 0.201 0.179 29,248 0.117***
mayor: term limit 0.302 0.459 57,181 0.287 0.452 28,007 0.317 0.465 29,174 -0.030***
years to next election 1.994 1.410 57,095 1.980 1.404 27,911 2.008 1.415 29,184 -0.028***
share: age≥ 60 0.292 0.064 58,323 0.321 0.068 28,335 0.265 0.045 29,988 0.056***
share: female 0.508 0.015 58,323 0.505 0.019 28,335 0.511 0.010 29,988 -0.005***
share: college degree 0.074 0.027 58,323 0.067 0.024 28,335 0.081 0.028 29,988 -0.014***
top income share 0.106 0.078 58,323 0.075 0.075 28,335 0.135 0.068 29,988 -0.060***
taxable income per capita 12,605.327 3,309.273 57,569 11,962.550 3,047.158 28,148 13,220.292 3,431.061 29,421 -1,257.742***
tax rate at the 1st decile 0.348 0.279 58,062 0.329 0.264 28,148 0.366 0.292 29,914 -0.037***
tax rate at the 2nd decile 0.355 0.278 58,062 0.333 0.264 28,148 0.377 0.290 29,914 -0.044***
tax rate at the 3rd decile 0.388 0.272 58,062 0.346 0.262 28,148 0.426 0.276 29,914 -0.080***
tax rate at the 4th decile 0.412 0.265 58,062 0.358 0.259 28,148 0.464 0.260 29,914 -0.105***
tax rate at the 5th decile 0.425 0.259 58,062 0.365 0.257 28,148 0.482 0.248 29,914 -0.117***
tax rate at the 6th decile 0.430 0.256 58,062 0.367 0.256 28,148 0.490 0.241 29,914 -0.123***
tax rate at the 7th decile 0.433 0.255 58,062 0.369 0.255 28,148 0.494 0.239 29,914 -0.125***
tax rate at the 8th decile 0.436 0.254 58,062 0.370 0.255 28,148 0.498 0.236 29,914 -0.128***
tax rate at the 9th decile 0.440 0.253 58,062 0.372 0.255 28,148 0.504 0.234 29,914 -0.132***
average rate progression 0.428 1.000 58,323 0.198 0.672 28,335 0.646 1.192 29,988 -0.448***
marginal rate progression 0.433 1.000 58,323 0.204 0.690 28,335 0.649 1.183 29,988 -0.444***
exemption level 2,019.226 4,718.198 58,035 997.086 3,348.429 28,135 2,981.029 5,545.364 29,900 -1983.943***
progressive tax 0.179 0.383 58,062 0.094 0.292 28,148 0.259 0.438 29,914 -0.166***
deficit 0.136 202.621 57,400 5.711 268.320 28,061 -5.197 106.800 29,339 10.908***
income tax revenues 45.811 32.760 57,104 36.972 32.142 27,822 54.209 31.091 29,282 -17.237***
property tax revenues 173.672 476.889 57,104 182.533 249.620 27,822 165.252 619.811 29,282 17.281***
trash tax revenues 106.744 84.675 57,104 114.252 88.938 27,822 99.610 79.764 29,282 14.642***
non-tax revenues 370.977 467.983 57,104 443.152 627.985 27,822 302.401 206.758 29,282 140.751***
transfer revenues 682.851 1,296.016 57,104 993.877 1,752.916 27,822 387.333 420.556 29,282 606.544***
loan revenues 143.526 383.864 57,104 173.298 489.218 27,822 115.238 241.489 29,282 58.060***
other revenues 104.349 700.645 57,104 137.844 760.640 27,822 72.525 636.822 29,282 65.319***
total expenditures 1,371.050 1,676.247 57,656 1,784.216 2,254.043 28,237 974.485 555.983 29,419 809.730***
current expenditures 859.789 595.954 57,656 1,003.021 772.813 28,237 722.312 290.224 29,419 280.709***
capital expenditures 511.262 1,360.819 57,656 781.195 1,858.662 28,237 252.174 420.030 29,419 529.022***
exp: administrative 358.101 415.556 57,656 471.887 530.687 28,237 248.887 209.219 29,419 223.000***
exp: culture 25.129 98.424 57,656 27.745 133.727 28,237 22.619 42.526 29,419 5.126***
exp: development 15.072 123.668 57,656 19.856 167.832 28,237 10.481 53.803 29,419 9.374***
exp: education 97.632 123.998 57,656 102.513 155.077 28,237 92.947 83.705 29,419 9.566***
exp: environment 320.293 949.229 57,656 445.122 1,323.818 28,237 200.479 233.465 29,419 244.643***
exp: judiciary 1.132 12.033 57,656 0.591 14.434 28,237 1.651 9.124 29,419 -1.060***
exp: police 32.768 44.306 57,656 33.043 57.428 28,237 32.505 26.107 29,419 0.537***
exp: social 97.483 152.768 57,656 93.587 183.620 28,237 101.223 115.537 29,419 -7.635***
exp: sport 32.031 341.246 57,656 43.866 485.028 28,237 20.671 46.479 29,419 23.195***
exp: resources 25.341 461.792 57,656 39.354 649.422 28,237 11.890 113.004 29,419 27.464***
exp: transport 183.282 376.503 57,656 264.642 511.934 28,237 105.191 117.561 29,419 159.451***
exp: tourism 26.458 278.320 57,656 43.964 390.665 28,237 9.655 68.931 29,419 34.309***
re-run 0.594 0.491 13,149 0.599 0.490 6,563 0.400 0.492 6,586 0.010***
reelection 0.798 0.401 8,271 0.827 0.378 4,266 0.768 0.422 4,005 0.059***
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Column 10 displays the difference between columns 4 and 7. All expenditure, revenue, and deficit variables are expressed in
per capita terms and 2015 Euros.
151
Austerity and Distributional Policy
Table 3.B.4: Descriptive statistics: matched sample
matched sample non-matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
mean sd N mean sd N difference
area (in km2) 34.855 47.672 44,781 33.000 45.448 12,357 1.855**
coast dummy 0.067 0.250 44,781 0.071 0.257 12,357 -0.004
altitude (in m) 332.851 275.745 44,781 342.933 277.283 12,357 -10.082*
mayor: female 0.115 0.319 44,768 0.127 0.333 12,249 -0.012*
mayor: college degree 0.456 0.498 44,240 0.451 0.498 12,082 0.004
mayor: age 51.807 10.072 44,768 52.261 10.312 12,249 -0.454**
mayor: political 0.296 0.457 44,129 0.293 0.455 12,093 0.003
mayor: term limit 0.295 0.456 44,725 0.330 0.470 12,196 -0.036***
years to next election 2.007 1.433 44,779 1.949 1.319 12,316 0.058***
share: college degree 0.074 0.027 44,781 0.074 0.028 12,357 0.000
share: female 0.508 0.015 44,781 0.507 0.016 12,357 0.001**
share: age≥ 60 0.292 0.064 44,781 0.296 0.064 12,357 -0.004***
top income share 0.105 0.077 44,781 0.104 0.079 12,357 0.001
taxable income per capita 12,557.276 3,307.428 44,549 12,696.957 3,273.648 12,272 -139.681**
average rate progression 0.427 0.999 44,781 0.398 0.966 12,357 0.029*
marginal rate progression 0.431 0.998 44,781 0.403 0.966 12,357 0.028*
exemption level 2,006.282 4,701.750 44,764 1,930.638 4,669.887 12,353 75.644
progressive tax 0.178 0.383 44,781 0.170 0.375 12,357 0.009
runner-up: female 0.147 0.354 44,781
runner-up: age 51.830 10.951 44,781
runner-up: college degree 0.443 0.497 43,232
runner-up: political 0.277 0.447 41,809
vote margin -0.033 0.291 44,240
mixed race 0.439 0.496 42,765
Notes: The matched sample includes observations for which we were able to match the main dataset with the election
data. The non-matched sample includes the remaining observations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Column 7 displays the
difference between columns 1 and 4.
3.C Additional Findings
Table 3.C.1: Effect of the reform on the average income tax rate at different income levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
5ke 10ke 15ke 20ke 25ke 30ke 35ke 40ke 45ke 50ke 55ke 60ke 65ke 70ke 75ke
LATE 0.014 0.032 0.034* 0.038** 0.040** 0.040** 0.042** 0.043** 0.044** 0.044** 0.044** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.046**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
> 5ke - 0.034 0.049 0.026 0.020 0.020 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
> 10ke - - 0.358 0.195 0.152 0.152 0.116 0.106 0.100 0.096 0.093 0.091 0.089 0.088 0.087
> 15ke - - - 0.109 0.067 0.076 0.050 0.046 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.046
mean 0.331 0.351 0.363 0.367 0.368 0.368 0.369 0.370 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.372 0.372 0.372 0.373
bandwidth 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663
N 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the
difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to
β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). The middle panel displays p-values for pairwise one-sided tests (estimated by
seemingly unrelated regression) whether the effect is higher than the effect on the tax rate at yearly incomes of 5,000e, 10,000e, and 15,000e respectively. In the bottom panel, the
sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Each graph is a regression discontinuity plot for pre-reform years
(2007-12, on the left) and post-reform years (2013-15, on the right). The outcome variable is reported underneath each graph. The running variable is lagged normalized
population. Plots are obtained with the STATA command rdplot (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015)) organizing the data in 10 bins on each side of the threshold. The lines
are linear fits estimated separately on each side of the threshold.
Figure 3.C.2: Effect of the reform on income tax rates at different income levels
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annual taxable income
Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment effects reported in Table 3.C.1 and their 95% confidence bands.
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Table 3.C.2: Effect of the reform on the income tax base by bracket
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<10ke 10ke-15ke 15ke-28ke 28ke-55ke 55ke-75ke 75ke-120ke >120ke
log taxbase
LATE -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07* 0.00 -0.06
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
mean 14.07 14.17 15.14 14.79 13.24 13.47 14.07
bandwidth 406 394 462 479 935 1058 1515
N 10,974 10,632 12,688 13,163 14,678 12,150 6,436
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the local average
treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for each outcome variable. The
LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). The outcome variables are
per capita (upper panel) and total (bottom panel) tax revenues in 2015 Euros generated by tax payers with taxable income included in the bracket
reported on top of each column. The table reports also the sample mean of the outcome variable, the average number of taxpayers in each bracket,
the used bandwidth and the number of observations. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.C.3: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill

















LATE -0.002 -0.002 -0.020 -0.008 -0.000 0.004 -0.009 0.012
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.070) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.069)
LATE x college degree 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.121*** 0.116**
(0.053) (0.052) (0.046) (0.046)
LATE x high-skill job 0.153*** 0.141** 0.113** 0.106**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.051) (0.050)
LATE x female mayor 0.045 0.045
(0.070) (0.072)
LATE x left-wing mayor 0.006 0.006
(0.064) (0.065)
LATE x right-wing mayor -0.190 -0.187
(0.134) (0.136)
LATE x centrist mayor -0.292 -0.327
(0.232) (0.253)
LATE x low win margin 0.027 0.024
(0.047) (0.048)
LATE x term limit -0.007 -0.021
(0.041) (0.042)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 0.037 0.029
(0.054) (0.054)
LATE x low top income share -0.076 -0.077
(0.054) (0.055)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
mean 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.086 0.088 0.088 0.088
bandwidth 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
N 16,932 16,663 16,663 16,663 16,848 16,321 16,321 16,321
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models extended to estimate
heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local
average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 )
in equation 3.3. We measure mayors’ skills using two dummies: college degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one; and high-skill job, which is equal to one in case the mayor was
employed in a managing position or in an intellectual profession (e.g. lawyer, medical doctor). Details on all covariates are described in Section 3.4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The
bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown.
Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.C.4: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill

















LATE -45 2 -211 167 -77 10 -158 289
(406) (403) (385) (861) (357) (354) (355) (830)
LATE x college degree 1494** 1457** 1363** 1361**
(604) (603) (553) (558)
LATE x high-skill job 1918*** 1741** 1629** 1552**
(700) (705) (656) (647)
LATE x female mayor 466 339
(819) (847)
LATE x left-wing mayor -94 -91
(743) (750)
LATE x right-wing mayor -1988 -1950
(1612) (1646)
LATE x centrist mayor -4601 -4856
(3388) (3518)
LATE x low win margin 124 138
(571) (583)
LATE x term limit -168 -260
(471) (476)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 470 366
(657) (656)
LATE x low top income share -1115* -1068
(668) (670)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
mean 896 906 906 906 886 904 904 904
bandwidth 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 635
N 16,577 16,319 16,319 16,319 16,493 15,985 15,985 15,985
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models extended to estimate
heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local
average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 )
in equation 3.3. We measure mayors’ skills using two dummies: college degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one; and high-skill job, which is equal to one in case the mayor was
employed in a managing position or in an intellectual profession (e.g. lawyer, medical doctor). Details on all covariates are described in Section 3.4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The
bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown.
Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.C.5: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill

















LATE 0.005 0.006 -0.009 0.055 0.016 0.024 -0.002 0.080
(0.086) (0.086) (0.084) (0.180) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.176)
LATE x college degree 0.353*** 0.346*** 0.281** 0.281**
(0.127) (0.126) (0.115) (0.117)
LATE x high-skill job 0.393*** 0.364*** 0.329*** 0.317**
(0.139) (0.139) (0.127) (0.125)
LATE x female mayor 0.039 0.039
(0.168) (0.172)
LATE x left-wing mayor -0.009 -0.008
(0.160) (0.161)
LATE x right-wing mayor -0.459 -0.444
(0.330) (0.334)
LATE x centrist mayor -0.523 -0.630*
(0.331) (0.375)
LATE x low win margin 0.082 0.076
(0.121) (0.125)
LATE x term limit -0.079 -0.105
(0.105) (0.107)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 0.126 0.115
(0.140) (0.140)
LATE x low top income share -0.244* -0.245*
(0.143) (0.144)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
mean 0.182 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.179 0.183 0.183 0.183
bandwidth 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 668
N 17,378 17,092 17,092 17,092 17,292 16,741 16,741 16,741
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models extended to estimate
heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local
average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 )
in equation 3.3. We measure mayors’ skills using two dummies: college degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one; and high-skill job, which is equal to one in case the mayor was
employed in a managing position or in an intellectual profession (e.g. lawyer, medical doctor). Details on all covariates are described in Section 3.4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The
bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown.
Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
municipal income decile
mayor without college degree mayor with college degree
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models
extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The blue estimates refer to the local average treatment effect for mayors without a college degree (β6), while the red
estimates plot the sum of β6 and βint6 referring to the effect for mayors with a college degree in equation 3.3.
Table 3.C.6: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill: mixed election RD













LATE -0.019 -0.024 -0.066 -0.143
(0.042) (0.043) (0.183) (0.189)
college degree -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 0.235 0.024 0.074
(0.018) (0.019) (0.048) (0.210) (0.022) (0.064)
LATE x college degree 0.140** 0.148** 0.510** 0.339
(0.062) (0.064) (0.257) (0.224)
controls yes yes yes yes yes
mixed election RD yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.088 0.041 0.041
population bandwidth 650 650 650 650 650 650
close election bandwidth 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
N 13,043 12,028 1,949 1,949 1,377 1,377
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The sample is restricted to observations for which we were able
to match the main dataset with the election data. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report estimates of the difference-in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous
treatment effects. In rows with “mixed election RD” switched on, the model is augmented with the margin of victory and its interaction with all other terms, and the sample
is further restricted to municipality-year observations, in which the incumbent mayor was elected in a race against a runner up with a different education level (college vs.
non-college). Population bandwidths are selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Election bandwidths are selected using the using the STATA command
rdrobust. Columns (5) and (6) report estimates of the college effect from regression discontinuity models where the running variable is the margin of victory, the treatment
dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform (β2) in equation 3.4. Details on all covariates are described
in Section 3.4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidths and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted
as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.C.7: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill: mixed election RD













LATE -72 -87 -1550 -932
(498) (502) (2280) (2368)
college degree -118 -116 -182 941 116 386
(163) (177) (539) (2092) (209) (526)
LATE x college degree 1440* 1458* 5694* 3007
(735) (754) (3130) (2848)
controls yes yes yes yes yes
mixed election RD yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 910.04 909.19 862.72 862.72 371.17 371.17
population bandwidth 635 635 635 635 635 635
close election bandwidth 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
N 12,764 11,770 2,119 2,119 1,509 1,509
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The sample is restricted to observations for which we were able
to match the main dataset with the election data. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report estimates of the difference-in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous
treatment effects. In rows with “mixed election RD” switched on, the model is augmented with the margin of victory and its interaction with all other terms, and the sample
is further restricted to municipality-year observations, in which the incumbent mayor was elected in a race against a runner up with a different education level (college vs.
non-college). Population bandwidths are selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Election bandwidths are selected using the using the STATA command
rdrobust. Columns (5) and (6) report estimates of the college effect from regression discontinuity models where the running variable is the margin of victory, the treatment
dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform (β2) in equation 3.4. Details on all covariates are described
in Section 3.4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidths and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted
as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.C.8: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill: mixed election RD













LATE -0.022 -0.034 -0.157 -0.317
(0.105) (0.105) (0.387) (0.392)
college degree -0.045 -0.049 0.017 0.303 0.022 0.072
(0.029) (0.031) (0.103) (0.390) (0.041) (0.078)
LATE x college degree 0.320** 0.335** 1.077** 0.828*
(0.146) (0.153) (0.524) (0.478)
controls yes yes yes yes yes
mixed election RD yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.184 0.184 0.175 0.175 0.081 0.081
population bandwidth 668 668 668 668 668 668
close election bandwidth 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
N 13,384 12,355 2,418 2,418 1,725 1,725
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The sample is restricted to observations for which we were able
to match the main dataset with the election data. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report estimates of the difference-in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous
treatment effects. In rows with “mixed election RD” switched on, the model is augmented with the margin of victory and its interaction with all other terms, and the sample
is further restricted to municipality-year observations, in which the incumbent mayor was elected in a race against a runner up with a different education level (college vs.
non-college). Population bandwidths are selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Election bandwidths are selected using the using the STATA command
rdrobust. Columns (5) and (6) report estimates of the college effect from regression discontinuity models where the running variable is the margin of victory, the treatment
dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform (β2) in equation 3.4. Details on all covariates are described
in Section 3.4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidths and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted
as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
158
3.C. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
Table 3.C.9: Effects of the reform on mayors’ reelection odds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reelection reelection reelection reelection re-run re-run re-run re-run
LATE -0.037 -0.323** -0.383*** -0.065 -0.069 -0.041
(0.060) (0.144) (0.129) (0.061) (0.112) (0.116)
high-skill job 0.400 0.235 -0.019 0.190 0.099 0.010
(0.295) (0.278) (0.025) (0.134) (0.137) (0.027)
LATE x high-skill job 0.644** 0.570** 0.001 -0.183
(0.269) (0.251) (0.227) (0.235)
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.837 0.837 0.839 0.839 0.624 0.624 0.629 0.618
bandwidth 1059 1059 1059 1059 1088 1088 1088 1088
N 2,675 2,675 2,548 1,276 3,935 3,935 3,720 2,059
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Columns (1) and (5) report estimates of the local average treatment effect (LATE) in the baseline difference-in-discontinuities
model. Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) report estimates of the LATE for mayors without a high-skill job (LATE) and for mayors with a high-skill job (LATE x high-skill job), estimated using the difference-in-discontinuities model
extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Columns (4) and (8) report estimates of the high-skill job effect from a regression of the outcome on a dummy is equal to one if the mayors has a high-skill job, and the sample
is restricted to years before the reform. Bandwidths are selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). The reelection outcome variable in columns (1) to (4) equals one for incumbents that run again and are reelected,
and is zero for those who rerun and fail to be reelected. The rerun outcome variable in columns (5) to (8) equals one for incumbents that are not term-limited and choose to run again, and is zero for those who do not and are not
term-limited.Control variables are described in Section 3.4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01













-150 -100 -50 0 50 100
expenditures per capita
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The figure plots the LATE corresponding to β6 in equation 3.2 and
its 95% confidence bands. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Outcome variables are reported on top of each column. All variables
are expressed in per capita terms and 2015 Euros and are winsorized.
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Table 3.C.10: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp: administrative exp: culture exp: development exp: education exp: environment exp: judiciary
LATE -19.07 1.50 -1.95 -6.96 -54.82 -0.03
(17.02) (5.11) (3.30) (10.22) (60.10) (0.08)
LATE x college degree 47.95 -3.91 -5.48 -3.57 93.65 0.15
(34.15) (9.03) (6.96) (16.26) (105.79) (0.12)
municipality FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
mean 418.10 21.28 11.73 104.06 379.13 0.19
bandwidth 514 664 694 583 509 530
N 13,397 16,918 17,618 15,036 13,306 13,738
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
exp: police exp: social exp: sport exp: resources exp: transport exp: tourism
LATE 0.59 4.31 -6.73 -9.68 -28.19 -12.81*
(1.77) (10.44) (5.41) (9.63) (20.84) (6.85)
LATE x college degree 1.03 1.62 9.58 28.80* 44.90 4.98
(3.27) (16.52) (8.62) (16.12) (37.95) (12.92)
municipality FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
mean 32.38 84.83 29.58 23.14 225.53 25.72
bandwidth 640 549 777 564 591 688
N 16,359 14,225 19,469 14,577 15,216 17,486
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models extended to estimate hetero-
geneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local average
treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation
3.3. Details on all covariates are described in Section 3.4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). In the bottom panel,
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
i) exemption level
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Each panel plots estimates from the dynamic model on a different
outcome variable, reported underneath each plot. The dynamic model is an extension of the baseline difference-in-discontinuities model that includes year dummies instead
of the reform dummy. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Each dot is the estimate of the deviation of the outcome variable in the
year reported on the horizontal axis relative to the pre-reform year 2012. Dotted bars are 95% confidence bands.
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
municipal income decile
baseline placebo reform in 2008 placebo reform in 2009
placebo reform in 2010 placebo reform in 2011 placebo reform in 2012
Notes: The blue line plots the local average treatment effect (β6) and its 95% confidence bands from Table 3.5.1. All other lines plot placebo estimates. These are obtained by
restricting the sample to pre-reform years, assigning the reform to a different year from 2008 to 2012 and finally re-estimating equation 3.2.
Table 3.D.1: Continuity tests

















LATE -0.012 0.492 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.021
(0.026) (0.876) (0.037) (0.043) (0.011) (0.028) (0.007) (0.029)
mean 0.118 52.029 0.361 0.312 0.023 0.108 0.011 0.287
bandwidth 658 625 662 530 597 619 668 563
N 17,404 16,565 17,238 13,946 15,917 16,464 17,670 15,046
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
share: age≥
60











LATE 0.005 -0.002* 0.039 0.012* -23.308 -0.066 0.006 0.020
(0.005) (0.001) (0.052) (0.007) (21.546) (0.077) (0.005) (0.014)
mean 0.321 0.506 2.766 0.021 445.792 1.971 0.075 9.998
bandwidth 586 621 587 581 526 511 614 658
N 15,771 16,604 15,796 15,650 14,244 13,835 16,437 17,537
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the
local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for each
outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 3.2. The bandwidth is selected following
Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Outcome variables are reported on top of each column. In the bottom panel, the sample mean




Figure 3.D.4: Dynamic McCrary test
Notes: The figure presents the density plot for the difference-in-discontinuities design in the spirit of (McCrary (2008)). Each dot is the local average of the change in the total
number of observations between the the pre- and post-reform periods within each bin of normalized log population. Each bin has width equal to 0.01. The lines are fit of local
polynomial using a quadratic degree and a triangular kernel. Grey bans are the corresponding 95% confidence bands.
Figure 3.D.3: McCrary test before and after the reform
a) pre-reform b) post-reform
Notes: This figure presents McCrary density plots (McCrary, 2008). The left panel shows a pooled graph for all pre-reform years, while the right panel shows pool graph for
all post-reform years.
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b) Income tax rate at the 9th decile
Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment effect (β6) and its 95% confidence bands reported in Table 3.5.1 for different bandwidths. The dashed vertical line refers to
the optimal bandwidth.
















1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile
municipal income decile
order 1 order 2 order 3
Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment effects reported in Table 3.D.2 and their 95% confidence bands.
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Table 3.D.2: Income tax rates: global polynomial regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
tax rate at 1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile
polynomial of order 1
LATE 0.005 0.011 0.024* 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.047***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
mean 0.329 0.332 0.346 0.358 0.364 0.367 0.368 0.369 0.371
N 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128
> 1st decile - 0.055 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
> 2nd decile - - 0.024 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
> 3rd decile - - - 0.029 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.003
> 4th decile - - - - 0.125 0.097 0.056 0.036 0.026
> 5th decile - - - - - 0.252 0.100 0.056 0.040
> 6th decile - - - - - - 0.066 0.042 0.030
> 7th decile - - - - - - - 0.102 0.051
> 8th decile - - - - - - - - 0.075
polynomial of order 2
LATE -0.005 -0.000 0.012 0.022 0.026* 0.028** 0.030** 0.032** 0.033**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
mean 0.329 0.332 0.346 0.358 0.364 0.367 0.368 0.369 0.371
N 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128
> 1st decile - 0.101 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
> 2nd decile - - 0.035 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
> 3rd decile - - - 0.03 0.022 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.005
> 4th decile - - - - 0.214 0.103 0.060 0.038 0.042
> 5th decile - - - - - 0.055 0.016 0.011 0.026
> 6th decile - - - - - - 0.082 0.034 0.063
> 7th decile - - - - - - - 0.053 0.107
> 8th decile - - - - - - - - 0.285
polynomial of order 3
LATE 0.010 0.013 0.025 0.032* 0.036** 0.039** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
mean 0.329 0.332 0.346 0.358 0.364 0.367 0.368 0.369 0.371
N 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128
> 1st decile - 0.161 0.055 0.023 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.004
> 2nd decile - - 0.095 0.040 0.024 0.015 0.008 0.005 0.006
> 3rd decile - - - 0.139 0.082 0.050 0.025 0.016 0.021
> 4th decile - - - - 0.215 0.120 0.053 0.030 0.042
> 5th decile - - - - - 0.140 0.030 0.014 0.036
> 6th decile - - - - - - 0.024 0.011 0.050
> 7th decile - - - - - - - 0.039 0.147
> 8th decile - - - - - - - - 0.462
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports
the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate global regression
for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column) on the sample of all municipalities below 2,500 inhabitants with
different polynomial orders n. The deciles refer to the income distribution in each municipality. The middle panel displays
p-values for pairwise one-sided tests (estimated by seemingly unrelated regression) whether the effect is higher than the effect
on the tax rate at the first to eighth municipal income decile, respectively. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome
variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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income tax rate at the 9rd decile
b) tax rate at the 9th decile
Notes: This figure plots the cumulative distribution of placebo estimates for the income tax rate at the first (panel a) and nineth decile (panel b). The placebo estimates are
obtained by estimating equation 3.2 at false thresholds between 400 and 900 as well as 1,100 and 1,600. The effect at the true threshold is indicated by the vertical line.
Table 3.D.3: Mixed election disconuinity: covariate balancing















RD estimate 0.187*** -2.602 -0.001 -0.071 -0.024 3.120 0.036 0.020
(0.066) (1.872) (0.058) (0.060) (0.075) (2.669) (0.070) (0.053)
mean 0.131 51.227 0.130 0.155 0.128 52.016 0.182 1.977
bandwidth 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.15
N 2,223 2,001 2,010 2,001 1,668 1,740 2,063 2,229
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)











RD estimate 0.003 -0.002 -0.007 0.043 0.011 -15.828 0.013 -0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.013) (0.158) (0.037) (49.379) (0.014) (0.047)
mean 0.069 0.507 0.321 2.886 0.018 478.622 0.069 9.306
bandwidth 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.14
N 1,892 1,750 2,001 1,834 1,852 2,375 2,027 2,108
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table displays regression discontinuity estimates using the STATA command rdrobust in a
mixed election regression discontinuity design for the whole sample period (Calonico et al., 2017).
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Notes: This figure presents the McCrary density plot for close elections between college- and non-college-educated candidates.
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d) exemption level
Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment interaction effect for the mayor having a college degree (LATE x college degree) and its 95% confidence bands reported in
Tables 3.6.2 (Panel a), 3.C.6 (Panel b), 3.C.8 (Panel c) and 3.C.7 (Panel d) for different bandwidths. The dashed vertical line refers to the optimal bandwidth.
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b) re-run
Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment interaction effect for the mayor having a college degree (LATE x college degree) and its 95% confidence bands reported in
Table 3.6.3 for different bandwidths. The dashed vertical line refers to the optimal bandwidth.
168
3.D. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
















0 .2 .4 .6
interaction effect
Notes: This figure plots the heterogeneous average treatment effects for college-educated mayors dropping one job category at a time.
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Table 3.D.4: Municipal budget accounts: placebo regressions













placebo in 2008 0.49 5.42 -3.01 -20.09 -4.23 7.35
(1.57) (9.45) (3.93) (19.04) (80.50) (26.08)
placebo in 2009 1.20 -1.54 -6.04 -24.38 37.52 6.43
(1.36) (8.26) (3.79) (20.60) (66.85) (25.17)
placebo in 2010 -0.34 -0.56 -7.93* -28.42 45.86 9.97
(1.25) (7.77) (4.05) (20.92) (67.41) (23.42)
placebo in 2011 0.53 3.37 -8.56** -19.42 -39.05 -10.07
(1.28) (8.09) (4.31) (21.88) (66.91) (23.06)
placebo in 2012 2.51 12.62 -3.93 -14.18 -32.32 -17.42
(1.57) (9.54) (4.09) (24.05) (76.90) (26.41)
mean 32.64 182.74 112.06 383.67 887.94 159.74
bandwidth 682 574 566 495 562 581
N 12,440 10,633 10,503 9,319 10,440 10,757










placebo in 2008 -5.00 68.86 15.99 50.35 -13.81
(14.26) (68.45) (46.74) (29.51) (10.67)
placebo in 2009 0.80 4.05 -11.83 15.61 -8.07
(13.18) (66.38) (49.27) (25.06) (7.50)
placebo in 2010 7.22 53.77 17.43 23.39 -4.04
(11.87) (70.00) (51.36) (25.62) (7.02)
placebo in 2011 24.51* -32.43 -57.67 19.81 -2.69
(13.95) (73.29) (56.43) (23.72) (7.66)
placebo in 2012 4.18 -22.16 -63.45 34.29 3.16
(13.59) (78.65) (62.00) (23.45) (10.11)
mean 75.21 1307.39 501.62 784.42 19.49
bandwidth 616 515 563 473 666
N 11,349 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,339
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table displays placebo effects using equation 3.2. These are obtained by restricting the sample to pre-reform years, assigning the
reform to a different year and finally re-estimating equation 3.2. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations
are shown. All revenue, expenditure, and deficit variables are expressed in per capita terms and 2015 Euros.
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Chapter 4
The Effects of Public Disclosure by
Politicians
Joint with Carina Neisser.
4.1 Introduction
As in many other countries, German politicians are legally permitted to carry out out-
side activities in addition to their political work. Politicians engaging in activities other
than their work in parliament remains a very controversial topic. On the one hand, there
is doubt on whether elected representatives devote all their energy to their political du-
ties and it also raises concerns of potential conflicts of interests (Akcigit, Baslandze, and
Lotti, 2018). On the other hand, banning politicians from engaging in outside activities
might negatively influence the selection of politicians (Fisman, Schulz, and Vig, 2019;
Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni, 2010). A central concern of democratic coun-
tries is the degree to which voters can hold members of parliament (MPs) accountable
(Djankov et al., 2010). Accountability heavily relies on availability of information about
both parliamentary and non-parliamentary actions. One potential policy to inform vot-
ers on politician’s outside activities are public disclosure laws.1 If voters observe unde-
sirable behavior, they can vote them out of office. This political pressure could cause
politicians to change their behaviour. Despite being widely used, there is little causal
evidence on the effects of public disclosure laws on outside activities and earnings. This
is due to several reasons. First, it is hard to obtain high-quality data, especially before
the introduction of disclosure rules, as politicians outside earnings are unobservable be-
fore the implementation of disclosure laws. Second, even the published (and thereby
disclosed) data is often coarse and might be misreported. Finally, one has to find a
suitable control group to establish a counterfactual scenario.
1 According to Djankov et al. (2010), 109 countries around the world have some form of a disclosure
law, roughly half of those make disclosed information public. They find suggestive evidence that public
disclosure is associated with better government and perceived corruption.
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This chapter aims to fill this gap and identify the causal effect of public disclosure
of outside activities and their associated earnings on politicians’ outside earnings. We
overcome the existing problems by exploiting (i) two policy changes with respect to
public disclosure laws in Germany and (ii) high-quality administrative tax return data
giving rise to a difference-in-differences setup with German federal MPs as our treat-
ment and state MPs as our control group. We exploit two reforms that differ in the de-
gree of disclosure intensity. First, we use the introduction of a public disclosure law for
federal MPs in Germany as a source of exogenous variation. In 2005, a law was passed
that requires MPs to publish their outside activities and levels of outside earnings on the
website of the German federal parliament (Bundestag) that are freely accessible to vot-
ers. Initially, disclosure was only private because a group of MPs filed a law suit against
such public disclosure rules. In July 2007, the German constitutional court narrowly
rejected the law suit, such that disclosure became public. Each activity is assigned an
income bracket such that outside earnings were reported in a bracket system top-coded
at 7,000e. The fact that information was top-coded was heavily debated in media and
parliament and it raised concerns that voters were not adequately informed.2 In 2013,
our second reform under study, more brackets were introduced such that only earnings
above 250,000e were censored. This greatly increased disclosure obligations for MPs
and the information available to voters.
We use administrative tax return data for 2001 to 2014 allowing us to observe politi-
cians’ outside earnings at a very precise level.3 Our main outcome is the total amount
of outside earnings. Another important feature of the tax data is that it allows us to
use state MPs as a control group. Since state MPs were not subject to any disclosure
rules during our sample period, we can use them to estimate a difference-in-difference
model. German state and federal MPs are highly comparable. Both groups are full-time
politicians and they are elected in a similar way. This comparability is underlined by
the absence of any differential trend between treatment and control group prior to the
reform.
To examine who responded to disclosure of outside activities and earnings, we use
(i) different income categories as outcome variables and (ii) run quantile regressions to
check for heterogeneous responses along the earnings distribution. On the one hand,
voters perceive sources of outside earnings differently (Campbell and Cowley, 2015).
On the other hand, the literature on behavioral responses towards taxation shows that
the self-employed can more easily adjust their labor supply and also the reporting of
their income (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012). Therefore, we check for different effects
between income from wages and salaries and income from self-employment and busi-
2 During the campaign in the run-up of the 2013 federal elections, politician’s outside activities were a
much discussed issue because of large outside earnings of the candidate for the chancellorship, Peer
Steinbrück.
3 In general, tax data has very little amount of socio-demographic information and researchers face strict
confidentiality rules. Importantly, we do not observe any names and we are not allowed to link any ex-
ternal data set to the tax data. Therefore, we cannot make statements about variables like party affiliation
when using our tax data.
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nesses. In addition, we use income from renting, an unaffected income category, as a
placebo outcome. Given the differences in the bracket structure across both reforms, we
expect heterogeneous responses across the earnings distribution. Since voters cannot
distinguish between a moderate and a high-earning MP, the first reform might induce
MPs to concentrate their earnings in the highest reporting level 3, which corresponds to
income of 7,000e or more, while the second reform and the associated changes in the
bracket structure might discourage MPs to report activities with high levels of outside
earnings.
On average, 89% of all federal MPs report an activity and 38% disclose positive out-
side earnings. The most common disclosed remunerated activities are working as a
lawyer (10%), working in management and consulting (10%) or giving speeches (8%).
Around 40% of all MPs hold a function in enterprises, either as being a member of the
advisory or supervisory board. Using tax return data, we observe that the distribution
of outside earnings is highly unequal following a pareto distribution.
Our results show that the introduction of public disclosure increased total outside
earnings by 15.3%. The amount of MPs having positive outside earnings also increased
by 4.5 percentage points. Quantile regressions show that the effect is mainly driven by
the upper end of the earnings distribution. This points to the problem of the conserva-
tive top-coding of earnings at 7,000e. We show that the increase is mostly driven by
income from self-employment and business income, which would be consistent with
increased tax compliance as these incomes are self-reported and the public visibility of
their incomes might have increased incentives to report income truthfully. However,
the timing of the effect suggests that this mechanism is unlikely. We do not see any
increase in earnings in two years of private disclosure even though MPs should have
anticipated that there a significant chance of their disclosed activities becoming public
retroactively. Other possible explanations for the increase include, for example, chang-
ing social norms regarding outside incomes, i.e. making outside incomes more normal
and therefore, more acceptable.
The tightening of the disclosure law reform provides evidence that disclosure rules
lead to a lowering of outside earnings. The introduction of seven new brackets allows
to distinguish between medium and high-earning MPs. This leads to a reduction in
outside incomes of 9.6%. This decrease is mainly driven by reductions in income from
wages and salaries consistent with MPs working less for firms other than their own.
Quantile regressions show that this decrease is particularly pronounced at the top of
the distribution. This is consistent with top-earners being treated most intensely since
the new brackets affected them the most.
We also make use of self-collected data on published earnings from the website of
the German Bundestag which we combine with rich data on demographic and politi-
cal variables. First, we examine the relationship between tighter disclosure rules and
electoral accountability. Directly elected MPs had significantly lower outside earnings
when compared to the runner-up in their election district, who joined via the party list,
after, but not before the second reform. Similarly, MPs with an unsafe rank on the party
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list had lower outside earnings than MPs with a very safe rank after the second reform,
while we could not find a difference before.
We contribute to several strands of the literature. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first examining public disclosure rules for politicians with administrative tax
return data for a western democracy. More specifically, we test if individuals change
their earnings and thereby the amount of outside activities in response to a mandatory
disclosure of these activities along with the respective earnings. Most related, Slem-
rod, Rehman, and Waseem (2020) and Malik (2020) exploit an unexpected release of tax
records of Pakistani politicians. In contrast to our study, their focus lies on tax evasion
in a developing country. While Malik (2020) consider only MPs and provides strong
evidence that the pressure to decrease tax evasion was highest for competitively and
directly elected legislators, Slemrod, Rehman, and Waseem (2020) focus on the universe
of tax filers and find a 9% increase in the tax paid by individuals that are exposed to
public disclosure.
Second, our study contributes to a broader question of how a change in third party
information requirements affects income reporting behavior and how public disclosure
of income affects the (reported) income itself (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2016). The
effects of income disclosure have been studied among others for the general population
(Bo, Slemrod, and Thoresen, 2015; Slemrod, Rehman, and Waseem, 2020), CEOs (Mas,
2016), and public employees (Mas, 2017). Both Slemrod, Rehman, and Waseem (2020)
and Bo, Slemrod, and Thoresen (2015) find that income disclosure leads to higher levels
of tax compliance driven by shifting social norms and concern for reputation. Dwenger
and Treber (2018) explicitly study whether public shaming increases tax compliance
through social pressure. They exploit the introduction of a naming-and-shaming policy
in Slovenia to show that taxpayers reduce their tax debt to avoid shaming. Perez Truglia
and Troiano (2018) run a field experiment to study shaming by sending different letters
to tax delinquents in the US. They find that increasing the visibility of the delinquency
status increases compliance by individuals who owe less than 2,500$, while the effect
on individuals with larger debt is negligible.4
Lastly, we contribute to the moonlighting literature, which investigates the rela-
tionship between politicians’ outside earnings and parliamentary activity, quality and
corruption. This literature shows that allowing moonlighting has ambiguous effects.
On the one hand, it might attract more competent politicians, on the other hand these
politicians are also more likely to shirk in office (Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Natic-
chioni, 2010). Furthermore, politicians connected to private firms might hinder the pro-
cess of creative destruction and thereby lower productivity (Akcigit, Baslandze, and
Lotti, 2018). There are also two studies investigating the moonlighting of German MPs.
Arnold, Kauder, and Potrafke (2014) show descriptively that (reported) outside earn-
ings are not correlated with absence rates and speeches, but negatively correlated with
oral contributions and group activities. Becker, Peichl, and Rincke (2009) find that politi-
cians report less outside income if they face stronger political competition. However, no
4 See Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) for a survey of the literature on social pressure and shaming effects.
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existing study examines the effect of disclosure rules in a casual manner. Furthermore,
we are the first who use administrative tax records to evaluate public disclosure rules
affecting politicians.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the
institutional context and provide more details about the introduction of disclosure rules
in 2007, the tightening of these rules in 2013 and briefly describe the German voting
system. We describe our different data sources and provide descriptive statistics in
Section 4.3. Section 4.4 outlines our empirical strategy for both reforms. In Section 4.5,
we present our results both for the introduction and the tightening of the disclosure
rules. Last, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Context
4.2.1 Introduction of Disclosure Rules
Historical background In Germany, both federal and state member of parliament
are legally permitted to carry out outside activities besides their political mandate, e.g.
lawyers might continue to work within their profession. However, it is clearly stated in
§44a of the Members of the Bundestag Act (Abgeordnetengesetz) that “the exercise of the
mandate of a Member of the Bundestag shall be central to his or her activity”. In late
2004, payments to federal MPs by large companies such as Siemens of Volkswagen be-
came the focus of public attention. Subsequently, the German federal parliament passed
a law in August 2005 that obliged MPs of the German Bundestag to publicly disclose
their outside activities and associated earnings. The purpose of the disclosed informa-
tion was to “indicate combinations of interests with implications for the exercise of the
said mandate”. The law was controversial and some MPs filed a lawsuit against it ar-
guing that it would violate their privacy rights and the obligation to public disclosure
makes it less attractive to run for office for citizens from certain occupations such as for
example entrepreneurs.
Private and public disclosure Until the final decision of the Federal Supreme Court,
the president of the German Bundestag (Bundestagspräsident) decided that outside ac-
tivities and earnings would have to be privately disclosed to the administration of the
Bundestag, but would not be publicly disclosed. In July 2007, the lawsuit was narrowly
defeated by a tied court and MPs were forced to publish their sources and levels of
outside earnings on the website of the German Bundestag retroactively. To conclude,
starting in 2005 federal MPs privately disclose their information and from 2007 on all
information was publicly disclosed.
Outside activities and associated earnings are published on the website of the Ger-
man Bundestag. Table 4.2.1 summarizes the disclosure rules.5 Disclosure obligations
involve publication of (i) each outside activity, (ii) corresponding outside earnings per
5 The interested reader can find an English version of the Code of Conduct for Members of the German
Bundestag online (Bundestag, 2013).
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Table 4.2.1: General disclosure requirements
(A) Outside Activities
remunerated activity during the term of the mandate e.g. speech
functions in enterprises e.g. supervisory board
functions in public corporations and institutions e.g. board of trustees
functions in clubs, associations and foundations e.g. development aid agency or foundations
shareholdings in private corporations or partnerships e.g. law firm
(B1) Outside Earnings (EP 16 and 17)
level 0 income up to 1,000e
level 1 income between 1,000e and 3,500e
level 2 income between 3,500e and 7,000e
level 3 income over 7,000e
(B2) Outside Earnings (EP 18)
level 0 income up to 1,000e
level 1 income between 1,000e and 3,500e
level 2 income between 3,500e and 7,000e
level 3 income between 7,000e and 15,000e
level 4 income between 15,000e and 30,000e
level 5 income between 30,000e and 50,000e
level 6 income between 50,000e and 75,000e
level 7 income between 75,000e and 100,000e
level 8 income between 100,000e and 150,000e
level 9 income between 150,000e and 250,000e
level 10 income over 250,000e
(C) Frequency and Time Frame
once, monthly or yearly starting and ending date
(D) Source
company’s name and location
Notes: We ignore the information on donations. The name of lawyer’s clients are not revealed due to existence of lawyer-client-confidentiality.
Shareholdings in private corporations only need to be reported if a MP holds more than 25% and no information about received outside earnings
needs to be provided (no information about level, frequency and time frame of the activity). For more details we refer to ’Code of Conduct for
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Notes: This figures visualizes the bracket structure of both reforms. The solid line refers to the first reform, where every activity
that is remunerated with more than 7,000e is is categorized as level 3. The dashed graph shows the bracket structure under the
second reform and thereby the increase in disclosure of outside earnings to voters.
activity, (iii) its frequency and (iv) its source. Disclosed earnings are determined by the
gross amounts paid, including expenses, compensations and the value of benefits in
kind, while deductions are not included. Not all kinds of outside earnings need to be
disclosed, for example stock options or shareholdings in private corporations, if they
are lower than 25%, are exempt. In addition, activities with associated earnings of less
than 1,000e also need not be reported.
The amount of outside earnings are published in income levels. Earnings below
1,000e are classified as level 0, those between 1,000e and 3,500e were referred to as
level 1, outside earnings between 3,500e and 7,000e were called level 2, while level
3 described outside earnings of above 7,000e. In addition, the law required MPs to
assign the respective source to each outside activity. Appendix Figure 4.A.1 shows a
screenshot of the website of an MP. Top-coding at 7,000ewas criticized since MPs might
cover their well-paid activities and declare it as level 3. Nevertheless, various watchdog
organizations and the media made extensive use of the published data in subsequent
years.
The enforcement of the law works as follows. Every MP has to submit all outside
activities and associated income levels, time frame and frequency, and its source to the
president of the German Bundestag within three months. These data are then published
on the individual websites of the respective MP that are administered by the German
Bundestag. If a MP misreports or does not report at all, the violation will be made public
and a fine has to be paid. Sanctions include cuts in their enumeration of up to 50%. In
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addition, considerable cost of reputation is added to the monetary fine, since these cases
are widely discussed in the media.6
4.2.2 Tightening of Disclosure Rules
Historical background In 2012, the former Minister of Finance Peer Steinbrück was
nominated as candidate for chancellor in the upcoming federal election. Subsequently, it
was pointed out by the media that he was the highest-earning member of parliament by
giving a large number of highly-paid speeches.7 Since most of his outside activities were
top-censored, i.e. above 7,000e, his outside earnings were not appropriately reflected in
the reporting scheme. This created a prolonged public debate about possible reforms of
the reporting requirements throughout 2012 with Google searches spiking (see Figure
4.2.2). Using a digitized database of all parliamentary speeches, we also show that the
use of the phrase “outside earnings” in speeches by federal MPs spikes in 2012 (see
Figure 4.2.2). Following this debate, the federal parliament passed a stricter version
of the disclosure law in March and came into force in September 2013. As MPs could
already anticipate the tightening of disclosure law, we treat 2012 as the reform year for
the second reform.
Tightening of disclosure rules The new law aimed to provide more detailed in-
formation on high-earning MPs. More specifically, seven new income categories were
added to the reporting scheme, so that top-censoring occurred at 250,000e instead of
7,000e. This makes it possible to distinguish between a MP earning moderate amounts
and top-earners. Figure 4.2.1 visualizes the bracket structure of both reforms. The solid
line refers to the first reform, where every activity that is remunerated with more than
7,000e is is categorized as level 3. The dashed line shows the bracket structure under
the new regime and thereby the increase in disclosure of outside earnings to voters. As
a reference, federal MPs receive around 90,000e as a yearly salary for their work as a
politician across our period under study.
For the disclosure rules to be effective, there has to be sufficient attention paid to the
reported earnings. This can either be archived through the media, which made exten-
sive use of the reported earnings, or by citizens themselves. To test the first channel,
we plot the number of articles mentioning politicians outside earnings found in the
newspaper archive GENIOS from 2000 to 2019 in Figure 4.2.2c. One can clearly see the
spikes in articles in 2005 and 2012 when the two big scandals happened. More gener-
ally, the number of articles clearly increased after MPs had to disclose their earnings. To
test whether citizens themselves look up their MPs earnings, we obtain data on unique
visitors and clicks on the website of the Bundestag where the earnings are reported.8
As one can see in Figure 4.2.2d, the number of clicks and unique visitors increases one
6 This has already happened twice, most notably to the former minister of the interior, Otto Schily, in 2008.
As an attorney, he argued that the rule would violate his client’s privacy rights. In the end, he had to pay
a 22,000e fine.
7 There were even cases of him missing votes in parliament when giving a paid speech (Spiegel, 2010).
8 Unfortunately, the data are only available from January 2015 to January 2018.
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the search interest relative to the highest point in the chart for the selected region in the specified time
period. The value 100 stands for the highest popularity of this search term. Source: Google Trends; search term: ‘Nebeneinkünfte‘
(engl: outside earnings); Search Period: 01.01.2004-31.12.2019 in Germany. Panel (b) plots the number of times outside earnings
were mentioned in speeches held in parliament per 100,000 words. Source: Die Zeit. Panel (c) plots the number of articles
mentioning outside earnings of politicians from the newspaper archive GENIOS. Panel (d) plots website clicks and unique visitors
(in 1000) on the website of the German Bundestag from January 2015 to January 2018 on a monthly basis. The solid line indicate
the federal election in September 2017. Source: Deutscher Bundestag (own freedom of information request of 18.11.2019).
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year before the federal election in September 2017. There were 61.7 million eligible vot-
ers and 47.0 million voters, implying a turnout of 76.2%. In the month of the election,
clicks spike at roughly 1,000,000 clicks and 200,000 unique visitors. Together with the
large amount of newspaper articles documenting the existence of outside earnings and
activities, we argue that sufficient attention was and still is paid to politicians’ outside
income.
4.2.3 Voting System in Germany
The German Bundestag is the federal parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany,
while state parliaments (Landtäge) are the legislative bodies of the 16 individual German
states. The competence of legislation is split between the state parliaments and the fed-
eral Parliament. Elections for the German Bundestag as well as for the state parliaments
are based on a “personalized” proportional representation system. Its goal is to com-
bine the advantages of both proportional representation and majority voting system.
Each citizen has two votes. The first vote is directly attributed to a candidate represent-
ing her electoral district. As there are 299 federal electoral districts, the same number
of mandates in the Bundestag are distributed to the candidates winning the plurality
of first votes in their districts (directly elected candidates). The second vote supports
a political party at the national level. Based on their share of the second vote, political
parties send their candidates from predefined electoral lists into the federal parliament.
The electoral lists are determined by the parties at the state level. This way 299 addi-
tional mandates are distributed to the parties who have received at least 5 percent of the
valid second votes.9 The Bundestag is elected for four years, while state-level elections
are held every five years.
In our analysis, we will distinguish between MPs that are directly elected and those
who entered parliament through the party list. In particular, directly elected MPs should
face a higher level of electoral accountability since voters have the possibility to punish
(or reward) them directly given their published information on outside earnings and
activities. Furthermore, we will compare MPs with a safe ranking on the electoral list
to those with a more insecure ranking. Again, the less secure the rank is, the higher the
degree of electoral accountability should be.
4.3 Data
We employ the German Taxpayer Panel for the years 2001 to 2014 (henceforth called
TPP), which comprises the universe of German tax returns. In addition, we collect pub-
licly disclosed outside activities and earnings for the years 2005 to 2017 as well as pub-
9 If a party receives more mandates via the first vote than the second vote, all directly elected candidates
gain additional seats in the Bundestag (Überhangmandate). To keep proportional representation intact,




licly available information on demographics, committee membership and voting statis-
tics (henceforth called reported data). The two data sets have distinct advantages and
drawbacks. The TPP allows us to precisely measure outside income before and after the
reforms both for federal and state MPs. This allows us to causally evaluate the reforms
in a difference-in-difference setting. The main drawback of the TPP is the low number of
demographic and political variables. Given the strict data protection rules when work-
ing with tax return records, we cannot identify individuals’ names or party affiliations.
In contrast to the tax return data, our reported data offers a rich set of demographic and
political variables, but the publicly disclosed information on earnings are imprecisely
measured. Given the nature of the reported data, we can only observe federal MPs after
the reform and state MPs are not covered at all. We use the reported data to provide
some suggestive evidence on the characteristics of outside activities and demographics,
but also to support potential mechanisms. Importantly, we are not allowed to combine
these two data sets and both will be evaluated separately.
4.3.1 German Taxpayer Panel
The German Taxpayer Panel (TPP) covers all tax units for the period 2001 – 2014. It is
an administrative data set collected by German tax authorities, provided and admin-
istered by the German Federal Statistical Office. The unit of observation is a tax unit,
i.e., either a single individual or a couple filing jointly. It contains all information nec-
essary to calculate a taxpayer’s annual income tax, including basic socio-demographic
characteristics such as age, gender, state of residence, marital status, as well as detailed
information on income sources and tax base parameters such as work related expenses
and (claimed and realized) deductions on a yearly level. Hence, the advantage of tax
return data lies in its precise measurement of pre- as well as post-reform income related
variables. However, it does not contain of information about the specific type of outside
activity (e.g. speech or ongoing work as a lawyer) or personal information (e.g. party
affiliation).10
Treatment and control group Our empirical strategy compares federal MPs (treat-
ment group) to state MPs (control group). Now, we outline how we determine the
two groups in the TPP. First, we identify all members of federal, state, and EU parlia-
ment by having positive income from parliamentary activities. Next, we gather data
on the remuneration and election dates of all 16 state parliaments as well as well the
federal and European parliament from 2001 to 2014.11 Since state MPs earn less than
federal MPs, we can discriminate between the two groups within state-year cells. Until
2009, members of the European parliament received the same amount of remuneration
as federal MPs. To identify those units we exploit an increase in their compensation
10 Data access is subject to very strict data security rules and we only work with these data via remote-
access. Every single request requires a confidentiality check. Moreover, it is impossible to combine these
data with any other information.
11 Appendix Figure 4.A.2 plots the average remuneration for the federal, EU and all state parliaments over
our sample period.
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the number of state MPs that are identified in the tax data (in black) and the actual or expected number of
MPs (in grey). Panel (b) shows the number of federal MPs that are identified in the tax data (in black) and the actual number of
MPs (in grey). We exclude parliamentarians from Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen for both groups. We further exclude those units
that newly enter parliament and those who leave parliament in a given year. Hence, in our baseline estimations, we only consider
’full year’ units such that our results do not get contaminated by e.g. individuals directly entering employment right after leaving
parliament. Source: German tax return data, 2001-2014 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)
in 2009 due to a EU-wide harmonization of their salaries. Hence, we drop observa-
tions whose income from parliamentary activities discontinuously jumps in 2009 by the
reform-induced amount.12 Further, we drop households, in which both the head and the
spouse are MPs since they could be part of both the treatment and the control group.13
Next, we exploit the panel structure of our data to exclude individuals who just en-
tered parliament for a given year, since we would wrongly classify their pre-politician
earnings as outside earnings. MPs leaving parliament receive a transitional payment
(Übergangsgeld). We make use of the fact that (i) most MPs leave parliament after elec-
tions, and (ii) the transitional payment is lower than the regular salary. This allows us
to pinpoint MPs whose income from parliamentary activities drops right after a state or
federal election. We classify these MPs as dropouts.14 As a robustness check, we will
report results both with and without dropouts. Finally, we drop all MPs from the three
German city-states (Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen) since being an MP is only a part-time
job in their state parliaments (so-called Feierabendparlamente).
12 We can identify about two thirds of the 99 EU parliamentarians since one third newly enters the European
parliament and is therefore indistinguishably from newly entering federal MPs. Note, that this induces
a bias towards zero since a (small) part of the treatment group is not actually treated. Over our sample
period there were no changes with respect to income disclosure for members of the European parliament.
13 This involves only a very small number of couples in our sample period. Including them does not change
our results.
14 Federal MPs receive one additional month of transitional payments for each year they spend in parlia-
ment. The transitional payments are capped at 18 months. Starting with the second month after leaving
parliament, transitional payments are reduced one to one by all other income a former MP receives.
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In 2013, Bavaria was the first state that introduced a public disclosure law for its
state MPs. One year later, five further states introduced similar laws (see Table 4.A.7).
Therefore, we exclude observations from these states when disclosure laws where in
effect to avoid a contamination of our control group. In Figure 4.3.1, we verify the
accuracy of our allocation mechanism and compare the amount of units identified in
the tax data with the actual number of units that are present in parliament. We match
the number of state and federal parliamentarians quite closely.
Outcome variables We capture disclosed outside earnings as closely as possible. We
take advantage of the fact that earnings from different sources are separately reported
in the German income tax system. Our main outcome is the total income from sources
that MPs have to disclose. This amounts to all income from (i) salaries and wages (ii)
(non-corporate) businesses and self-employment (iii) agriculture and forestry, as well
as other sources. We will also evaluate the effect on each of the categories (i) to (iii)
separately. Furthermore, we use rental income as a placebo outcome since such income
does not need to be disclosed.15
4.3.2 Reported Data
Table 4.3.1: Number of MPs with at least one activity and positive outside earnings
EP16 EP17 EP18 Total
N in % N in % N in % N in %
MPs who report at least one activity 573 89.81 581 89.11 582 88.45 1736 89.12
MPs with positive outside earnings 241 37.77 250 38.34 252 38.30 743 38.14
Notes: This table provides an overview about federal MPs who report outside activities and who report outside earnings for the election
periods 16-18 and the average across all three election periods. All percentages refer to the total amount of MPs for a given election period.
Source: Reported Data, own calculations.
Our second data set consists of several publicly available sources. The most impor-
tant part of this data are the reported outside earnings and activities from the website of
the German federal parliament. We enrich this data with further demographic and po-
litical variables. Our reported data covers every MP who was at least present in one of
the following three legislative periods of the German Bundestag: 16th legislative period
(2005-2009), 17th legislative period (2009-2013) and 18th legislative period (2013-2017).16
In the following, we describe the different data sources in greater detail.
Demographic variables Using the handbook of German MPs, we extract a number
of demographic variables. We observe a politician’s name, gender, age, marital status,
and number of children. Additionally, we know whether a politician has a PhD degree
15 We do not consider capital income in our analysis, since MPs were not required to disclose such earnings
and investment income is only observable until 2009 in the tax data.
16 Table 4.A.2 provides an overview about these three election periods under study as well as the composi-
tion of MPs in federal parliament by party.
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and their resident state. We classify a politician’s (former) occupation into ten groups.
Importantly, as opposed to the tax data, we know the party membership of each MP. For
our sample period about half of MPs are part of a center-right party (CDU/CSU and
FDP), while the other half is a member of one of the left-wing parties (SPD, Greens and
The Left). Moreover, we group MPs by their political experience into three categories:
newcomers (first term), those serving for two to three terms, and MPs with four or
more terms in parliament. Lastly, we construct dummies for MPs that leave (or join)
parliament in the middle of an election period since they have less time to accumulate
outside earnings. Summary statistics of all these variables can be found in Appendix
Table 4.A.3.
Political and electoral variables A MP can be voted into the Bundestag either via
party list or direct ballot (see Section 4.2.3). To capture this distinction, we construct
a dummy for being elected directly. We also create a dummy for MPs who entered
through a safe rank on the party list (above-median ranking) as opposed to those that
where placed on a less safe rank (below-median ranking). Furthermore, when a MP ran
for direct ballot in one of the 299 electoral districts, we obtain her own as well as her
party’s vote share in that district. Then, we calculate the vote margin of each MP as the
difference to the second-placed candidate for winning candidate and the difference to
the first placed candidate for all other candidates. To account for political offices and to
capture a politician’s policy expertise and interest more accurately, we construct dum-
mies for membership in one each of the committees of the German federal parliament.
In addition, to capture the rank and status of the MP, we create dummies for being part
of party leadership and for being a committee chair, respectively. Summary statistics
are again displayed in Appendix Table 4.A.4.
Published data on outside earnings We collect every disclosed activity, its income
level (0 to 3 for election period 16 & 17 and 0 to 10 for election period 18), its starting
and end date as well as frequency (monthly, yearly, once), and the respective employer.
Table 4.3.1 provides information about the number of MPs with at least one activity
and positive outside earnings. 89.12% of all MPs report an activity and 38.14% report
positive outside earnings. This is due to the fact that many activities are voluntary work
and thus not remunerated. In Appendix Table 4.A.6, we display the distribution of each
activity’s bracket and frequency. 18% of all activities are assigned level three of higher
across all election periods. 94% of all activities are carried out once and only 2% and 4%
of all activities happen on a yearly or monthly basis.
To determine a value of outside earnings, we assign the mean value of each bracket
to every activity (e.g. an activity with level 0 is measured with 500e). The value as-
signed to the last bracket is determined by polynomial extrapolation, i.e. an activity
with level 3 is assigned 9,500e (see Appendix Figure 4.A.3). Since the addition of seven
new levels in election period 18 mechanically increases this measure, we code every
activity of level 4 or higher as a level 3 activity. More precisely, an activity with level
0 is assigned a value of 500e , level 1 2,250e , level 2 5,250e and level 3 and above
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Notes: Panel (a) displays the distribution of (positive) outside earnings from federal parliamentarians excluding the top 2% for
privacy reasons based on the tax return data. Panel (b) shows the corresponding distribution for the baseline measure of outside
earnings based on the reported data. Source: German tax return data, 2001-2014 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP) (Panel (a)); Reported Data
EP 16 - 18 (Panel (b))
9,500e .17 This is likely to underestimate the true level of outside earnings, but ensures
comparability over time. In a last step, we calculate the total amount of reported outside
earnings of every federal MP for a given election period and divide it by four to ensure
comparability to the yearly tax data.
Published data on outside activities The composition of the main activities that MPs
undertake are displayed in Appendix Table 4.A.5. 32% pursue a remunerated activity,
40% hold functions in enterprises and 59% hold functions in public corporations. The
most popular remunerated activities are classified as law (10% of all MPs report at least
one law activity), 10% of all MPs have at least one management and consulting activity
and 9% were giving at least one speech. Typical functions in enterprises are member
of advisory board (Mitglied des Beirates) or member of supervisory board (Mitglied des
Aufsichtsrates). 11% of all MPs report shareholdings in private corporations with a share
larger than 25%, but we cannot observe their income from these shareholdings.
4.3.3 Descriptive Analysis: Outside Earnings
The reported data consists of 1,952 MP-election period observations and covers election
period 16-18 of the German Bundestag. We observe 1,108 individual MPs, 264 of which
are present throughout all election periods.18
17 As a robustness check, we also use a lower bound measure, where we we assign the lower threshold of
7,000e to level 3 (and above) activities.
18 We provide details of the composition of the German Bundestag for the election periods under study in
the Appendix.
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Table 4.3.2: Descriptive statistics: outside earnings (reported data & tax data)
mean sd min max N
tax data
all MPs
outside earnings 29,358 146,151 27,974
wages & salaries 14,633 136,463 27,974
business & self-employment 11,762 113,943 27,974
renting -986 17,880 27,974
other sources 2,963 15,770 27,974
federal MPs
outside earnings 21,546 75,968 8,537
wages & salaries 8,230 42,613 8,537
business & self-employment 10,390 59,358 8,537
renting -1,830 14,363 8,537
other sources 2,926 16,702 8,537
state MPs
outside earnings 32,789 167,837 19,437
wages & salaries 17,445 161,184 19,437
business & self-employment 12,364 130,909 19,437
renting -616 19,212 19,437
other sources 2,980 15,344 19,437
reported data
federal MPs
outside earnings: baseline 9,677 26,957 0 251,875 1,952
outside earnings: lower bound 8,478 23,205 0 227,562 1,952
Notes: Both panels refer to yearly values. The upper panel reports earnings based on the German tax return data,
2001-2014 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP). Outside earnings amounts to all income from (i) salaries and wages, (ii) business
and self-employment income and (iii) other sources (except for income from parliamentary activities). Income from
renting is our placebo outcome. Due to privacy reasons minimum and maximum values are omitted in the tax return
data. In out reported data, outside earnings are calculated as follows: baseline: an activity with level 0 is assigned a
value of 500e , level 1 2,250e , level 2 5,250e and level 3 and above 9,500e . In our lower bound definition, we assign
a value of 7,000e for each activity with level 3 and above. Source: Outside earnings are based on reported data for
the election periods 16, 17 and 18 (lower panel);
Outside earnings Figure 4.3.2 plots the distribution of federal MPs outside earnings
both from the reported data as well as from the tax data. Outside earnings is extremely
unequally distributed in both data sets. The outside earnings from the tax data closely
traces a pareto distribution, while the reported distribution exhibits bunching at differ-
ent points. Between these bunching points, one can see the missing mass that is caused
by the bracket reporting system. In our tax data, half of those MPs who do have positive
earnings, have less than 10,000e and around 30% have more than 30,000e across the
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Table 4.3.3: Outside earnings: correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





East Germany -5,987*** -6,755***
(1,375) (1,486)
age between 50 and 60 1,307 -122
(1,380) (1,438)
age 60 above 3,191* 1,188
(1,919) (1,988)
terms: 2 - 3 1,270 84
(1,272) (1,429)
terms: > 3 2,069 -1,882
(1,703) (2,127)
controls Yes
N 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952
# politicians 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108
Notes: The outcome variable is outside earnings as described in Section 4.3.2. SPD, Greens and The Left are coded as left-wing (parties). Controls include all variables in Tables 4.A.3 and 4.A.4 for
which we have full observations. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Reported data for EP 16 - 18 (2005–2017).
period under study. Next, we compare the outside earnings that were publicly disclosed
with the actual outside earnings that we can observe in the tax data.
Federal MPs have on average 21,000e of outside earnings, while state MPs earn on
average 32,000e (see Table 4.3.2). This difference might be surprising since the focus
of the political debate is usually on federal MPs. Possible explanations might be the
lower public attention placed on state MPs or simply because they still have a closer
relationship to their hometown and thereby their initial occupation. The major income
source is business and self-employment income for federal MPs, while state MPs earn
(on average) the most from wages and salaries. The mean in the reported data is around
10,000e. The values reported in the tax data are almost twice as high as our baseline
measure from the reported data. This confirms one frequent criticism of the public
disclosure law. The bracket system, and in particular the highest bracket, mask the real
extent of moonlighting that politicians engage in.
Correlations We classify SPD, Greens and the Left Party as left-wing parties and
show that they earn less compared to members of other parties, a result often found in
the existing literature (Becker, Peichl, and Rincke, 2009; Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009).
Table 4.3.3 shows that the unconditional difference amounts to about 7,400e per year.
This difference shrinks to 3,600e when including all control variables, such as for ex-
ample their former occupation, but is still statistically significant and of a economically
meaningful size. Furthermore, in our sample both female and East German MPs earn
significantly less outside earnings. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference by age
and experience once we control for all other variables.19
19 Appendix Figure 4.A.4 shows that there is also substantial variation in outside earnings by committee
membership. MPs in the economics, agriculture and exterior committee earn on average over 13,000e,
while members of the environmental and digital committee earn 3,000e and less.
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4.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we outline our empirical strategy. First, we describe both our simple
difference-in-differences setting and our identification strategy. Furthermore, we ex-
tend our model to a dynamic difference-in-difference strategy. Second, to analyze who
particularly responded to disclosure of outside earnings and activities, we run a quan-
tile regression approach and we use different income categories as outcome variables.
Last, we explore the mechanisms behind our results using the reported data by compar-
ing MPs with different levels of electoral accountability.
4.4.1 Difference-in-Differences Strategy
Since 2005, federal MPs were obliged to privately disclose their outside activities and
earnings. From 2007 onwards, the information was publicly disclosed, including the
prior privately disclosed information. We exploit the fact that members of the federal
parliament (Bundestag) were affected by disclosure rules, while members of state par-
liaments (Landtag) did not face such legal requirements. Thus, members of the federal
parliament are our treatment units and members of state parliaments form our control
group. This setup gives rise to a difference-in-difference design by comparing federal
to state MPs before and after the reform. This identification strategy will uncover the
casual effect of the public disclosure law if the assumption of parallel trends between
the treatment and control group holds. We implicitly validate this assumption using a
dynamic difference-in-difference approach.
Our baseline estimation is structured as follows. Let Yist be an outcome of politician
i resident in state s in year t. We then estimate
Yit = βTreatiReformt + γi + λst + εit (4.1)
where Treati is a dummy taking the value one if i is a federal MP and Reformt is an
indicator equal to 1 from 2007 onwards. We also include individual fixed effects γi to
control for potentially unobserved and time-constant features of MPs. The state-year
fixed effects λst absorb aggregate movements as well as state-specific shocks such as
local economic conditions. Finally, we cluster our standard errors at the individual level
to allow for serial correlation. The coefficient of interest is β, which identifies the casual
effect of the public disclosure law. Our sample period runs from 2001 to 2009 for the
first reform. Note that, since this is classical 2x2 difference-in-difference setup, we do
not have to assume homogeneous treatment effects for our estimator to be consistent
(Goodman-Bacon, 2021).
We evaluate the tightening of the public disclosure law in much the same manner
as its introduction with one exception. We drop observations in which state MPs were
also subject to disclosure rules (see Section 4.3.1). Next, we estimate equation 4.1 on the
sample from 2010 to 2014 with the reform dummy being one for t ≥ 2012. Standard
errors are again clustered on the individual level.
188
4.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Dynamic difference-in-difference As mentioned above, we also estimate a more
dynamic version of equation 4.1 both to test for pre-trends and to allow for dynamic
post-treatment effects. To do so, we define a set of dummy variables 1k=t, which takes
the value one if k equals t and zero otherwise. To estimate the effects of the introduction







βlTreati1l=t + γi + λst + εit (4.2)
where we omit the interaction of the 2006 dummy to normalize our estimates to the pre-
reform year. Therefore, βk ∀k ∈ {2001, ..., 2005} refer to differences in trends between the
treatment and control group before the reform, while βl ∀l ∈ {2007, ..., 2009} represent
the dynamic treatment effects.
Analogous to equation 4.2, we adjust the dynamic difference-in-difference equation







βlTreati1l=t + γi + λst + εit (4.3)
where we omit the interaction of the 2011 dummy to normalize our estimates to the
pre-reform year. Again, β2010 refers to differences in trends between the treatment and
control group before the reform, while βl ∀l ∈ {2012, ..., 2014} represent the dynamic
treatment effects.
4.4.2 Who responds to the Disclosure of Outside Earnings and why?
Increased transparency makes politicians more accountable. In which way politicians
adjust their earnings depend on the preferences of voters. If voters perceive outside in-
come negatively, increased transparency could make politicians more accountable such
that they reduce outside activities. We discuss direct ways to test for the effect of elec-
toral accountability in the reported data in Section 4.4.3.
Income components Income disclosure by politicians might have counteracting ef-
fects on different categories of outside income. On the one hand, the effect depends
on the preferences of voters on incomes from different sources. For example, Campbell
and Cowley (2015) show via a survey experiment that voters do not penalize business
owners or the self-employed for continuing their business. On the other hand, the liter-
ature on behavioral responses towards taxation shows that the self-employed can more
easily adjust their labor supply and also the reporting of their income (Saez, Slemrod,
and Giertz, 2012). Another possible behavioral effect can occur if income disclosure af-
fects tax compliance. By increasing the possibility to detect evasion behaviour, income
disclosure laws incentives tax payers to declare their true income (Bo, Slemrod, and
Thoresen, 2015; Slemrod, Rehman, and Waseem, 2020). Given strict third-party report-
ing standards in Germany, we expect this possible effect only to be present for income
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from business operations and self-employment, since these income categories are self-
declared by the tax payer. Both of these effects should (at least partially) materialize
already in 2005 when private disclosure was applied and politicians had to assume that
there is a decent chance for public disclosure to be applied retroactively. In contrast, if
the effect is only observed from 2007, it is more likely that it is connected to the infor-
mation that was publicly released.
Social norms towards having outside work might have changed after the introduc-
tion of the public disclosure law. Initially, the very conservative top-coding at 7,000e,
has prevented voters to distinguish between a high- and moderate-earning MP and
might have lead voters to underestimate the true extent of outside earnings. Therefore,
from a voter’s point of view it might have become more acceptable to have a second
job as a politician. The second reform, which introduced more brackets and thereby in-
creased the amount of information available to voters, however, could have had the op-
posite effect. In response, politicians might then reduce the amount of outside income.
Public disclosure could also have changed a previous social norm of not pursuing out-
side activities among MPs to a market transaction by putting a price on it (Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2000).20 Given that MPs are paying a price, which is the reporting require-
ment itself, they might engage in more outside work. Moreover, politicians might have
misperceived social norms and learned from the behavior of their peers, which causes
them to update their beliefs about the acceptability of outside earnings (Bursztyn, Gon-
zalez, and Yanagizawa Drott, 2020). Last, the reported income could also be used as
a signal of skill to (certain) voters. This could be potentially heterogeneous with some
MPs wanting to highlight the importance of their mandate by having no outside jobs,
while others explicitly start to have outside jobs to signal competence.
Quantile regression As already seen in Figure 4.3.2, outside earnings of politicians
are highly unequally distributed. To shed light into the full distribution of outside earn-
ings, we use (unconditional) quantile regressions. Whereas ordinary least squares re-
gressions allow us to estimate the effect of a given variable at the mean, quantile re-
gressions tell us about the effect of a policy change on the entire distribution of outside
earnings.
We apply the estimator suggested by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) to estimate
the effect of the reform on all nine deciles of the outside earnings distribution. We
apply this estimator to both data periods: 2001 – 2009 (first reform) and 2010 – 2014
(second reform). The results are particular interesting for the second reform, since it
has changed only the bracket structure. More precisely, until 2012 every activity that
was remunerated with more than 7,000ewas top-coded and appeared as level 3 on the
web pages of the German Bundestag. After the tightening of the rules, activities that are
remunerated with more than 250,000e are top-coded. Therefore, we expect most of the
effect to be concentrated at the top of the distribution.
20 This is also connected to the concept of moral licensing, where an individual, after doing something
perceived as morally good, i.e. a politician being transparent about their outside earnings, it gives herself
license to do something that is perceived to be morally bad, i.e. increasing her outside earnings (Merritt,
Effron, and Monin, 2010).
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4.4.3 Mechanisms: Electoral Accountability
To further investigate the mechanism of the reform, we look at variation in electoral
accountability. As explained in Section 4.2.3, we exploit the fact that there are two ways
to become a federal MP in Germany: direct ballot election and party lists. Since it is
impossible to differentiate between the two groups of MPs in the tax data, we will test
this hypothesis using the reported data. As we do not have a control group in this data
set, all evidence has to be considered suggestive.
Election via direct ballot or party list Politicians, who enter parliament by direct
ballot election, are arguably more accountable to voters. In case for any perceived mis-
behaviour, voters have the opportunity to directly vote specific politicians out of office.
In contrast, voters cannot (directly) vote out specific politicians that enter trough the
party list. Therefore, directly elected MPs are more electorally accountable and should
react more strongly to the reform if electoral accountability matters. We test the pre-
diction by looking at the subset of electoral districts, from which the second-placed
candidate also entered parliament (through the party list). This allows us to compare
directly elected MPs to their runner-ups in the following way:
Yie = βeD
direct
ie + δXie + γd + εide ∀ e ∈ {16, 17, 18} (4.4)
where Yie are outside earnings for MP i in election period e. Ddirectie is a dummy for being
directly elected, and γd are electoral district fixed effects ensuring that we only compare
first-placed candidates to their runner-ups. We estimate this equation both for the two
election periods before the second reform and for the election period after the second
reform.
We expect βe to be negative for all election periods, since they are subject to a higher
level of electoral accountability. If the tightening of the disclosure rules, which went
into effect, in election period 18, increased electoral accountability, directly elected MPs
should reduce their outside income relative to MPs entering parliament through the
party list. That is, we expect βe to be even more negative in election period 18.
Safe and unsafe ranking on party list In contrast, MPs entering parliament via party list
are only at risk to be voted out of office if they are close to the marginal rank, meaning
the last rank which gets into parliament. Therefore, we also compare MPs with a safe
list rank to those with an unsafe rank. Given the higher risk of being voted out of office
for MPs with an unsafe rank, we argue that they are subject to a higher level of electoral
accountability. Since party lists are organized at the state-party level, we construct a
dummy Dunsaferankie that takes the value one if a politician has an above median rank.
For example, 22 politicians entered through the list of the Bavarian Social Democrats
in election period 18. According to our classification, those ranked 1 to 11 had safe list
ranks, whereas ranks 12 to 22 were unsafe. We then estimate the following equation:
Yie = βeD
unsaferank
ie + δXie + γsp + εie ∀ e ∈ {16, 17, 18} (4.5)
where Yie are outside earnings for MP i in election period e. γsp are state-party fixed
effects controlling for the (potentially) different assignment procedures of the state-level
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party associations. Similar to above, βe should generally be negative and become even
more negative in election period 18 if electoral accountability plays a mediating role.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Introduction of the Public Disclosure Law
Baseline results We first present the results from our baseline difference-in-difference
approach. Table 4.5.1 shows the causal effects of the introduction of disclosure laws.
Outside earnings did actually increase by about 15%. Also, the probability of having
positive outside income increased by 4.5 percentage points. Both of these effect are sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels. One potential concern is that we include
politicians who just dropped out of parliament in our sample conflating outside earn-
ings with their regular income. To test this possibility, we exclude these MPs from our
sample (see column (2) and (4) in Table 4.5.1). This leaves our estimates almost un-
changed.
Figure 4.5.1 visualizes the estimates of our dynamic difference in differences ap-
proach (see equation 4.2). The effect only emerges after the introduction of public dis-
closure in 2007. Importantly, there is no evidence for any significant differential trend
between the treatment and control group before the reform. This is reinforcing the par-
allel trends assumption underlying our research design. In addition, we do not observe
any differential trend in the time period of private disclosure from 2005 to 2006. Politi-
cians are only reacting to public, but not to private disclosure. The effect in 2007 is posi-
tive, but insignificant. In the following years, the effect becomes stronger and significant
at conventional levels.
Income components To disentangle the total effect of an increase in outside earn-
ings, we apply our baseline difference-in-difference setup to different income categories.
Table 4.5.2 shows the results for wages & salaries (columns 1 and 2), business & self-
employment (columns 3 and 4), other sources (columns 5 and 6) and last, renting as our
Table 4.5.1: Introduction of the disclosure law: extensive and intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log outside income log outside income outside income > 0 outside income > 0
treatment x reform 0.155** 0.153** 0.049*** 0.045***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.017) (0.017)
politician FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
state-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
w/o dropouts Yes Yes
N 14,135 12,955 19,993 18,412
# politicians 3,189 3,013 3,652 3,546
Notes: This tables displays estimates from equation 4.1 using log outside earnings (columns 1 & 2) and a dummy for positive outside earnings (columns
3 & 4) as outcome variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: German tax return
data, 2001-2009 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)
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Notes: This graphs displays the coefficients βt ∀ t ∈ {2001, ..., 2009} and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals estimated
by equation 4.2 using outside earnings as the outcome variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Source: German tax return data, 2001-2009 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)
placebo outcome (columns 7 and 8). The results show that the increase is solely driven
by income from business and self-employment, which increased by 19.3% at the inten-
sive margin and 3.7 percentage points at the extensive margin. All other coefficients
are insignificant. Lastly, rental income, which was not affected by the disclosure law,
does also not react to the reform. This increased credibility of that the measured effect
is solely driven by the introduction of the disclosure law and not by some other shock
occurring at the same time.
Next, we discuss the possibility that an increase in tax compliance might be the ex-
planation for the positive effect on outside earnings. We argue that the timing of the
effect is not consistent with this explanation. If politicians were concerned about being
caught evading taxes, they should have already reacted in 2005, when private disclo-
sure was introduced. Since it was known that the privately disclosed income would
become public retroactively, MPs should have anticipated the possibility of public dis-
closure and, at least partially, increased their tax compliance starting in 2005. Moreover,
tax evasion is a criminal offence and MPs not only would loose their mandate, but also
face severe penalties.
Instead, the increase in 2007 is consistent with a change in social norms towards
outside activities and earnings. These social norms could only have changed when out-
side earnings became public, not when they were privately disclosed. As the reported
amounts were kept artificially low by top-coding at 7,000e, this could have induced vot-
ers (and subsequently politicians) to view outside earnings less negatively. This mecha-
nism is also consistent with the increase being driven by income from self-employment
as this income category has been shown to be acceptable by voters (Campbell and Cow-
ley, 2015).
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Table 4.5.2: Introduction of the disclosure law: income categories
income category wages & salaries business & self-employment other sources renting (placebo)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log income income > 0 log income income > 0 log income income > 0 log income income > 0
treatment x reform 0.089 0.001 0.193** 0.037** 0.060 0.009 0.095 0.018
(0.089) (0.011) (0.089) (0.018) (0.111) (0.014) (0.179) (0.014)
politician FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
state-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
w/o dropouts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,608 18,412 9,046 18,412 4,463 18,412 3,799 18,412
# politicians 1,518 3,546 2,319 3,546 1,229 3,546 1,550 3,546
Notes: This tables displays estimates from equation 4.1 using log outside earnings and a dummy for positive earnings from wages and salaries (columns 1 & 2), business operations and
self-employment (columns 3 & 4), forest and agriculture and other sources (columns 5 & 6), and renting (columns 7 & 8) as outcome variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: German tax return data, 2001-2009 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)
Social norms might also change when previously intrinsically motivated is replaced
by extrinsically motivated behavior. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show in a field ex-
periment that the introduction of a fine for parents who pick up their children late from
a day-care center actually increased late-coming. Before the fine, it was simply a social
norm to be on time and afterwards it was perceived as a market transaction. Applying
this finding to our setting, it might be that it was a social norm not to have little (or
no) outside earnings. After the policy change, the price an MP pays for earning out-
side income is the duty to report it. Therefore, since politicians pay the price, earning
outside income becomes more acceptable simply because they report it. Another ex-
planation might be that social norms were initially misperceived. Bursztyn, Gonzalez,
and Yanagizawa Drott (2020) define the term “pluralistic ignorance”, referring to a sit-
uation where most people privately hold an opinion, but they incorrectly believe that
most other people hold the contrary opinion, and end up acting against their own view.
When politicians believe having outside jobs are stigmatized, they might be reluctant to
reveal their private views to others out of fear of social sanctions. In our setting, MPs
might have misperceived the norms regarding outside activities since they were not
public knowledge. Although the private view of an MP might have been that earning
outside earnings is not necessarily a bad thing, they might have been reluctant to act on
that belief, as they thought that others disapprove such behavior. When outside income
became public and was seen to be widespread, they engaged more in that behavior.
Quantile regressions We test whether the effect is driven by different parts of the
outside income distribution by conducting (unconditional) quantile regressions on the
deciles of the outside earnings distribution. That is, we estimate not the average effect,
but the effect on all nine deciles (Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 2009). The results are
plotted in Figure 4.5.2. The treatment effect is very small for the lower and middle part
of the distribution, whereas the effect on the eighth and ninth decile is considerably
larger. This implies that most of the treatment effect is driven by high-income MPs that
are likely to be top-censored.
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
decile
Notes: This graphs displays the coefficient β on log of outside earnings and the corresponding 95% confidence interval when
estimating equation 4.1 using unconditional quantile regression for the first to ninth decile. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the individual level. Source: German tax return data, 2001-2009 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)
4.5.2 Tightening of the Public Disclosure Law
Baseline result Recall, that the second reform introduced seven new brackets such
that it shifted top-coded incomes from 7,000e to 250,000e. Therefore, voters were
now enabled to differentiate between medium- and high-earning MPs. Our baseline
difference-in-difference estimates using equation 4.1 are presented in Table 4.5.3. The
tightening of disclosure law significantly decreased total outside income by 9.6%, while
leaving the extensive margin unchanged. This result is line with the institutional details
of the new rules, since the introduction of new brackets did not change the reporting
requirements at the extensive margin. As one can see in Figure 4.5.3, the effect emerges
in 2012 with parallel trends between the treatment and control group in the year before.
Importantly, the effect occurs before the federal election in 2013 and can therefore not
be driven by a changed composition of the federal parliament.
Income categories When we decompose the total effect into the different income
categories, we find that the negative intensive margin effect is driven by a reduction
of 15.8% of income from wages and salaries (see column 1 of Table 4.5.4). We do not
find any significant negative effect on self-employment or business income. This is
consistent with the tightening of the rules inducing a sizeable transparency effect as
this income category is viewed more favourably among voters (Campbell and Cowley,
2015).
We do not find consistent evidence for a change in the other income categories. Sim-
ilarly to the introduction of the law, we do not find any effect on rental income, which
acts as our placebo outcome.
Quantile regression Given that the introduction of the new income brackets mainly
affected top-earning MPs, we expect the treatment effect to be concentrated at the top
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Table 4.5.3: Tightening of the disclosure law: extensive and intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log outside income log outside income outside income > 0 outside income > 0
treatment x reform -0.092* -0.096** 0.011 0.008
(0.047) (0.048) (0.013) (0.013)
politician FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
state-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
w/o dropouts Yes Yes
N 8,622 8,299 11,223 10,849
# politicians 2,716 2,600 3,212 3,096
Notes: This tables displays estimates from equation 4.1 using log outside earnings (columns 1 & 2) and a dummy for positive outside earnings (columns
3 & 4) as outcome variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: German tax return
data, 2010-2014 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)





2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Notes: This graphs displays the coefficients βt ∀ t ∈ {2010, ..., 2014} and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals estimated
by equation 4.3 using outside earnings as the outcome variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Source: German tax return data, 2010-2014 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)
of the distribution. We test this hypothesis by estimating quantile regressions for every
decile of the distribution. As one can see in Figure 4.5.4, the effect is very small and
insignificant for the first deciles and then becomes larger the further one goes along the
distribution.
Electoral accountability Next, we explore potential mechanisms of the decrease in
outside earnings following the tightening of the disclosure rules.21 As we argued before,
we expect the effect to be stronger the more accountable politicians are to their voters.
Since we cannot test this hypothesis in the tax data, we make use of the reported data.
In a first step, we compare MPs elected by direct ballot and their runner-up peers, who
entered via party list. We additionally add electoral district fixed effects to only compare
the winner of a direct election and the second-placed candidate. Panel A in 4.5.5 shows




Table 4.5.4: Tightening of the disclosure law: income categories
income category wages & salaries business & self-employment other sources renting (placebo)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log income income > 0 log income income > 0 log income income > 0 log income income > 0
treatment x reform -0.158*** -0.000 -0.035 0.034** -0.116 -0.027** 0.003 -0.017
(0.052) (0.009) (0.064) (0.015) (0.073) (0.011) (0.095) (0.012)
politician FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
state-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
w/o dropouts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,580 10,849 5,808 10,849 3,163 10,849 2,554 10,849
# politicians 1,256 3,096 1,978 3,096 1,064 3,096 964 3,096
Notes: This tables displays estimates from equation 4.1 using log outside earnings and a dummy for positive earnings from wages and salaries (column 1 & 2), business operations and
self-employment (column 3 & 4), forest and agriculture and other sources (column 5 & 6), and renting (column 7 & 8) as outcome variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: German tax return data, 2010-2014 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)
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Notes: This graphs displays the coefficient β on log of outside earnings and the corresponding 95% confidence interval when
estimating equation 4.1 using unconditional quantile regression for the first to ninth decile. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the individual level. Source: German tax return data, 2010-2014 (Taxpayer Panel, TPP)
that there was no significant difference between MPs elected by direct ballot and MPs
joining via the party list before election period 18.22 In election period 18, when the new
rules became effective, the difference increases to roughly 14,000e and becomes signif-
icant at the 1% level (see column (3) of Table 4.5.5). This suggests that directly elected
MPs reduced their outside earnings more dramatically because of electoral concerns.
We observe a similar pattern for MPs inhabiting more and less safe party list ranks. Be-
fore election period 18, there is no significant difference between those, who just made
it in, and MPs, who were relatively safe (see columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.5.5). After
the reform, we observe a significant difference of about 6,000e. Both results are robust
to the lower bound measure of outside earnings (see Appendix Table 4.A.8). Taken
together, these estimates provide support for the mechanism of electoral accountability.
22 The negative, but insignificant coefficients are consistent with the introduction of the law causing minor
electoral pressure.
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Table 4.5.5: Electoral accountability
(1) (2) (3)
EP 16 EP 17 EP 18
outside earnings outside earnings outside earnings
Panel A: directly elected
Ddirect -8,501 -6,112 -13,997***
(5,653) (10,725) (5,282)
electoral district FE Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes
N 318 238 404
# politicians 318 238 404
Panel B: unsafe rank
Dunsaferank -2,790 -605 -5,907**
(2,471) (3,968) (2,360)
party-state FE Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes
N 562 578 593
# politicians 562 578 593
Notes: The outcome variable is outside earnings as described in Section 4.3.2. In Panel A, the sample
contains only MPs from districts, where both the first- and second-placed candidate entered parliament to
estimate equation 4.4. In Panel B, we use only MPs that were ranked on a party list to estimate equation
4.5. Controls refer to all variables in Tables 4.A.3 and 4.A.4. Robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01 Source: reported data EP 16 - 18
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter evaluates the effects of public disclosure rules on politicians’ outside earn-
ings. Since 2005, members of the German federal parliament are obliged to publish
their outside activities and associated earnings in a (top-coded) bracket-based report-
ing scheme on the website of the German Bundestag. First, we exploit the introduction
of this policy as exogenous variation. We can observe both federal and state MPs in
administrative tax records before and after the policy change. Thereby, we use unaf-
fected state MPs as a control group in a difference-in-difference design. Second, we
can differentiate between private and public disclosure. Since 2005, information on out-
side activities and earnings was initially privately disclosed to the administration of the
Bundestag. In 2007, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the information must
be publicly disclosed including a retroactive disclosure of the information for the years
2005 and 2006. Third, we evaluate a second reform that tightened existing rules by in-
troducing seven new income brackets in the reporting scheme causing reported outside
income to be top-coded at 250,000e instead of 7,000e. Last, given the sparse number of
demographic variables in the tax return data and the inability to merge this data with




We show that the introduction of public disclosure of outside activities and earnings
lead to an increase of 15% in outside earnings. This effect is mainly present at the top
end of the distribution and is largely driven by income from self-employment and busi-
nesses. Importantly, the effect only emerges when disclosure is public, not when it is
private. Therefore, it is unlikely that it is driven by increased tax compliance, since MPs
should have anticipated that there is a significant chance that their privately disclosed
income would become public retroactively. A more likely explanation is a change in so-
cial norms regarding outside income that made the practice more acceptable. Next, we
find that the tightening of the disclosure decrease outside income, in particular, income
from salaries and wages drop by 15.8%, while other income categories are largely unaf-
fected. Using the reported data on outside income, we provide evidence that electoral
accountability might explain the decrease in outside income. More specifically, we show
that outside income of directly elected MPs drops relative to MPs joining via party list
after the reform. Similarly, MPs with an unsafe rank on the party list decrease their out-
side income relative to MPs with a safe rank. Taken together, our results suggest that the
effect of income disclosure laws crucially depends on their exact implementation. If the
disclosed information is very limited and lacks precision such that voters cannot iden-
tify top-earners, public income disclosure can increase outside activities and earnings
and thereby, might increase the risk of conflicts of interest.
This chapter faces various limitations. Earnings in the tax data does not necessarily
reflect the time an MP has invested into his or her outside work. Activities differ in the
type of activity, the time invested, and the degree of interdependence with third parties,
all of which we cannot observe in the tax data. Therefore, we cannot make statements
about the impact on the quality of parliamentary work or direct conflicts of interest.
199
Appendix
4.A Additional Graphs and Tables
Figure 4.A.1: Example of outside earnings public disclosure on the website of the Ger-
man federal parliament
Notes: This figure is a screen shot of Peer Steinbrück’s published outside earnings in election period 18. Source: Website of the
Bundestag https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/biografien18/S/steinbrueck_peer/259022
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Table 4.A.1: Public disclosure rules and measures of reported outside earnings
election period 16 & 17 election period 18
level from to baseline lower bound from to baseline lower bound
0 0 1,000 500 500 0 1,000 500 500
1 1,000 3,500 2,250 2,250 1,000 3,500 2,250 2,250
2 3,500 7,000 5,250 5,250 3,500 7,000 5,250 5,250
3 7,000 9,500 7,000 7,000 15,000 9,500 7,000
4 15,000 30,000 9,500 7,000
5 30,000 50,000 9,500 7,000
6 50,000 75,000 9,500 7,000
7 75,000 100,000 9,500 7,000
8 100,000 150,000 9,500 7,000
9 150,000 250,000 9,500 7,000
10 250,000 9,500 7,000
Notes: All values are in Euros. Public disclosure rules for election period 16, 17 and 18 as well as our two different measures that are used
in the reported data. See Section 4.3.2 for details of the construction of the baseline and lower bound measures.
























Notes: This figure plots the distribution of average compensation for a MP in each parliament (federal, state or EU). These values
refer to the average for the years 2001 to 2014.
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Table 4.A.2: Details of election periods in federal parliament
Election Period 16 Election Period 17 Election Period 18
Election Details
election date 18.09.2005 27.09.2009 22.09.2013
duration 18.10.2005 - 27.10.2009 27.10.2009 - 22.10.2013 22.10.2013 - 24.10.2017
seats 614 622 631
Party
CDU/CSU 226 239 311
SPD 222 146 193
FDP 61 93 0
The Left 54 76 64
Greens 51 68 63
Notes: This table consists of information of each election period in federal parliament under study.
Figure 4.A.3: Reporting brackets
Notes: This figures visualizes the imputed values for each bracket. The blue dots are the average value for the respective bracket
through which we fit a polynomial (blue dotted line). We then extrapolate the polynomial function to the highest bracket and
impute the predicted value (orange dots).
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Table 4.A.3: Descriptive statistics: demographics (reported data)
variable mean sd N
female 0.34 0.47 1952
age below 50 0.39 0.49 1952
age between 50 and 60 0.37 0.48 1952
age 60 and above 0.24 0.43 1952
East Germany 0.17 0.37 1952
married 0.72 0.45 1952
# children 1.60 1.37 1952
title: doctor 0.19 0.39 1952
title: professor 0.01 0.09 1952
occupation: other 0.32 0.47 1952
occupation: lawyer 0.19 0.39 1952
occupation: economist/MBA 0.16 0.36 1952
occupation: farmer 0.03 0.16 1952
occupation: teacher 0.09 0.28 1952
occupation: civil servant 0.02 0.15 1952
occupation: doctor 0.02 0.12 1952
occupation: journalist 0.03 0.16 1952
occupation: academic 0.08 0.28 1952
occupation: self-employed 0.07 0.26 1952
party: left-wing 0.50 0.50 1952
party: CDU/CSU 0.41 0.49 1952
party: SPD 0.30 0.46 1952
party: Greens 0.10 0.30 1952
party: The Left 0.10 0.30 1952
party: FDP 0.08 0.28 1952
terms: newcomer 0.31 0.46 1952
terms: 2 - 3 0.38 0.49 1952
terms: > 3 0.30 0.46 1952
early dropout 0.03 0.18 1952
late entry 0.04 0.20 1952
Source: Reported data for election periods 16, 17 and 18.
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Table 4.A.4: Descriptive statistics: political and electoral variables (reported data)
variable mean sd N
entry: direct ballot 0.46 0.50 1952
entry: list ranking 10.55 12.31 1733
vote margin: candidate 6.78 16.51 1866
vote margin: party 12.09 10.11 1866
leadership 0.11 0.32 1952
committee chair 0.07 0.25 1952
committee: interior 0.06 0.23 1952
committee: digital 0.01 0.09 1952
committee: social 0.06 0.23 1952
committee: family 0.05 0.22 1952
committee: health 0.05 0.22 1952
committee: culture 0.03 0.18 1952
committee: human rights 0.03 0.16 1952
committee: justice 0.05 0.23 1952
committee: environment 0.05 0.22 1952
committee: election 0.03 0.16 1952
committee: development 0.03 0.18 1952
committee: exterior 0.06 0.23 1952
committee: budget 0.10 0.29 1952
committee: petition 0.04 0.19 1952
committee: accounting 0.02 0.13 1952
committee: sports 0.03 0.16 1952
committee: agriculture 0.05 0.22 1952
committee: tourism 0.03 0.16 1952
committee: traffic 0.06 0.24 1952
committee: defense 0.05 0.22 1952
committee: economics 0.06 0.24 1952
committee: science 0.05 0.22 1952
committee: EU 0.05 0.22 1952
Source: Reported data for election periods 16, 17 and 18.
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Table 4.A.5: Composition of outside activities per MP (reported data)
EP 16 EP 17 EP 18 Total
N in % N in % N in % N in %
remunerated activity 195 31.76 219 35.21 195 30.90 609 32.62
type of activity
law 61 9.93 65 10.45 58 9.19 184 9.86
speech 52 8.57 55 8.84 45 7.13 152 8.14
management and consulting 61 9.93 70 11.25 57 9.03 188 10.07
other 37 6.03 42 6.75 38 6.02 117 6.27
functions in enterprises 240 39.09 223 35.85 291 46.12 754 40.39
type of function
public office 0 0 4 0.64 11 1.74 15 0.80
consult 94 15.31 76 12.22 87 13.79 257 13.77
control 144 23.45 144 23.15 197 31.22 197 25.98
lead 25 4.07 24 3.86 32 5.07 81 4.34
type of membership
regular member 216 35.18 201 32.32 269 42.63 686 36.74
chairman 33 5.37 34 5.47 42 6.66 109 5.84
functions in public corporations 359 58.47 357 57.40 385 61.01 1,001 58.97
type of function
public office 226 36.81 247 39.71 264 41.84 737 39.48
consult 95 15.47 90 14.47 89 14.10 274 14.68
control 70 11.40 71 11.41 104 16.48 245 13.12
lead 35 5.70 39 6.27 31 4.91 105 5.62
type of membership
regular member 339 55.21 341 54.82 372 58.95 372 56.35
chairman 37 6.03 37 5.95 35 5.55 109 5.84
functions in clubs 437 71.17 469 75.40 446 70.68 1,352 72.42
shareholdings in private corporations 69 11.24 76 12.22 67 10.62 212 11.36
Total # MPs 614 622 631
Notes: This table provides an overview about the composition of outside activities per MP, meaning how many MPs pursue a certain activity.
The percentages define the share of MPs who persue a certain activity. For example, 32.62% of all MPs report a remunerated activity, while
58.97% of all MPs hold a function in a club. Activities are reported such that they belong to one of the following categories: remunerated
activity, functions in enterprises, functions in public corporations, functions in clubs or shareholdings in private corporations. We broadly
categorize remunerated activities into (a) law (e.g. lawyer, judge), (b) speech (e.g. speech, publishing books), (c) management and consulting
(e.g. business consultant, notary, manager) and (d) other (e.g. farmer, doctor). We classify the type of function into (a) public office (e.g. position
in local politics/ church), (b) consult (e.g. advisory board), (c) control (e.g. supervisory board) and (d) lead (e.g. committee, management board,
board of trustees). For 1.44% of all remunerated activities and for 0.32% of all functions in enterprises, no information about the type of activity
is available. Functions in clubs are often voluntary work. The information ‘voluntary’ is optional and added in more than 85% of all functions
in clubs. In some cases, the name of clients are not revealed due to existence of lawyer-client-confidentiality. We ignore the information of
occupational activities pre-dating membership (e.g. lawyer). Shareholdings in private corporations need to be reported if a MP holds more
than 25%.
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Table 4.A.6: Distribution of levels and frequency by activity (reported data)
EP 16 EP 17 EP 18 Total
N in % N in % N in % N in %
Level
0 1314 48 1395 48 1745 54 4454 50
1 696 26 780 27 721 22 2197 25
2 206 8 218 8 226 7 650 7
3 and higher 497 18 512 18 519 18 1528 18
3 497 18 512 18 235 7 1244 14
4 115 4 115 1
5 52 2 52 1
6 31 1 31 0
7 18 1 18 0
8 23 1 23 0
9 21 1 21 0
10 24 1 24 0
Frequency
once 2559 94 2721 94 3032 94 8312 94
yearly 67 2 59 2 53 2 179 2
monthly 86 3 126 4 129 4 341 4
Notes: Levels and frequencies are reported for the following categories of activities: remunerated ac-
tivities, functions in enterprises, functions in public corporations and functions in clubs. For functions
in clubs, MPs can optionally indicate whether is is voluntary work or not. Source: Reported Data, own
calculations.
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Notes: This graphs displays the average outside earnings as defined in Section 4.3.2 for each committee in the German federal
parliament. Source: Reported Data EP 16 - 18
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Table 4.A.7: Average number of MPs in federal and state parliaments
number of MPs election years
Treatment Group 722
Federal Parliament 623 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013
Control Group 776
Baden Württemberg 134 2001, 2006, 2011
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 71 2002, 2006, 2011
North Rhine Westphalia 210 2005, 2010, 2012
Rhineland-Palatinate 101 2001, 2006, 2011
Schleswig-Holstein 83 2005, 2009, 2012
Saarland 51 2004, 2009, 2012
Saxony 126 2004, 2009, 2014
Control Group (excluded in 2013 & 2014) 187
Bavaria 187 2003, 2008, 2013
Control Group (excluded in 2014) 557
Hessia 112 2003, 2008, 2013
Lower Saxony 163 2003, 2009, 2013
Brandenburg 88 2004, 2009, 2014
Saxony-Anhalt 106 2002, 2006, 2011
Thuringia 88 2004, 2009, 2014
Part-time parliament (excluded in all years) 352
Berlin 146 2001, 2006, 2011
Bremen 85 2003, 2007, 2011
Hamburg 121 2001, 2004, 2008, 2011
Notes: This table consists of information of each parliament under study. The number denotes the average number of MPs in each
parliament for the years 2001 to 2014. Germany consists of 16 states (Länder). We entirely exclude Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg
from our analysis (part-time Parliament (Feierabendparliament)). Bavaria, Hessen, Lower Saxony, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and
Thuringia introduced public disclosure rules in 2013/2014 and are excluded from our sample for these years.
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Table 4.A.8: Tightening of the disclosure law: channels (lower bound)
(1) (2) (3)
EP 16 EP 17 EP 18
outside earnings outside earnings outside earnings
Panel A: directly elected
Ddirect -7,870* -5,108 -12,328***
(4,697) (8,512) (4,488)
electoral district FE Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes
N 318 238 404
# politicians 318 238 404
Panel B: unsafe party rank
Dunsaferank -2,466 -417 -4,996**
(2,130) (3,473) (2,044)
party-state FE Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes
N 562 578 593
# politicians 562 578 593
Notes: The outcome variable is outside earnings as described in Section 4.3.2. In Panel A, the sample contains
only MPs from districts, where both the first- and second-placed candidate entered parliament to estimate
equation 4.4. In Panel B, we use only MPs that were ranked on a party list to estimate equation 4.5. Controls
refer to all variables in Tables 4.A.3 and 4.A.4. Robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source:
reported data EP 16 - 18
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